WHAT FACTORS PROMOTE OR INHIBIT ALTRUISM IN ORGANISATIONS: A CASE STUDY IN HEALTHCARE by Peters, Samantha
        
University of Bath
PHD









If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact:
openaccess@bath.ac.uk
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 21. Oct. 2021
 1 
   
WHAT FACTORS PROMOTE OR INHIBIT ALTRUISM IN 
ORGANISATIONS: A CASE STUDY IN HEALTHCARE 
 
Samantha Peters 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Bath 










Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this document rests with the author 
and copyright of any previously published materials include may rest with third 
parties. A copy of this document has been supplied on the condition that anyone 
who consults it understands that they must not copy it or use material from it 
except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author or other copyright 
owners, as applicable. 
 
 
This thesis may be made available for consultation with the University Library and 
may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation. 
  
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
SECTION I .................................................................................. 5 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................... 6 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................ 7 
1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 8 
 
SECTION II ..................................................................................... 12 
 
2 CHAPTER 2: ALTRUISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL CONTEXT ........... 13 
3 CHAPTER 3: ALTRUISM AND THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT . 37 
 
SECTION III .................................................................................... 86 
 
4 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY .................................................... 87 
 
SECTION IV ................................................................................. 106 
 
5 CHAPTER 5: AN EMOTIONALLY NOISY ORGANISATION .......... 109 
6 CHAPTER 6: A CLIMATE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN MEMBERS .... 125 
7 CHAPTER 7: A DEMANDING ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT ....... 143 
8 CHAPTER 8: ORGANISATIONAL UNRESPONSIVENESS ............. 167 
 
SECTION V .................................................................................. 198 
 
9 CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION ....................................................... 199 
 
SECTION VI ................................................................................. 239 
 
10 INQUIRY REPORTS ................................................................. 240 
11 REFERENCES .......................................................................... 241 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Emergent Altruistic Practices .......................................................................73 
Table 2: Data Coding Questions ..............................................................................101 
Table 3: Rationalising Unhelpfulness.......................................................................102 
Table 4: Sources of Organisational Emotional Noise ..............................................123 
Table 5: Sources of Organisational Member Conflict ..............................................141 
Table 6: Helping Resources in High-Strain-Low-Support Context ...........................166 
Table 7: Systemic Unresponsiveness .......................................................................186 
Table 8: Summary of User to User Altruism ............................................................202 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Altruism and the Individual ........................................................................19 
Figure 2: Organisational Context and Altruism .........................................................37 
Figure 3: Organisational Relationships and Altruism ................................................38 
Figure 4: Organisational Cultural Fabric and Altruism ..............................................51 
Figure 5: Activity Architecture and Altruism .............................................................64 
Figure 6: Organisational Practices and Altruism .......................................................72 
Figure 7: Organisational Altruism Constructs ............................................................83 
Figure 8: Emerging Promotional Practices ................................................................84 
Figure 9: Proposed Inhibitory Practices .....................................................................84 
Figure 10: Organisational Narratives .......................................................................107 
Figure 11: Emotional Noise in the Hospital .............................................................109 
Figure 12: Member Conflict in the Hospital ............................................................125 
Figure 13: Demanding Context in the Hospital .......................................................143 
Figure 14: The Effect of Inhibitory Practices ...........................................................167 
Figure 15: Organisational Inattentiveness in Action ...............................................169 
Figure 16: Organisational Indifference in Action .....................................................178 
Figure 17: Organisational Avoidance in Action .......................................................182 
Figure 18: Organisational User Deterrence in Action ..............................................190 
Figure 19: Practices which Inhibit Altruism .............................................................195 
Figure 20: A Model of the Organisational Inhibition of Altruism ............................228 
Figure 21: Agent Versus User Altruism Comparison ...............................................230 






ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................. 6 
 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................... 7 
 
1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................... 8 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 8 
1.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES ............ 9 






I would like to thank those instrumental in helping me with this research. I would like 
to thank my supervisors Professor Yiannis Gabriel for his thought-provoking 
questions and challenges and Dr Andrea Herepath for her guidance and 
encouragement without which I simply would not have reached the end, as well as 
Professor Veronica Hope-Hailey for inspiring my entry into academia. I would like to 
thank my parents, Stan and Brenda, for supporting me through all my studies. I 
would also like to record my appreciation for colleagues, Caroline Clipson, Dominic 
O’Toole, Gareth Hadley, Safia Iman, Harry Cayton, Ros Searle and Douglas Bilton. 
Discussions with them about healthcare systems, professional ethics and theories of 
human nature all stimulated the research process. Thanks must also go to Lorna 
Fitzsimons and Baroness Margaret McDonagh, whose Top Flight leadership 
programme galvanised much of my thinking. Staff, speakers and colleagues on the 
programme were a huge support. Finally, I would like to thank Sara Allen, who held 






The purpose of this thesis is to understand how altruism is shaped by organisational 
contexts and conditions. It takes the form of an in-depth case study of a hospital 
criticised in national inquiries for a lack of kindness and compassion towards 
patients. The literature indicated that altruism inside organisations would be 
affected by an organisation’s internal relationships, cultural fabric, and activity 
architecture, as well as its members’ personal helping resources and their 
behavioural practices. However, there was a significant gap in the literature for a 
model of how organisational contexts undermine altruism and encourage practices 
which inhibit it. 
 
The findings from this study indicate that an organisational context will be 
unconducive to altruism when its emotional terrain is noisy, its culture or climate is 
threatening or uncertain, its relationships are characterised by friction, its users are 
diminished or denigrated and the balance between their helping needs and 
organisational helping resources is misaligned. Such factors can reduce 
organisational agents’ personal resources with which to help users. In this case, four 
un-altruistic practices emerged out of such a context and the organisational 
conditions within it. These were agents’ inattentiveness or indifference towards 
users, their avoidance of users, or their more active deterrence of users from seeking 
help. Combined, this reduced the extent to which organisational agents noticed, 
appreciated or assessed organisational users’ welfare or need for help. Such 
practices are likely to distort professional practice and undermine good patient care 
as well as inhibit altruism. 
 
The study contributes a new model to the literature setting out how these 
unconducive organisational conditions, reduced agent helping resources and un-
altruistic practices might combine to erode the internal perception of user need and 
inhibit altruism. Further research is needed to test the validity of the proposed model 
and confirm the un-altruistic practices nested within it.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand how organisations shape the altruistic 
emotions, actions or behaviours of their members. The author is interested in why 
people help each other. Why do we stop and perform an act of kindness one day but 
pass on by the next? The work takes the form of an in-depth study of a well-known 
case in healthcare. The case is that of Mid Staffordshire (Mid Staffs) Hospital, which 
was the subject of two major public inquiries into its treatment and care of patients 
(between 2005 and 2009). These inquiries identified a lack of kindness, compassion 
or concern for the welfare of patients. The work is intended to enhance 
understanding of how altruism operates in organisational settings and generate 
knowledge about which organisational factors promote or inhibit it by an exploration 
of this particular case.  
 
Questions about why we do (or do not) help each other have preoccupied 
philosophers and theologians for millennia. The concept of ‘a concern for the welfare 
of others’ has a long-standing tradition in religion and philosophy (Berchman, 2005; 
Chilton, 2005; Davis, 2005; Habito, 2005; Homerin, 2005; Neusner and Avery-Peck, 
2005). However, ‘altruism’, the term which delineates the academic space within 
which such concerns are studied, was coined relatively recently by sociologist August 
Comte (in his 1851 Systeme de Politique Positive) from the Latin ‘alter’ and ‘u’ 
meaning literally ‘to this other’ (Scott and Seglow, 2007). Since then it has become a 
classic sociological concept, operating as an antithesis to egoism (Bykov, 2017). At 
its simplest, altruism is indeed a concern for the welfare of others.  
 
Man is a social animal whose ecological success is founded on a collection of highly 
developed social instincts, such as trust and co-operation (Ridley, 1996). That success 
is made possible by collective structures such as groups, organisations and societies. 
So, altruism must be considered in the context of a complex panoply of organisations 
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which have leverage over ‘when’, ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ we help each other. In 
that context, this work is intended to generate insight into the organisational aspects 
of altruism. Its main theoretical concern is how altruistic actions are shaped by 
organisational factors. It aims to answer the question of what factors promote or 
inhibit altruistic behaviour in organisational settings. The author is especially 
interested in situations where we would expect altruism to be present but perceive 
it to be absent. The academic value of this research will lie in an investigation of the 
less well-explored organisational aspects of altruism. Its practical value will lie in 
helping managers understand the role of altruism in organisational life. The intention 
is to expand existing theory on such matters. 
 
1.2 Ethical Considerations and Personal Perspectives 
 
The case being studied is extremely well-known. It resulted in active local and 
national campaigning by relatives of those treated at the hospital. It generated 
significant debate in the media and parliament, precipitated two national inquiries 
and prompted a number of related investigations by regulators and other agencies. 
The case provoked (and still provokes) strong views in the healthcare sector. Those 
involved are likely to feel strong emotions about the case and hold firm views about 
its causes or others involved. The main ethical considerations concern how 
individuals involved in such a charged (and contested) case are identified and data 
arising out of it is discussed. Patients died at the hospital. In these circumstances, it 
is important to write about such matters with compassion and show appropriate 
consideration for those involved, whilst maintaining the spirit of sceptical inquiry and 
critical challenge necessary to develop a full and balanced understanding of the case.  
 
The approach a researcher adopts is inevitably shaped by their own values; values 
which they must manage in order to avoid undermining the credibility of their 
research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). It is hard for human beings to divorce 
themselves from events. Values will, at the very least, affect how researchers 
interpret the events they are studying, which means that this research is likely to be 
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constrained by the author’s own values. These were actually the impetus for this 
topic. As a child, the author was rescued by a bystander after falling off the wharf at 
high tide. Growing up in a small seaside town, altruism was highly visible, with 
lifeboat crew going out in winter storms at considerable danger to themselves and 
(indirectly) to their families. This author vividly remembers the night of the Penlee 
Lifeboat Disaster when the Solmon Browne went down with the loss of its entire 
crew. Care must be taken to prevent such life experiences from skewering the study.  
 
1.3 Document Structure 
 
This thesis is organised in five sections. Section I includes acknowledgements, an 
abstract and this introductory chapter. Section II sets out the Literature Review on 
altruism as a phenomenon. It has two chapters. The first of these, Chapter 2, 
explores the concept of altruism as an individual phenomenon. It indicates that an 
individual’s personal, cognitive and affective traits might all have a bearing on their 
altruistic or helping behaviour inside organisations. The second of these, Chapter 3, 
explores the literature on altruism inside organisations. It indicates that the 
relationships inside an organisation, as well as its culture and arrangements for 
meeting demand, are likely to have a bearing on altruism. It indicates that altruism 
is likely to be promoted by practices of noticing, appreciating and assessing others’ 
needs. However, it also delineates a gap in the literature for a model of how altruism 
is inhibited and what, if any, un-altruistic practices might be involved in such a 
process.  
 
Section III sets out the methodology for the study. It has one chapter, Chapter 4. In 
this, the rationale for adopting a single case study in relation to the author’s chosen 
questions is explained, as are pertinent methodological issues arising from that 
choice. In this chapter, the data sources are identified, the approach to analysis is 
set out and the results of a pilot study are summarised. The author’s epistemological 
views and ontological perspective are also shared. An explanation of why this 
particular case is a suitable site for exploring the study’s questions is also included. 
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Section IV sets out the findings. These are organised to focus on four aspects of the 
case which are most relevant to altruism as an organisational construct. These four 
aspects are a high level of emotional noise within the organisation (set out in Chapter 
5), extensive conflict between its members (in Chapter 6), a demanding internal 
operational context (in Chapter 7) and un-altruistic practices which emerge as a 
result (in Chapter 8). Chapter 5 on emotional noise explores the distress of both 
organisational agents and users. Chapter 6 on conflict also includes an exploration 
of the diminishment of organisational users. Chapter 7 on demanding context 
explores the high strain on organisational agents as well as the low level of support 
to meet it. The four un-altruistic practices covered in Chapter 8 are inattentiveness, 
indifference, avoidance and deterrence.  
 
Section V discusses these findings. It has one chapter, Chapter 9. This explores how 
the various factors identified in the findings, namely organisational conditions, 
reduced agent helping resource and un-altruistic practices may come together to 
suppress the visibility of user need and generate a high level un-noticing, which 
consequently inhibits altruism. The contrasting example of users is presented in this 
chapter to explain how altruism is promoted. This chapter also sets out the main 
contribution of the study, which is the construction of a model of the organisational 
inhibition of altruism. The research agenda for this model, and any limitations 
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2 CHAPTER 2: ALTRUISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 An Introduction to Altruism 
 
Altruism is a simple notion which has generated a considerable body of research. 
Despite its apparent simplicity, there are some significant challenges associated with 
studying it. One problem is ambiguity. Altruism may be a simple concept, but it is not 
necessarily a conceptually clean one. Analysis of it can be impaired by the 
inconsistent or contradictory use of overlapping terms and concepts in the literature. 
The main constructs, which are altruism, prosocial behaviour, organisational 
citizenship and the more colloquial term kindness, are often used interchangeably 
or indistinguishably. Associated concepts include those which denote other-
orientated emotions, such as pity, compassion, sympathy, empathy, generosity and 
benevolence, or other-orientated actions, such as giving, sharing, helping or 
comforting (McGuire, 1994; Collett and Morrissey, 2007; Phillips and Taylor, 2009; 
Wittek and Bekkers, 2015).  
 
In its simplest form, altruism is a concern for the welfare of others. August Comte, 
who coined the term (in his 1851 Systeme de Politique Positive) developed it from 
the Latin ‘alter’ and ‘u’ meaning literally ‘to this other’ (Scott and Seglow, 2007). 
Some theorists argue that altruism must benefit the ‘recipient’ as an end in and of 
itself in order to distinguish it from other forms of prosocial behaviour which can be 
egoistically (as well as altruistically) motivated (Bierhoff, 2008). Framed thus, 
altruism is defined as ‘prosocial behaviour that has the ultimate goal of benefiting 
another person’ (Bierhoff, 2008, p.179). Other theorists disagree, arguing that 
egoistic impulses which stimulate prosocial action do not necessarily undermine 
simultaneously occurring altruistic ones (Batson, 1987). This is an important 
distinction for a workplace environment where the boundaries between meeting the 
requirements of one’s role and behaving prosocially may be blurred or overlap.  
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Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of altruism is that provided by Monroe, 
who describes it as: 
 
‘behavior intended to benefit another, even when doing so may risk or entail 
some sacrifice to the welfare of the actor. There are several critical points in 
this definition. First, altruism must entail action. It cannot merely be good 
intentions or well-meaning thoughts. Second, the goal of the act must be 
furthering the welfare of another. If another's welfare is treated as an 
unintended or a secondary consequence of behaviour designed primarily to 
further one's own welfare, the act is not altruistic. Third, intentions count 
more than consequences. If I try to do something nice for you, and it ends 
up badly or with long-term negative consequences for you, this does not 
diminish the altruism of my initial action. Fourth, the act must carry some 
possibility of diminution to my welfare.’ (Monroe, 1994, p.862-3). 
 
This definition makes the inter-active and bi-directional nature of altruism clear. It 
shows: that it requires action by someone (the giver or helper); that it must 
intentionally aid someone (the beneficiary or recipient); that the giver’s intention is 
potentially more important than the outcome (the altruistic impulse or motivation); 
and that the giver must experience (or be exposed to) potential losses (a cost for 
helping). In line with this definition, most theories include the intentions which 
motivate people’s actions, as well as the potential consequences for those being 
helped and the potential costs or rewards for those helping them (Dovidio, 1984). 
The common theme which unifies all such definitions is potentially costly other-
orientated action in the face of need.  
 
Another problem associated with studying altruism is the impact of the disciplinary 
matrix within with it is being studied: those symbolic generalizations, beliefs, values 
and exemplars which blinker scientific communities (Kuhn, 1996). Altruism’s 
theoretical conceptualisation has been diversely shaped by the contradictory 
assumptions about human nature associated with different disciplines (Monroe, 
1994; West, Griffin and Gardner, 2006; Clavien and Chapuisat, 2013). The 
development of a rounded and integrated understanding of it is impeded by this. 
Problematically, since much of the literature focusses on people’s psychology, most 
of the models sit within the individual domain rather than the organisational one. 
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Unhelpfully, some important disciplines have neglected the subject. Altruism is 
substantially missing from management literature (Haynes, Josefy and Hitt, 2015). 
Its organisational aspects are underexplored, with limited attention paid to 
organisations themselves as structural factors underpinning it (Healy, 2004; Piliavin, 
2009). Ironically, although altruism evolved out of sociological perspectives, 
sociologists have neglected the concept since the mid 20th century, creating a need 
to return to the subject through such lenses (Bykov, 2017).  
 
Despite these limitations, some useful attempts to classify altruistic behaviour in 
organisational settings have emerged. Brief and Motowidlo (1986) developed a 
typology of 13 such behaviours which vary according to: whether they are directed 
at the organisation, its agents or customers; whether they are functional or 
dysfunctional in their impact on organisational effectiveness; and whether they are 
prescribed by organisational roles (or not). They define prosocial organisational 
behaviour as being: 
 
‘…performed by a member of an organization,…directed toward an 
individual, group, or organization with whom he or she interacts while 
carrying out his or her organizational role, and…performed with the 
intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, group, or organization 
toward which it is directed.’ (Brief and Motowidlo 1986, p.711). 
 
By way of some examples, they explain that staff can provide services consistently 
or inconsistently in order to help users. Such variation could be detrimental or 
advantageous to the organisation. Alternatively, staff might provide additional 
personal services to colleagues, such as helping them with family matters. The 
functionality or dysfunctionality of such actions would, according to their typology, 
depend on the extent to which they erode capacity for prescribed or in-role 
activities. A potentially more costly action for staff which they identify is objecting to 
‘improper’ organisational directives. In healthcare, that could mean objecting to 
targets which perversely affect patient care. 
 
In one of the few attempts to theorise altruism as a purely organisational concept, 
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Szulc (2019) extends this typology further. Like Brief and Motowidlo (1986), Szulc 
identifies how altruism may be directed at colleagues, customers or the organisation 
itself (as stakeholders), may be directed to work-related or non-work related matters 
and be functional or dysfunctional in its effects. However, the model is extended to 
encompass the possibility that such behaviour may be characterised by deep or 
causal effort, be planned or spontaneous and arise from proactive or reactive 
initiative. The model is founded on the assumption that ‘organisational altruism is 
benefitting a stakeholder as an end in and of itself’, operating without the 
requirement for reciprocity (Szulc, 2019, p.51). However, although many definitions 
of altruism exclude reciprocity in this way, it is not without its advocates as a force 
for altruism (Trivers, 1971; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr, Fischbascher and Gächter, 
2002; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006).  
 
In healthcare, altruism towards patients can be seen as an integral part of 
interpersonal professionalism (Van de Camp, Vernooj-Dassen, Grol and Bottema, 
2004). Healthcare staff are seen to assume a duty of ‘specific beneficence’ towards 
patients and promote their welfare on that basis (Faust, 2009). However, even if one 
argues that much of their prosocial activity should (or does) fall within the 
boundaries of their role-related obligations or professional expectations towards 
clients, they can still go above and beyond their duties and experience costly loses 
for doing so (Montada and Bierhoff, 1991). There is evidence that they undertake 
extra role activity, work beyond contracted hours and go the ‘extra mile’ in 
professional matters (Davidoff, 2002). Altruism can also encourage approaches 
amongst medical or professional staff that help meet an organisation’s common or 
overarching goals (Chahal and Mehta, 2010). However, altruism may also spur them 
to take actions which are personally threatening to their sense of self, their relations 
with peers or even the organisation itself. They may, for example, step outside of 
proscribed policies or procedures to provide a good service for their patients (Hyde, 
Harris and Boaden, 2013) or they might altruistically report mistakes and errors 
(Hung, Lee, Liang and Chu, 2016). The costliness of such choices is what makes them 
altruistic.  
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According to Feather and colleagues, hospital settings can be seen as sites which 
incorporate an extremely wide range of potentially prosocial actions (Feather, 
McGillis Hall, Trbovich and Baker, 2018). They consider working overtime, relieving 
others who need breaks or helping out with difficult patients and demanding 
obligations as altruistic. Alongside that, they identify a set of associated prosocial 
actions which include: conscientiously adhering to internal policies and procedures 
whilst avoiding short-cuts or workarounds; being a good sport, for example adopting 
welcoming stances, supporting new staff or eschewing negative attitudes; pursuing 
civically minded behaviours, such as joining in rounds, huddles or meetings; and 
behaving courteously. In the latter they encompass reporting errors or near misses 
and providing safe patient hand-offs which are more like obligations than courtesies.  
 
Drawing on such expositions of healthcare professionals’ altruistic or prosocial 
behaviour, one might conceptualise them as incorporating: extra-role activities, that 
is altruistic or prosocial actions not associated with one’s job; discretionary in-role 
activities, that is additional action or effort, which might be altruistic by virtue of its 
scale and impact; or ultra-role activities for which one might be penalised by virtue 
of their non-conformity to the expectations of one’s role amongst one’s peers. 
Picking up on the point about costly choices, the actions Feather and colleagues 
deem prosocial could become altruistic under certain conditions. Where actions 
generate a significant personal cost for those undertaking them, yet they still choose 
to act, such behaviour could be considered altruistic. By way of example, if an 
employee supported a new staff member despite feeling extremely tired or highly 
stressed, it would enhance their peer’s welfare whilst diminishing their own. It could 
be considered altruistic because of the physical or emotional costs involved. The 
extent to which it is altruistic, however, might also be affected by the intentions as 
well as the costs. If it was done to secure help in return, or enhance one’s reputation, 
it would not be altruistic. If it was done purely to help a peer, it would be. 
 
Despite the above two typologies, this field still lacks a comprehensive multi-
disciplinary depiction of how altruism operates inside organisations which reconciles 
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the individual, contextual, social or relational influences identified in the general 
literature on the subject. For this reason, the study will pursue a multi-level, 
multidisciplinary approach, embracing the varied (and conflicting) disciplines in the 
literature. A working definition of organisational altruism will be: 
 
Actions (a) carried out by an organisation’s members (b) intended to 
enhance the welfare of its agents or users (c) carrying the potential to 
diminish the welfare of those undertaking them, which (d) may be adopted 
as common practice and (e) may (or may not) be supported by internal 
contexts or conditions.  
 
In this definition, agents are those responsible for operating organisations, their 
leaders, managers, staff and so on. Users are those depending on their services 
directly (their clients, customers, etc) or indirectly (i.e. friends, colleagues or relatives 
of users). The term members is used to denote both. This literature review is 
structured into two chapters. The rest of this chapter will briefly explore the 
individual traits or qualities which might influence organisational members’ 
intentions or actions to address the welfare of another. These are relevant in so far 
as an organisation might promote or inhibit altruism by stimulating or suppressing 
such characteristics amongst its agents as a group. That is conceptualised as an 
organisation’s effect on the collective internal quality or quantity of agents’ helping 
capacity or resource. The second chapter in this section considers which 
organisational conditions might promote or inhibit altruism and what organisational 
or group-level practices might emerge as a result. 
 
2.2 Altruism and the Individual  
 
Altruism is carried out by individuals. As a human force, it can be generated, shaped 
or influenced by a wide range of individual personal traits, characteristics or qualities 
(Krebs, 1970; Dovidio, 1984; Piliavin and Charng, 1990; Batson and Shaw, 1991; 
Batson, Shaw and Slingsby, 1991; Eisenberg, Valiente and Champion, 2004; Penner, 
Dovidio, Piliavin and Schroeder, 2005; Scott and Seglow, 2007; Feigin, Owens and 
Goodyear-Smith, 2014). Put simply, it may be promoted or inhibited by ‘who you 
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are’ or ‘how you feel’ (Bierhoff, 2008, p.185). The rest of this chapter sets out those 
aspects which might influence the altruism of an organisation’s members 
individually (see Figure 1). In particular, it will explore the personal traits or qualities 
which people bring to an organisation that might be strengthened or weakened by 
internal contextual influences to promote or inhibit altruism. 
 




2.2.1 Personal Traits and Altruism 
 
Some theorists argue that distinct and identifiable character traits promote altruistic 
or prosocial behaviour. Rushton, for example, identifies altruistic personalities as 
those with higher standards, moral modes of thinking or reasoning, empathy for 
others and an ability to see the world from their perspective (Rushton 1981, p.264). 
By way of an historical example, drawing on extensive interviews with Holocaust 
rescuers, Oliner and Oliner (1988) identify certain personalities, those characterised 
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to act altruistically (Oliner and Oliner, 1988).1 Such an association has been 
confirmed in studies of moral obligation (Einolf, 2010). There is also some evidence 
that altruistic tendencies can be predicted, our peers know which of us are more 
likely to act altruistically (Rushton, Chrisjohn and Fekken 1981; Rushton 1981). 
However, proof of an altruistic personality per se is difficult to establish, as studies 
are methodologically unreliable and correlations with prosocial behaviour remain 
low (Krebs, 1970; Batson and Powell, 2003).  
 
Despite this problem, a small number of specific personal traits emerge as 
significant. It appears our responses to others’ suffering depends on how equipped 
we feel to respond, that is how we appraise our resources to help them or perceive 
our ability to cope with their needs (Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas, 2010). There 
is a body of evidence showing that those who see themselves as more competent, 
capable or successful are more inclined to act prosocially (Berkowitz and Connor, 
1966; Krebs, 1970; Isen 1970; Isen and Levin, 1972; Moore, Underwood and 
Rozenham, 1973; Piliavin and Charng, 1990; Penner et al., 2005). Personal agency, 
that is a sense of power to influence events, is also notably evident amongst the 
Oliners’ altruists (Oliner and Oliner, 1988). This feature is important in care related 
contexts. For example, a study of NHS clinical (and non-clinical) staff working in 
varied settings, showed that employees’ personal characteristics, their attitudes or 
abilities, were the most common reason given for acting prosocially (Hyde et al., 
2013). Along similar lines, another study showed that nurses who see themselves as 
more efficacious behave more altruistically and deliver a higher quality of service 
(Lee, 2001). Conversely, caring professionals who evaluate themselves negatively 
tend to withdraw from others, experience negative emotions (such as fear) and even 
avoid service users to escape the stimulation of such states (Gibson, 2014). The 
importance of this for altruism as an organisational construct, is the extent to which 
internal environments foster feelings of efficacy or inefficacy amongst their staff, 
because it is an important helping resource.   
 
 
1 Conversely, un-altruistic constrictive personalities had traits of dissociation, detachment and exclusiveness. 
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Evidence also suggests that conscientious or agreeable qualities play a role in 
promoting prosocial actions inside organisations (Organ and Ryan, 1995; Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, Paine and Bachrach, 2000; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff and Blume, 
2009; Chiaburu, Berry, Li and Gardner, 2011; Podsakoff, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Maynes and Spoelma, 2014). By way of example, studies show that conscientious 
and agreeable managers are more likely to value altruism, be motivated to act 
altruistically and respond to customers (Furnham, Treglown, Hyde and Trickey, 
2016). The importance of such factors is also evident in studies of anti-sociality. In a 
meta-analytic review of the field, Jones, Lynam and Miller (2011) found that altruism 
had one of the largest negative relationships to antisocial behaviour or aggression. 
Such an effect is evident amongst public sector staff where altruistic orientations 
reduce aggression towards users (Mallia, Lazuras, Violani and Lucidi, 2015; Shi and 
Zhang, 2017). Considering such factors in healthcare settings, agreeableness might 
stimulate staff to provide additional emotional support to patients, while 
conscientiousness might stimulate them to point out mistakes or errors which cause 
harm. Taking the latter point on board, the importance of strong personal 
convictions or non-conformity are also indicated as an important requirement for 
morally rebellious acts of altruism such as rule breaking or whistleblowing (Dozier 
and Miceli, 1985; Monin, Sawyer and Marquez, 2008; Ambrose, Taylor and Hess, 
2015; O’Connor and Monin, 2016).  
 
Transposing individual traits which appear to promote altruism into an 
organisational context raises questions about how internal contexts or workplace 
conditions nurture or quell such qualities amongst their members. For those with 
strong personalities, the internal organisational context may have less influence on 
how they perceive situations (Dalal, Meyer, Bradshaw, Green, Kelly and Zhu , 2015). 
Conversely, personal characteristics may be undermined where an organisational 
context exerts a strong countervailing influence (Meyer and Dalal, 2009). The 
strength of such contexts will be influenced by the clarity and consistency of 
situational cues, the freedoms or constraints in place, and the likelihood of 
consequences (Meyer, Dalal and Hermida, 2010, p.125). While studies have shown 
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a high correlation between personality variables and altruism when such contextual 
constraints cannot be evaded, no significance remains when they can be avoided 
(Batson, Bolen, Cross and Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer 
and Speer, 1991; Bierhoff and Rohmann, 2004).  
 
What this says about organisations is that their ability to reinforce, or override, any 
personal inclination for altruism will depend on the extent to which their 
constrictions can be evaded and the extent to which the personal qualities of their 
staff are strongly or weakly manifested. So, while there is sufficient evidence to 
indicate that altruism as an organisational construct needs to concede a role for 
individual traits and qualities, it should mainly focus on the organisational context’s 
stimulation or suppression of those traits amongst its members which promote or 
inhibit altruism, as this will affect the level of internal helping resource. 
 
2.2.2 Cognitive Traits and Altruism 
  
Morals, values or beliefs are another important influence on individual altruism 
(Hauser, 2006; Haidt, 2007; Monroe, Martin and Ghosh, 2009; Van Veelen; 2009; 
Tomasello and Vaish, 2013). Krebs and Van Hesteren argue that altruism derives 
from systematic moral reasoning, with our prosociality determined by our level of 
moral development along a continuum ranging from complete egoism to absolute 
self-sacrifice (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994). However, linking altruism to morality 
has proven difficult, and while there is empirical evidence to support a relationship 
between moral reasoning and moral action, there is disagreement regarding the 
existence of specific associations with altruism itself (Blasi, 1980; Clavien and 
Chapuisat 2013, De Posada and Vargas-Trujillo, 2015). So, morality is likely to be a 
tricky concept to incorporate into any organisational model of altruism. Nonetheless, 
it appears worth pursuing. 
 
Alternatively, some theorists have proposed more sequential moral decision-making 
processes to explain altruism. Schwartz, for example, proposes a role for 
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situationally specific personal norms or beliefs about helping which promote it. 
These norms or beliefs arise from internalised values and direct our altruism towards 
others in line with our expectations of our self and our perception of any 
responsibilities towards others as a result (Schwartz, 1973). Empirical evidence 
supports such a theory (Schwartz and Howard, 1981). The common point advocated 
by such approaches is that our altruism is rooted in specific values or beliefs which 
create expectations of our responsibility for altruism. The relevance of this to 
organisational contexts is that members may bring certain personal views about 
their responsibilities towards others with them, which might affect how they see 
their responsibilities towards others inside the organisational context. For altruism 
as an organisational construct, any conflict between these two moral drivers, that is 
personal responsibilities and organisational responsibilities, would be important.  
 
Other theorists give even more primacy to our views or beliefs about those who need 
aid in their attempts to explain altruism. Drawing on detailed studies of Holocaust 
rescuers, Kirsten Monroe identified a unique view of others amongst altruists, a 
perspective in which they see people as connected by a common humanity, believe 
that everyone has value, with no one group better than another, and consider 
people as just people (neither good nor bad) (Monroe, 1996). What is especially 
noticeable amongst those with this view is not simply their disregard for costs, but 
their lack of a cost-reward matrix altogether in the face of need (Monroe, Barton and 
Klingemann, 1990). Monroe’s theory extends the ethical values identified by the 
Oliners in the same very extreme context (Oliner and Oliner, 1988). However, it is 
difficult to validate.2 By way of a counterpoint, one well-evidenced other-orientated 
view is Melvin Lerner’s just-world-hypothesis which indicates that we believe our 





2 For example, a series of ten studies indicate that identification with all humanity is less about the presence of 
values or morality, and more about the absence of ethnocentrism (McFarland, Webb and Brown, 2012). 
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According to Lerner, when we see recipients being harmed we can restore balance 
(i.e. make the world fair again) by compensating those harmed, punishing 
perpetrators, or even distorting our perception of harm. We achieve the latter by 
devaluing the victim or lessening the perceived harmfulness of actions. There is 
substantial empirical evidence that individuals do indeed believe this view, and that 
as well as reducing (or recompensing) a victim’s suffering to support their belief, they 
might even distort their perception of that suffering as deserved (Simmons and 
Lerner, 1968; Lerner and Lichtman 1968; Lerner and Miller, 1978; Dovidio, 1984). 
Pertinently for organisations, the presence of such beliefs internally, or their 
promotion by organisational contexts and cultures, could promote or inhibit 
altruism, especially towards customers or clients. As an organisational construct, 
altruism needs to take account of how such beliefs are manifested, normalised and 
collectivised by internal contexts or conditions. 
 
A number of theories have emerged which indicate a more pooled role for morality, 
whereby our views or values combine with other factors which promote 
responsiveness to suffering in order to motivate altruism. Drawing on a study of staff 
working in public services, Szulc (2020) for example, identifies ‘good soldiers’ inside 
organisations who combine motives which predispose them to treat others well with 
personal traits which enable them to capitalise on those motives. According to this 
model, our motives incorporate concern for other colleagues or customers and 
generalised beliefs about reciprocity, but no expectation of benefit for helping them. 
Relevant personal characteristics include discretion, self-sacrifice and initiative. This 
model neatly responds to some of the cognitive factors in the literature concerning 
what people believe is morally appropriate but adds them together with those 
personal traits in the literature which may be necessary to induce or enable them to 
act on such beliefs. Placing such a model into healthcare, a nurse who stays after 
their shift to reassure a patient would be using their initiative to decide that support 
is needed, exercising their discretion to provide it and sacrificing their personal time 
to do so. No benefit might be expected, but such an action would probably be 
contingent upon their beliefs about patients. A just-world perspective might see the 
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patient as deserving (or undeserving) of aid, while a common humanity view might 
impel action even if the patient is demanding. The model has strength in its capacity 
to explain how altruism might arise from an interplay of moral beliefs and personal 
qualities. 
  
Transposing views or values into an organisational context raises questions about 
the potential interaction between organisational members’ personal beliefs and the 
prospect of broader organisational views or values. Individual personal norms, 
values or attitudes are generally shown to promote altruistic behaviour inside 
organisations (Organ and Ryan, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 2000; Podsakoff et al., 2009; 
Chiaburu et al., 2011; De Geus, Ingrams, Tummers and Pandey, 2020). In healthcare, 
the most prominently identified sets of values amongst employee populations are: 
altruism, including related concepts such as compassion, caring and empathy; 
equality, which includes beliefs about dignity, respect and justice; and capability or 
competence (Moyo, Goodyear-Smith, Weller, Robb and Shulruf, 2016). Importantly, 
healthcare professionals see their other-orientated values as a source of motivation. 
In a comprehensive study of prosocial organisational behaviours amongst NHS staff 
for example, prosocial values towards patients (or colleagues) were the most 
commonly given reasons for helping, by 21 percent and 11 percent respectively 
(Hyde et al., 2013). However, only 13 percent of those studied actually reported 
acting prosocially.3 This indicates that although professionals may see their own 
personal values as playing a role in promoting prosocial behaviour, they might not 
actually be acting in accordance with them. For organisations, this raises the 
question of why employees might not act upon any prosocial orientations which they 
hold towards the organisation, its agents or users. 
 
This might be explained by competing values. Behaviour inside organisations is 
shaped by a threefold moral dimension comprising employee values, management 
 
 
3 Notably, in this study, prosocial values towards patients were the best predictor of staff helping peers deliver 
services or providing those services flexibility to benefit patients, including operating outside of organisational 
policies or procedures to do so. 
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values and organisational values (Arieli, Sagiv and Roccas, 2020). Or there may be 
other broader occupational or contextual moderators. For example, Treviño and 
colleagues found evidence of an association between the nature of one’s own moral 
judgement and the moral quality of one’s workplace environment, with differing 
levels of moral reasoning evident in different professions, tiers or ages and stages of 
life at work (Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, 2007). Evidence of such variations can 
be seen in a study of nursing staff, which found that moral judgment was a unique 
and distinct predictor for altruism, but only amongst older staff (Wagner and Rush, 
2000). For the construct of organisational altruism, this raises the issue of how 
individual and organisational values align to endorse (or undermine) altruistic 
actions or prosocial behaviour. It also indicates the need to ascertain which 
organisational contexts or conditions might normalise acting in accordance with 
prosocial values and which might legitimise eschewing them.  
 
Morality models exhibit a high level of overlap. Krebs and Van Hesteren’s integrative 
model, for example, incorporates, embraces or foreshadows a range of altruistic 
forms explored by other theorists.4 They identify mutual or conscientious altruists, 
echoing the importance of duty and responsibility outlined in Schwartz’s (1973) 
model of personal norms. Their mutually motivated altruists also reflect the critical 
obligation of give and take which is enshrined in theories of reciprocal altruism. Their 
conscientiously motivated altruists, those who aid others as a result of their personal 
scruples or responsibilities, also fit with theories of personality. Their integrated or 
autonomous altruists resemble Batson’s (1987) empathically motivated altruists, 
who help on the basis of concern for others. Their autonomous altruists, those who 
engage on the basis of high-level internalised values, resemble the Oliners’ ethically 
 
 
4 Individuals progress through eight stages of altruistic attainment: ‘undifferentiated affective responsiveness’ at 
stage zero (e.g. reflexive behaviours such as smiling); ‘egocentric accommodation’ at stage one (e.g. responding to 
others distress in order to reduce one’s own); ‘instrumental co-operation’ at stage two (e.g. engaging in exchanges 
to benefit oneself); ‘mutual altruisms’ at stage three (e.g. responding to others on the basis of shared roles and 
obligations); ‘conscientious altruism’ at stage four (e.g. responding to others on the basis of responsibility and 
conscience); ‘autonomous altruism’ at stage five (e.g. responding to others on the basis of high internalised values); 
‘integrated altruism’ at stage six (e.g. feeling a sense of oneness with others); and ‘universal self-sacrificial love’ at 
stage seven (driven universal love or a sense of oneness with the world), (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994, p.120/121).  
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motivated actors. Finally, their integrated altruists, those who engage based on a 
feeling of oneness with other people, appear to resemble Monroe’s (1996) common 
humanists.  
 
The vital common feature that one can synthesise from these similarities is that 
one’s moral, ethical or cognitive stance towards oneself, in conjunction with one’s 
moral, ethical or cognitive stance towards others, will influence one’s altruism. 
Considering this in an organisational context raises questions about the extent to 
which members internally both believe others are deserving of aid and see 
themselves as responsible for providing it. Should such a stance be common inside 
an organisation, altruism is likely to be promoted. Clearly, the opposite orientational 
pattern would inhibit it. The main issue for altruism as an organisational construct, 
however, is how organisational contexts or conditions might contribute to the 
creation or suppression of such orientations. As sources of altruistic motivation for 
altruism, they could be conceptualised as an internal ethical resource which might 
be nurtured or restrained by organisational forces.  
 
Moving on from what we think to how we think, our mental capacity to discern or 
process need is also important for altruism. This encompasses our ability to see 
situations from the position of another, understand their thoughts and feelings and 
make assessments or attributions about their behaviour (or our own) (Schroeder, 
Penner, Dovidio and Piliavin, 1995). Reliable relationships have been established 
between our ability to take the view (or perspective) of another and our altruism 
towards them (Krebs and Russell, 1981; Underwood and Moore, 1982; Galinsky and 
Moskowitz, 2000; Longmire and Harrison, 2018). Though recently the importance of 
‘getting’ rather than simply ‘taking’ the perspective of another has been stressed 
(Eyal, Steffel and Epley, 2018). Moreover, perspective-taking itself may be 
moderated by the nature of the perspective taker, the nature of the target and any 
attributions made about them, as well as the orientation of relationships between 
the two (Ku, Wang and Galinsky, 2015). One can assume that the level of altruism 
inside an organisation will be affected by the collective cognitive capacity (or 
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resource) for perspective-taking prevalent amongst staff. More importantly for 
altruism as an organisational construct, however, might be the role that an 
organisational context plays in stimulating or suppressing perspective-taking as a 
collective resource, or the internal distractions which might reduce the practice of 
it. 
 
Taken altogether, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that altruism as an 
organisational construct needs to concede the possibility of a role for individual 
moral traits, qualities or cognitive resources. However, it is unlikely that morality will 
be enough to promote altruism on its own. Addressing this limitation, some theorists 
argue that feeling and morality are closely intertwined in promoting prosocial 
treatment of others (Neiman, 2009; Phillips and Taylor, 2009). In their kindness-
based model for example, Canter and colleagues (2017) extend the concept of 
morally motivated altruism. They argue that everyday prosocial acts come from a 
combination of benign tolerance, principled pro-action and empathic responsivity 
(Canter, Youngs and Yaneva, 2017, p.17).5 Their benign tolerance, which adopts a 
live and let live stance, is somewhat akin to Monroe’s (1996) conceptualisation of 
common humanity in stressing acceptance of others. Their principled pro-action, 
which is characterised by proactive and honourable behaviour towards others, and 
stresses what we owe them, is akin to equity theories, such as the just-world 
hypothesis. Importantly, however, they argue that such moral or ethical motivations 
must be complemented by a personal, reactive and emotional consideration of 
other’s feelings. That is, an empathic concern for them. The model suggests that 
altruism can be better explained by balancing the moral elements evident in rational 
or cognitive theories of altruism with the emotions evident in affective theories of 




5 Three factors together generate core kindness, which is: 'a tendency towards active gestures motivated by genuine 
warm feelings for others. There is no expectation of reward or social approbation,’ (Canter et al. 2017, p.17/18). 
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2.2.3 Affective Traits and Altruism 
 
There is a substantial body of evidence that positive moods, states or emotions 
promote altruistic or prosocial behaviour, as well as some indications that negative 
ones have the capacity to inhibit it (Manucia, Baumann and Cialdini, 1984; Dovidio, 
1984; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987; Carlson and Miller, 1987; Carlson, Charlin and 
Miller, 1988; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg, 2000; Cuff, Brown, Taylor and 
Howat, 2014). Emotions function as proximate mechanisms which support altruism 
or reciprocity between people, with empathy motivating givers to help, anger 
motivating them to harm those who do not help and guilt motivating them to help 
injured parties (De Waal 2008; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew and West, 2015).6 
Employees who experience positive moods at work are more likely to engage in both 
prosocial behaviour prescribed by their roles, such as customer service, as well as 
extra-role altruism (George, 1991). Clearly, emotions are an import factor.  
 
Critically, certain moral, social or other-orientating emotions, such as empathy, 
sympathy and compassion, enable us to enable us to feel ‘as’ others do, ‘with’ or 
‘for’ them, stimulated by an awareness of their suffering (Wispé, 1986; Cassell, 2002; 
Haidt, 2003; De Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek, 2007; 
Singer and Lamm, 2009; Lamm and Singer, 2010; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012).7 The 
theory that our empathic concern for others arises from an imbalance between their 
ideal and actual state and generates altruistic motivation to alleviate their distress, 
has been widely tested and endorsed (Batson, 1987; Batson and Shaw, 1991; Batson, 
Shaw, and Slingsby, 1991; Batson and Powell, 2003; Bierhoff and Rohmann, 2004; 
Batson, Ahmad and Stocks, 2004; Feldman Hall, Dalgleish, Evans and Mobbs, 2015). 
The common factor is that these emotions orientate us towards others and enable 
 
 
6 De Waal defines directed altruism as ‘helping or comforting behaviour directed at an individual in need, pain or 
distress’ in response to situational triggers (De Waal 2008, p.281). 
7 Haidt defines moral emotions as: 'those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a 
whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent,' (Haidt 2003, p.853). Other-suffering emotions are 
empathy, sympathy and com passion. The other emotions are other-condemning emotions of anger, contempt and 
disgust; self-conscious (or self-condemning) emotions of shame, embarrassment and guilt; and other-praising 
emotions which include gratitude and self-elevation (stimulated by acts of moral beauty such as sacrifice. 
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us to enter into or appreciate their suffering to varying degrees. What this means for 
organisations is that the general emotional state of their members is likely to affect 
altruism. At a group level, that could have implications for altruism as an 
organisational construct. It indicates that emotional or affective capacity will be an 
important organisational resource for promoting prosocial behaviour. 
 
In their model of altruism, McGaghie and colleagues propose that healthcare 
professionals possess a compassionate core from which altruistic acts emanate, 
which they bring into healthcare with them and which helps them maintain their 
enthusiasm for prosocial action over the course of their working life (McGaghie, 
Mytko, Brown and Cameron, 2002). This core combines cognitive and affective 
capacities with moral resources and social skills. The latter, which they say 
incorporates an awareness of self and other, can be conceived of as a form of 
perspective-taking. They also argue that there is a layer between one’s 
compassionate core (from which altruistic acts emerge) and the external world 
(where altruistic acts are discharged) which is comprised of discernment and 
judgment about the appropriateness of altruistic responses. Importantly, within the 
model, a doctor who misjudges the proper level of altruistic behaviour in 
professional situations might either over-extend themselves, or under-respond to 
another’s needs. This model elegantly integrates a number of individual level factors 
into the concept of a compassionate core but it lacks an explanation of how specific 
organisational features might nurture (or supress) behaviour in line with that core. 
Pertinent for altruism as an organisational construct, is the question of how internal 
contexts or conditions encourage employees (as a group) to over-extend themselves 
or under-respond to patients by means of its impact upon their compassionate core.  
 
Although affective explanations of altruism indicate that emotions which connect us 
to another’s suffering can indeed promote altruism, there is also evidence that they 
are insufficient to do so on their own, can be countermanded by other factors, and 
may even be deliberately dampened (Slote, 2007; Singer and Lamm, 2009; Cuff et 
al., 2014). Correlations between empathic concern and specific prosocial behaviours 
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(such as consoling the distressed) can be weak Einolf (2008). The reason for this may 
lie in the context within which such emotions have been generated. Pulcini (2017) 
argues that affective states are morally neutral prompting differing (positive or 
negative) emotions, depending on who is the subject of such emotions and what our 
relationship with them is. The missing element in purely affective explanations of 
altruism is that one must care how another feels (not simply have feelings about 
them) and be concerned about what happens to them as a result (Jensen, Vaish and 
Schmidt, 2014). You must possess other-regarding concerns which are aligned with 
your other-suffering feelings if you are to act. Those might come from one’s moral 
beliefs about responsibilities towards others discussed in the previous section. For 
altruism as an organisational construct, however, this means that simply nurturing 
employees’ compassion towards colleagues or clients is unlikely to generate 
widespread altruism or prosociality on its own. That is a clear problem for NHS 
healthcare contexts, where much has been made of compassion as a solution to the 
neglect of patient welfare.  
 
Importantly, the influence of affect depends on what it instigates us to think about 
(Isen, 2008). From a comprehensive review of the evidence for moods’ influence on 
altruism or helping behaviour, Dovidio (1984) concluded that good moods appear to 
stimulate helping through their power to shape our attention to others, our 
perception of their needs (in relation to our own), our sense of ‘we-ness’ with them, 
our feelings of efficacy about helping them and the importance of any rewards 
involved in doing so, all of which might increase our arousal, elevate our empathic 
concern, lessen the cost of helping or increase the rewards for doing so. Although 
there is less evidence to support it, Dovidio went on to speculate that negative 
moods or states might inhibit altruism by means of lessening our attention to others, 
lessening our perception that their needs are important (compared to our own), or 
heightening our own sense of helplessness (Dovidio, 1984). Synthesising Dovidio’s 
main themes, there appear to be moral, relational, tonal and attentional dimensions 
moderating the influence of our moods and emotions upon altruism. What that 
means is that how we perceive or assess such emotions is a factor.   
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Picking up on the tonal and attentional variables, Weyant (1978) proposes a mood-
related model of altruism which might explain how such effects would work. Drawing 
on a study which examined the costs and benefits of helping, Weyant found that 
feeling negative might promote helping when it is highly beneficial (but not very 
costly) to do so, but inhibit it when it is both costly and unbeneficial (Weyant, 1978).8 
So, if one feels depleted, staying on beyond one’s shift might be unlikely because it 
would further erode one’s energy without recompense. It would be costly and 
unbeneficial. However, the rewarding gratitude of one’s colleagues might change 
that. It would still be costly, but there would now be a benefit. Along related lines, 
studies have shown that the way in which our attention is directed (to ourselves or 
others) and applied to either party (positively or negatively) does indeed have a 
bearing on our helpfulness (Wegner and Schaefer, 1978; Thompson, Cowan and 
Rosenhan, 1980; Rosenhan, Salovey and Hargis, 1981; Rosenhan, Salovey, 
Karylowski and Hargis, 1981).9 So, an issue for organisations is the extent to which 
internal contexts or conditions direct employees’ attention (as a group) in ways that 
moderate, increase or reduce their emotional propensities to act altruistically. 
Altruism as an organisational construct may, therefore, need to consider an 
organisation’s direction of its member attention to their own situation or to others’ 
in positive or negative ways. Doing so might explain poor quality care as easily as it 
might explain altruistic action or inaction.  
 
Another significant problem with affective influences on altruism is that the very 
emotions which enable us to detect other-suffering can also prompt us to ignore or 
neglect it. This may be a result of the nature or tenor of the emotions aroused. 
Cialdini and colleagues argue that when we see others suffering we experience 
 
 
8 The study examined the costs and benefits of helping under states of positive, negative or neutral mood in 
situations in which subjects were asked to collect donations for a charity (i.e. high benefit) or a community activity 
(i.e. low benefit) through high cost (door to door) or low cost (seated at a desk) . Weyant found that positive mood 
generated more helping than negative mood, and that negative mood generated more helping than neutral mood, 
when the benefits were high, but the costs were low. 
9 Rosenhan, Salovey, Karylowski and Hargis (1981) go on to hypothesise that the main psychological purpose of 
emotions is to increase our attention and amplify our cognition, with the power to narrow our attention and anchor 
it onto those stimuli that provoke the emotion, what they call 'attentional anchoring'.  
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negative emotional states of arousal, in particular sadness, which we act on in order 
to alleviate (Baumann, Cialdini and Kendrick, 1981; Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, 
Fultz and Beaman, 1987). However, the evidence for this is weak (Dovidio, 1984; 
Piliavin, 2009). More usefully, Batson distinguishes between personal distress, that 
is feeling anxious, upset, disturbed, distressed or perturbed, which can prompt 
egoistic motivation to reduce one’s own feelings about others’ suffering, and 
empathic concern, that is warmth, compassion, sympathy, soft-heartedness or 
tenderness, which can prompt altruistic motivation to relieve their distress (Batson, 
1987). Again, the former might be seen as directing one’s attentions to one’s own 
distress in a negative way, while the latter would be seen as directing one’s attention 
to others’ distress in a positive way. Considering affective elements at an 
organisational level raises questions about the tenor of the internal emotional 
environment. As a construct, organisational altruism may need to allow a significant 
role for the internal emotional climate, as well as carefully consider which contextual 
factors or conditions are most likely to stimulate positive emotions that are 
conducive to altruism or prompt negative ones which are unconducive to it. 
 
Considering this point further, organisations themselves are intensely affective 
environments, in which some feelings appear to be widely expressed, while other 
emotions seem to go under the radar (Clancy, Vince and Gabriel, 2012). The 
extensive expectation, and potentially draining effect, of emotional labour at work, 
is well evidenced (Kessler, Heron, Dopson, 2015; Grandey and Melloy, 2017). 
Experiencing significant emotional pressures generates an additional cognitive load 
for staff who must manage or attend to the sources of such emotions (Elfenbein, 
2007). Pressured conditions inside organisations can reduce the emotional 
bandwidth which is needed to induce those feelings for others which would prompt 
empathic responses (Lilius, Kanov, Dutton, Worline and Maitlis, 2012). Working in 
professional contexts can induce very negative emotions, placing staff in tense and 
vulnerable states which undermines such feelings (Grant, Lavery and Decarlo, 2019). 
The emotional fatigue which contexts create affects our ability to manage our 
emotions, can reduce our other-suffering capacity and may even increase our 
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aversive affective responses to their pain (Goetz et. al, 2010). Moreover, employees 
have to manage their emotions to match their organisation’s affective climate or 
culture (Mikolajczak, Tran, Brotheridge and Gross, 2009). What all this suggests is 
that a negative internal emotional climate may play a significant role in inhibiting 
altruism by means of its dilution of collective affective capacity or resource. 
However, some emotions may be easier to distinguish within this process than 
others.  
 
Sharing the distress of others is an especially challenging feature of working in 
healthcare, which can generate substantial mental, emotional or psychological costs 
and result in staff actively managing their emotions to avoid sharing in others’ 
suffering (Theodosious, 2008; Faust, 2009; Singer and Klimecki, 2014; Cocker and 
Joss, 2016). Problematically, emotions may become maladaptive, stimulating 
organisational agents to adopt inappropriate behaviours or emotional responses in 
attempts to manage them (Mikolajczak et al, 2009). Being required to show 
emotions we do not feel, can be managed by physically or psychologically 
withdrawing from situations (Stets and Turner, 2008). Thus, employees might take 
steps to regulate any emotional demands upon them by deploying their attention in 
ways which protect them from having to experience these at all (Gross, 1998; Gross, 
2008; Gross, 2013). This may be done deliberately (or reflexively) and consciously (or 
unconsciously) to control which emotions they feel, or when or how they feel them, 
in order to increase or decrease the negativity they feel about others’ distress (Gross, 
1998).10 By way of example, from a study of call centre employees experiencing 
significant emotional demands in the workplace as a consequence of emotionally 
demanding customers, Do Bonfim and Gondim (2009) identified both cognitive 
 
 
10 We may regulate our emotions by: selecting which situations we do (or not) enter, for example avoiding particular 
people, places or objects; modifying the situations we do enter and thus changing the emotional impact they have 
on us; deploying our attention in a particular way within situations (for example, allowing ourselves to be distracted 
from a situation, concentrating on something else extraneous to it or ruminating on particular aspects or feelings); 
cognitively changing a situation or how we appraise it; and then modulating our responses accordingly (Gross, 1998; 
Gross, 2008). Changing situations enables us to frame them in a way which gives us permission to changes our 
emotional responses (Gross, 2013).  
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strategies regarding their beliefs, attributions and so on, as well as behavioural 
strategies, such as avoidance. Avoidance is particularly likely in those situations 
where we know that we will be asked to help others and doing so will be costly 
(Batson, Shaw and Todd, 1994). Along such lines, staff in healthcare settings have 
been shown to avoid becoming too involved in their clients’ situations to protect 
themselves from the emotional intensity of such work (Ostadhashemi, Arshi, 
Khalvati, Eghlima, Hamid and Khankeh, 2019). They may deliberately avoid the 
development of fellow feeling for patients (Faust, 2009). 
 
Even more problematically, because we have an optimal range of distress we can 
tolerate, inside of which we are responsive to others’ needs, but outside of which 
we become absorbed in our own, organisational members might experience an over-
arousal effect which severely erodes capacity for altruism (Hoffman, 1981a; 
Hoffman, 1981b). Importantly for a study of healthcare, such an effect is pronounced 
among professional employees who are unable to lessen others’ distress, or curb it 
to a manageable level (Hoffman, 2008). Behaviours associated with this effect 
include: directing one’s attention to oneself and focussing inwardly; adopting means 
to lessen one’s sense of arousal or reduce one’s empathic distress, for example not 
looking at people, leaving or moving away from them; and even manipulating one’s 
cognition of situations, such as thinking of other matters to distract oneself 
(Hoffman, 1981a; Hoffman, 2008). Importantly for this study, healthcare is a sector 
in which patients’ emotions are likely to be both powerful and pervasive, so staff 
may be unable to assuage or curb them, as well as unable to absorb or cope with 
them.  
 
Given this structural arrangement of the sector, it is important to acknowledge that 
the effect of patient distress upon professionals can be intense and extreme. 
Clinicians who work with trauma patients, for example, report significant symptoms 
and disturbing cognitive disruptions, such as nightmares (Hoffman, 2008). In a real-
life study of observers’ responses to terminally ill patients’ video testimonies, for 
example, Preston, Hofelich and Stansfield (2013) found that distraught patients 
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generated more empathic concern or personal distress than other types of patient, 
but also more horror. Problematically, there is a body of evidence from 
neuroimaging studies which shows that empathising with others’ pain activates the 
same pathways as those stimulated by one’s own pain (Singer and Klimecki, 2014, 
Decety and Lamm, 2009). Thus, one can speculate that healthcare professionals are 
being constantly exposed to other-related pain which is tantamount to experiencing 
their own. This may explain why physicians are shown to rate pain and 
unpleasantness much lower than others do, actively reducing their perception of 
distress or dampening their fear and alarm about suffering (Decety, Yang and Cheng, 
2010).11 It may be considered an inevitable practice, given the structural 
arrangement of the industry. 
 
What this means for altruism as an organisational construct is that in those sectors 
where emotional distress is extreme in nature, or widespread, altruism is likely to be 
inhibited by means of its impact on affective capacity or resource. This is a structural 
feature which will vary from sector to sector, depending on the pain, suffering and 
distress of the organisational user group, and the expectations of the organisational 
agent group to collectively manage that distress or cope with it. Considering such 
matters at an organisational level raises questions about the extent to which this 
feature might reduce an organisation’s internal affective helping capacity or 
stimulate practices amongst its members which help them navigate the emotional 
terrain but reduce their inclination to help others. This brings us to a consideration 




11 Decety et al.,(2010)  go onto speculate that whilst this lessens feelings of which would undermine their ability to 
work effectively, it also undermines helping action, by leading them to underestimate the importance of the pain 
which others’ feel. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: ALTRUISM AND THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Although altruism is a human force, undertaken by individuals, it is also grounded in 
specific contexts where help is needed. As a contextualised phenomenon, it is 
created and shaped by potential givers’ situational circumstances. The 
environmental factors which influence altruism include: potential helpers’ situated 
awareness, that is the extent to which their contexts allow them to see someone’s 
need for help; their situated capacity, that is the helping resources available to them 
in a particular context; the impact of providing any help, including any costs or 
benefits of helping in particular situations or contexts; as well as the characteristics 
of those who need help and any situational social signals about helping them (Krebs, 
1970; Dovidio, 1984; Piliavin and Charng, 1990; Penner et al., 2005; Scott and 
Seglow, 2007; Bierhoff, 2008; Feigin et al., 2014). This chapter explores the potential 
influence such factors wield inside an organisation’s context. There are sections 
covering culture, relationships and organisational architecture (see Figure 2).  
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available with which to do so. Cultural fabric encompasses norms and sanctions as 
well as organisational culture and climate. Relationships concern those between 
agents and users. Organisational architecture includes organisational roles, routines 
and constraints. Emergent practices which develop inside organisations to promote 
or inhibit altruism are also considered at the end of this chapter.  
 
3.1 Organisational Relationships and Altruism  
 
Some theories see altruism as part of a system of social exchange within which 
relationships manage or moderate our helping interactions with those both related 
and unrelated to us (Ridley, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Penner et al., 2005; 
West et al., 2006; Scott and Seglow, 2007; Kurzban et al., 2015). This system of 
exchange includes people’s roles, the groups or networks they belong to, as well as 
the broader cultural, societal or institutional arrangements within which they are 
situated. These delineate people’s respective positions, carry associated 
expectations concerning their benevolence or reciprocity towards each other and 
govern their altruism accordingly. This section sets out the main relationships in an 
organisational context which may promote or inhibit altruism (see Figure 3).  
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These include relationships between organisational agents, between agents and 
users and between any associated in or out-groups. It is acknowledged that these 
relationships will also affect, or be affected by, the culture of the organisation or its 
staff. 
 
Much prosocial behaviour is driven by relationships within (or between) groups, 
societies or cultures which enable us to co-operate with both related and unrelated 
members (Kurzban et al., 2015). Importantly for the organisational context, group 
members are more willing co-operate or benefit other members, even at their own 
personal expense (Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange, 2011; Balliet, Wu and De Dreu, 
2014). Altruism is shown to corelate strongly with the cohesiveness of a group, or 
the commitment and concern of its members towards it (Podsakoff et al., 2000; 
Rioux and Penner, 2001; Lemmon and Wayne, 2015; De Geus et al., 2020). 
Moreover, studies show that not only are we more likely to help a stranger who is 
perceived to belong to the same group as us, but the effect is pronounced if we are 
primed to make our sense of group affiliation more salient (Levine, Prosser, Evans, 
and Reicher, 2005) or we believe fellow group members are dependent upon us 
(Slater, Rovira, Southern, Swapp, Zhang, Campbell and Levine, 2013). This means 
that the way in which organisational contexts frame their members as belonging to, 
or excluded from, their boundaries should affect altruism. A similar pattern should 
also be evident within or between discrete internal groupings, an organisation’s 
teams, departments, hierarchical tiers and so on. So, altruism as an organisational 
construct, may need to develop understanding of how internal contexts or 
conditions create perceptions of in and out-group boundaries.  
 
There is also considerable evidence for an affective effect within in-groups which 
promotes altruism: we exhibit strong empathic reactions towards the suffering of 
group members which, in turn, stimulates helping (Shroeder et al., 1995; Stürmer, 
Snyder and Omoto, 2005; Mathur, Harada, Lipke and Chiao, 2010; Singer and 
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Klimecki, 2014).12 Transposing this into an organisational context, the cognitive and 
affective connections which promote helping at the individual level could infuse in-
group relations, making teams or units more sensitive to each other’s needs or 
distress. Such patterns would affect altruism between members or non-members of 
cohorts inside the organisation as well as towards those deemed insiders or 
outsiders of the organisation as a whole. Thus, in healthcare, altruism might be 
influenced by perceptions of patients as outsiders or by agents’ sense of belonging 
to different staff groupings, for example nurses versus doctors, management versus 
staff or one speciality versus another.  
 
Some theorists see altruism arising from the need for cooperation within groups or 
competition between them (Ridley and Dawkins, 1981; Ridley, 1996). According to 
such theories, just as individuals may act for egoistic as well as altruistic reasons, so 
might groups. Sober and Wilson (1999), for example, argue that group evolution is 
feasible, since those with more altruists in them might have an advantage over those 
comprised of predominantly selfish members. Considering this in an organisational 
setting raises questions about the extent to which employees (as a body) are 
prepared to make altruistic sacrifices of their own time, effort, wellbeing and so on, 
for the good of the organisation. People are prepared to make extraordinary 
sacrifices for organisations they belong to (Qirko, 2013; Barber, 2004). There is a 
body of evidence that commitment to, or affective concern for, one’s organisation 
(as a group) promotes altruism towards the organisation (Rioux and Penner, 2001; 
Chahal and Mehta, 2010; Lemmon and Wayne, 2015; De Geus et al., 2020). Drawing 
on such group level theories, Clarkson (2014) proposes a model of altruism in which 
the success of the organisation, as a group, depends upon the altruism of its staff, as 




12 Conversely, some of these studies show personal attraction is a much greater predictor of helping for out-group 
members. A factor which  would be relevant in situations where patients are disliked.  
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Working on the basis that the overall success of the organisation will realise the 
success of its members, in Clarkson’s model altruism becomes the primary 
employment relationship or means of exchange, with staff acting altruistically for 
the benefit of the collective. According to this model, an organisation’s success 
depends upon its degree of horizontal collectivism, that is the primacy given to its 
goals and the equality accorded to members who contribute to its success. Clarkson 
argues that a collectivist culture, in which organisational members’ equality and 
interdependence is accepted, will promote altruism, encouraging the development 
of an internal altruistic social norm regardless of any starting norms. Individual staff 
will act altruistically, influenced by organisational fairness, the autonomy of their 
roles and their awareness of responsibility, as well as these altruistic norms. For the 
construct of organisational altruism, this model raises the possibility that it can 
evolve over time, promoting prosociality within organisational boundaries 
irrespective of external expectations, reinforced by internal normative feedback.13 
The relevance of the model for healthcare may lie in its explanation of the sacrifices 
staff are prepared to make to meet internal demands. It could explain, for example, 
why burnout is so prevalent in the sector.14 
 
Moving on from group relations to more discrete ones, there is also a substantial 
body of evidence that prosocial behaviour is precipitated by our personal or social 
connections with each other (i.e. family, friends, acquaintances, and so on) (Krebs, 
1970; Scott and Seglow, 2007; Kurzban et al., 2015). Our relationships promote 
prosociality by means of the significance they ascribe to potential recipients, 
elevating their needs or distress above others and altering our perception of the 
balance between the costs or rewards for helping (or not helping) them (Schroeder 
et. al., 1995; Goetz et. al., 2010). Simpson and Willer (2015) argue that our social 
relationships and networks promote prosociality because of the inherent emotional 
 
 
13 This model also indicates the need to consider individual altruism as a possible starting point for horizontal or 
collective organisation-wide altruism. 
14 Burnout can be seen as an altruistic cost, a costly consequence of the emotional sacrifices which employees make 
to benefit the welfare of the organisation or its users at the expense of their own welfare. 
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commitment within them, with those related to each other more likely to be 
concerned about each other’s welfare or assume mutual moral obligations towards 
its maintenance. They speculate that the visibility which relationships create 
underpins this process. Interestingly, however, some studies have shown that 
perceived closeness with connections can have a greater effect on prosocial 
behaviour than the structural nature of the relationship itself (Curry, Roberts and 
Dunbar, 2013; Hackman, Munira, Jasmin and Hruschka, 2017). The importance of 
our emotions for altruism was set out in the previous section (see 2.2.3). Here the 
emotions generated by relationships, as well as the emotional significance of them, 
arise as an important feature. This suggests that the quality of relationships inside 
organisations may moderate or affect the extent to which members help each other.  
 
Exploring this very issue, Lilius and colleagues argue that relational conditions inside 
organisations can promote the collectivisation or organisation-wide adoption of 
prosocial activity (Lilius, Worline, Dutton, Kanov and Maitlis, 2011; Lilius et al., 2012). 
They identify a process whereby high quality connections between members 
together with dynamic boundary permeable norms promote responsiveness to 
suffering. According to their model, these motivate organisational members to 
lessen or alleviate each other’s suffering by promoting orientations between them 
(such as understanding or familiarity) which encourage those who need help to share 
their pain and those who can provide it to notice their suffering. Thus, the quality of 
these relationships makes it easier to take the perspective of another and, as a result, 
increase the prospect of the empathic concern which motivates altruism emerging.15 
Along similar lines, Madden and colleagues argue that increasing both the quality 
and quantity of social interaction between agents inside organisations increases the 
chances that they will notice, feel and respond to others’ pain or suffering (Madden, 
Duchon, Madden and Ploughman, 2012). High quality interactions between 
colleagues certainly does appear to have a positive effect on prosociality (Chahal and 
 
 
15 They say that this process starts with everyday practices. For example, acknowledging others or collective decision 
making, spawned high quality connections, while celebrating others, or addressing conflict fostered helpful norms. 
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Mehta, 2010). Interestingly, the effect may be a form of cyclical reciprocity. In a study 
of employee-supervisor relations for example, Deckop, Cirka, and Andersson (2003) 
found that those helped by their peers are more helpful (in turn). They propose a 
workplace cycle in which ‘repeated reciprocal helping’ cumulatively increases staff 
helpfulness, or, conversely, a vicious circle might emerge from staff withholding aid 
because they do not receive it (p.107). Importantly, for the construct of 
organisational altruism, such reciprocity might be normalised by internal contexts, 
conditions or practices. In an organisation which discourages reciprocity, altruism is 
likely to spiral downwards. 
 
In healthcare, positive relations with one’s peers can promote prosocial action 
towards them. In their review of the literature on nursing relationships for example, 
Feather et al., (2018) found that the social character of the workplace environment 
makes a significant contribution to nurses’ prosocial behaviours, including the 
respectfulness of their social interactions with each other as well as their sense of 
belonging. Similarly, in another study of nursing Tsang, Chen, Wang and Tai (2012) 
found that both formal working relationships and informal social connections such 
as friendship, increase prosocial behaviour inside healthcare organisations. There is 
even some suggestion that informal supportive relationships exercise a more 
pronounced effect than formal scrutiny. For example, in their study comparing the 
impact of peer observation versus peer support, Brock, Lange and Leonard (2016) 
found that the latter feature, support from one’s colleagues, had a much greater and 
longer lasting effect on the quality of care. 
 
Problematically, however, healthcare is characterised by the kind of poor quality 
relationships which according to Lilius and colleagues’ model would undermine 
altruism between staff (Lilius et al., 2011; Lilius et al., 2012). Commonly disruptive 
behaviours include psychological violence, such as intimidation or abuse, and more 
generalised incivilities, such as anger and disrespect towards colleagues (Oliveira, 
Silva, Guedes, Oliveira, Sánchez, Torres, 2016). Relationships in the NHS can be 
extremely fractious. Bullying and incivility is widespread, experienced by large 
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numbers of staff and likely to be directed at those who challenge bad care (Randle, 
2011; Carter, Thompson, Crampton, Morrow, Burford, Gray and Illing, 2013; Hands, 
2013). Poor, tense or dysfunctional working relationships have been identified in a 
number of healthcare scandals or failures, both before and after the case being 
studied in this thesis (Kennedy, 2001; Walshe and Offen, 2001; Walshe and Higgens, 
2002; Walshe, 2003; Kirkup, 2015). Misalignment between sharp-end (frontline) and 
blunt-end staff is typical, characterised by a tendency towards blame (Dixon-Woods, 
Baker, Charles, Dawson, Jerzembek, Martin, McCarthy, McKee, Minion, Ozieranski, 
Willars, Wilkie and West, 2014). Importantly, blaming others correlates positively 
with bullying them and bullying them correlates negatively with altruism (Thornberg 
and Wänström, 2017).  
 
Poor relations or tensions between staff also exercise a deeply negative effect on 
employees’ emotional capacity (Wade, Cooley and Savicki, 1986; Lee and Akhtar, 
2011; Scott and Duffey, 2015). Critically, a study by Burnes and Pope (2007) showed 
that NHS environments have a significant negative impact on organisational agents’ 
emotions and are likely to make staff feel isolated, insecure and fearful, as well as 
powerless, worthless and vulnerable. Their study, in which more than 50 percent of 
staff had experienced or witnessed bullying and incivility, showed that such 
conditions induce these negative emotions irrespective of whether organisational 
agents experience incivility, bullying and so on themselves, or simply witness it 
happening to others. Taken altogether, it appears that healthcare is a context which 
often lacks the high quality relationships that are needed to promote altruism, is 
characterised by a tendency to incivility, hostility, bullying or blame, and has a 
negative relational climate which is likely to inhibit altruism.  
 
Moving on from organisational agents, relationships with users are also important 
for altruism as an organisational construct. Grant (2007) proposes a model which can 
explain altruism towards users, in which prosocial behaviour derives from the 
relational architecture of jobs which govern interaction between staff and 
beneficiaries, their interpersonal connections and so on. In this model, relational 
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architecture increases employees’ motivation to act prosocially by connecting them 
to the impact they have on beneficiaries through their work.16 The process is such 
that their job’s impact on beneficiaries, together with the nature of their contact or 
interaction with them, will influence the motivation to behave prosocially.17 
Alongside this, employees’ affective commitment, which also derives from their 
contact with beneficiaries, will have a similar effect. Importantly, according to such 
a model, jobs vary in the meaningful contact they enable and it is this which then 
drives prosocial motivation. According to this theory, healthcare would be 
categorised as having a rich relational architecture, since it provides employees with 
many opportunities to have a significant impact on patients’ lives, as well as 
meaningful contact with them, by means of the close emotional or physical 
interactions which arise from caring and treating users. So, the relational 
architecture of healthcare should create conditions conducive to altruism.  
 
However, one has to ask how the model aligns with the many failures in healthcare 
where patients are treated without dignity or respect. What is countermanding this 
relational richness? By way of answer, Grant allows a moderating role for social 
information about beneficiaries, arguing that organisational and occupational 
ideologies may define them as either important and valuable, or conversely, 
stigmatise, devalue and degrade them. For altruism as an organisational construct, 
one important issue will be how agents (as a group) perceive users (as a group), since 
positive assessments should promote altruism and negative ones should inhibit it. 
However, the perception of users in hospital settings is problematic. To begin with 
users themselves may be seen as difficult or demanding. In a study of patients in 
primary care for example, Wills and Hahn (1991) found that between ten and twenty 
percent of patients are considered difficult, a rating associated not with their medical 
condition or personal demographics, but rather with their nature. Importantly, 




17 Job impact on beneficiaries  includes the magnitude, scope, frequency and presentational focus of the work, while 
contact with beneficiaries includes its frequency, duration, proximity, depth and breadth. 
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which are shown to promote uncivil responses in turn (Koopmann, Wang, Liu and 
Song, 2015).18 So, a pattern of incivility between doctors and patients could be 
cyclical. Importantly, the thoughts or feelings which users stimulate amongst staff 
may be difficult to manage.  
 
The previous chapter indicated that perceiving the distress of another is not enough 
to promote altruism (see 2.2.3). The nature, direction and intensity of the emotions 
that this provokes is pertinent. These can inhibit altruism by means of their effect on 
arousal levels. Healthcare is characterised by complex states of ill-being, which can 
disrupt relationships between agents and users and evoke difficult emotional states 
amongst them, such as shame, guilt, fear or anger and even victimhood (Ballatt and 
Campling, 2011). Critically, it is a context which can provoke excessive emotional 
reactions amongst staff which they may direct towards patients (such as anger or 
disgust) or themselves (such as guilt or shame). These may include emotions such as 
dislike or disgust, which would be out of kilter with normative expectations of their 
profession. An issue for altruism as an organisational construct is the effect of sectors 
which are structured to include a large population of distressed and demanding 
users, who stimulate deeply uncomfortable emotions amongst those there to help 
them. Considering that issue in healthcare, the agent-user relationship is a site of 
‘unacceptable’ emotions which discomfit employees and patients alike. This is likely 
to undermine the relational architecture Grant outlines.  
 
One way to explain why Grant’s rich relational architecture does not always produce 
altruistic or prosocial behaviour in healthcare, is a normalised devaluation of 
patients’  pain or suffering in response to this discomfiting situation. A number of 
healthcare failures have been characterised by the diminishment or dehumanisation 
of users (Flynn, 2012; Neuberger, 2016; Darbyshire and Ion, 2019; Gosport 
Independent Panel, 2018; Hilton, 2019; Richards, 2019). Relevantly, according to 
Grant’s model, within organisations social information may characterise either 
 
 
18 They argue it may also precipitate a sense of failure as a result. 
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patients as less worthy (for example, there is something underserving about them 
as people) or as having a less legitimate claim upon employees for assistance (for 
example, they are not as ill as they say they are). The perceived legitimacy of 
recipients, and any appropriate or accepted dependencies, promotes altruism, while 
illegitimately perceived expectations have a deleterious effect (Berkowitz and 
Daniels, 1963; Krebs, 1970; Shroeder et al, 1995). It matters whether we think others 
deserve their suffering, because our feelings expose us to exploitation by unworthy 
beneficiaries if we err in such assessments (Goetz et. al, 2010). However, even if 
patient suffering is genuine, healthcare professionals may diminish that by reframing 
patient suffering as deserved, or absolve themselves of responding by saying that 
the condition is not serious, that the patient deserves it (i.e. they brought it on 
themselves) or that they are personally undeserving (i.e. unlikeable, unpleasant) 
(Faust, 2009). Diminishment strategies such as these may be an important element 
for altruism as an organisational construct.  
 
This is because diminishing others’ suffering is a way to psychologically avoid seeing 
their welfare needs as deserving of aid, since it can erode both the legitimacy of the 
recipient who needs aid and the validity of their dependency upon you for providing 
it. Such a process is evident in organisations or institutions which dehumanise 
members (Stanton, 1998; Zimbardo, 2004; Zimbardo, 2007; Reimann and Zimbardo, 
2011). A common feature of such situations is the combined lessening of the 
suffering of one group, together with a reduction in the responsibility of another 
group for responding. Thus, other-orientation is eroded by a particular framing of 
potential givers and recipients in relation to each other. This framing appears to be 
the exact opposite of what the literature regarding individual beliefs indicates is 
needed for altruism (see 2.2.2). So, if organisations generate or institutionalise social 
information about agents or users in this way it would be likely to inhibit altruism. 
An issue for healthcare organisations, in particular, may be their potential to 
generate diminishing presentations of users. Where user distress is thus denuded of 
its significance, then the cues that help is needed can be ignored or neglected.  
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An alternative explanation for why the rich relational architecture of healthcare 
envisaged by Grant’s model does not normalise altruistic or helping behaviour may 
be imbalances in agent-user reciprocity. According to the theory of reciprocal 
altruism, we act altruistically in the short-term to secure benefits in return longer-
term (Trivers, 1971).19 The concept of reciprocal altruism (or strong reciprocity) has 
been substantially proven to stimulate altruistic action or prosocial behaviour 
(Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr, 2003; Nowak, 
Vallacher and Miller, 2003; Feyr and Rockenbach, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; 
Nowak, 2006). Reciprocity helps us manage the tensions between our own self-
interest and our groups’ collective interest (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks and Van Dijk, 
2013). Transposing this concept into healthcare settings exposes a problem in the 
staff-patient relationship. There is an inherent and potentially damaging structural 
tension between the interests of patients and users, which is not always 
acknowledged. Healthcare professional contact with patients, and the strain that it 
can cause, is a structural source of stressful interaction.  
 
From a five-year longitudinal study of UK general practitioners for example, Bakker 
and colleagues found that contact with demanding patients undermines the 
reciprocity of the doctor-patient relationship, draining doctors of emotion, depleting 
them of physical resources and undermining their sense of efficacy (Bakker, 
Schaufeli, Sixma, Bosveld and Van Dierendonck, 2000). Importantly, they identified 
a pattern whereby practitioners take steps to distance themselves from patients, 
fostering more demanding behaviour from users in turn.20 Pertinently, they argue 
that the structure of the relationship itself is out of kilter since it positions 
practitioners as solely giving and patients as solely receiving, with the costs for 
doctors, their time, energy, effort and so on, inadequately balanced by the rewards 
that patients can confer upon them, such as gratitude. That is, the structurally 
 
 
19Reciprocal altruism is also regulated by social emotions such as sympathy or gratitude (Trivers, 1971).  
20 In their study, if doctors reported a negative attitude towards their patients at the first point measured, this 
predicted patients’ demandingness at the second point measured, leading them to conclude that the detachment 
professionals need to carry out their roles can – if too detached or cynical – can actually undermine the relationship. 
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unbalanced nature of the contact between the two groups generates a perceived 
lack of reciprocity in the relationship which not only depletes employees’ emotions 
but eventually fosters cynicism or callousness towards patients. Importantly, 
gratitude regulates how we respond to altruism, by propelling us to acknowledge 
the benefits that we have received and stimulating us to return benefits ‘in kind’ to 
those we have received them from (Emmons and Shelton, 2002; McCullough, 
Kimeldorf and Cohen, 2008). Although one could argue that healthcare professionals 
should not expect gratitude given their duty of care, should they see patients as 
ungrateful it could undermine altruism. Put more simply, who would want to go the 
extra mile for someone who appears ungrateful and who would not want to go the 
extra mile for someone that does. 
 
So, there are two alternative explanations for why the rich relational architecture of 
health might fail to deliver altruism. One is normalised patient diminishment. The 
other is unbalanced reciprocity. Both raise the possibility of users being treated as 
an unworthy or ungrateful out-group. According to Ballatt and Campling (2011) 
healthcare services already operate at the edges of kinship, where there is a tension 
between goodwill towards, or rejection of, certain groups of patients deemed less 
worthy by society more generally.21 Critically, out-group members can be treated 
differently. We can perceive them with reduced warmth or disgust (Harris and Fiske, 
2006), rate their pain far less negatively (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson and Singer, 
2010) or be deterred from altruism towards them by out-group prejudice (Bednall 
and Bove, 2011). Decreasing others’ value, lessening or even blaming them, makes 
cruelty or callousness permissible (Staub, 1985; Staub, 2004). In healthcare, if staff 
(as one group) see patients (as another group) as lesser, either unworthy or 
ungrateful, it gives them permission to collectively treat, or feel about them, 
differently. Should such a stance become normalised, altruism towards patients 




21 By way of an example an injured drunk might stimulate feelings of kindness concerning their injuries but their 
drunken state might prompt ambivalence, or generate a reluctance  to treat them or even provoke hostility. 
 50 
Clarkson’s model (2014) can explain why employee populations might make 
altruistic sacrifices, such as time, effort and so on, to meet demanding organisational 
goals or targets. Grant’s model (2007) can explain how information might be used 
against certain groupings within the broader organisational entity, with one group 
pitted against another. Neither quite account for why the complete breakdown 
between organisational agents and users is so prevalent in healthcare contexts. But 
together they might do so by indicating what would happen if the success of the 
organisation, as a group, was seen to be misaligned with the demands of its users. 
Should such a situation arise, diminishing patients could help reconcile any tension 
staff experience between acting in the perceived interest of the organisation as a 
whole and responding to the welfare needs of individual users in day-to-day practice. 
In the NHS that might be a choice between spending your time on meeting a target 
which would benefit your organisation in national rankings, as well as meet approval 
from your manager, or spending it on tending to a request from a patient which 
might interrupt your doing so. 
 
3.2 Organisational Cultural Fabric and Altruism 
 
Cultural theories of altruism tend to see it as emerging or evolving in line with 
broader environmental factors. Theorists argue that we develop or acquire group 
level traits for altruism in line with our cultures, environments and the cooperative 
needs or requirements inherent in them (Gintis, 2000; Gintis et al., 2003; Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Bowles, Choi and Hopfensitz, 2003; West et al., 2006; Wilson and 
Wilson, 2007; Wilson, 2015). Though comparative analysis is rare, cross-cultural 
studies have shown that differences at this level account for much variation in 
altruism, and even imply that our preference for prosocial behaviour may evolve 
over time as a result of our social or cultural environments (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, 
Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, McElreath, Alvard, Barr, Ensminger, Henrich, Hill, Gil-White, 
Gurven, Marlowe, Patton and Treacer, 2005). Transposing this into an organisational 
setting, one would expect that as societal cultures evolve over time to value altruism, 
institutions or organisations within them will be shaped and reshaped accordingly. 
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However, organisations themselves might also exhibit evolving capacity for altruism 
in alignment with their own particular industry, service, country or occupational 
environment. 22 
 
This section will set out the main elements of an organisation’s cultural fabric which 
may play an evolving role in promoting or inhibiting altruism within their boundaries 
(see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Organisational Cultural Fabric and Altruism 
 
Culture is likely to work in conjunction with member relationships, especially in 
respect of its influence on the internal value placed on users discussed in the 
previous section. Costs and rewards are likely to be generated both by an 
organisation’s culture as well as the arrangement of its activities, hierarchies and 
services. For that reason, a consideration of costs and rewards is demitted to the 
















Social structures, cultures and institutions govern expectations of interaction 
between those located within their sphere. Prosocial behaviour is founded in 
expectations that are influenced by what we think others will do, as well as what we 
think they think that we will do (Pereda, Branas-Garza, Rodriguez-Lara and Sanchez, 
2017). Institutions provide shared social prescriptions governing our thoughts and 
behaviours (Dequech, 2009; Herepath and Kitchener, 2016). Social environments 
come with associated norms concerning how members should relate to each other. 
Importantly, within groups, these 'systematize, standardize, and contextualize 
…which prosocial (or antisocial) behaviours are expected, when, and toward whom' 
(Jensen et al., 2014, p.11). Both descriptive and prescriptive norms provide prosocial 
motivation (Bednall and Bove, 2011).  
 
Those norms which promote altruism in particular include: the norm of social 
responsibility, which stipulates that people should help those who are dependent on 
them (Berkowitz and Daniels, 1963); the norm of reciprocity, which stipulates that 
people must help, but not harm, those who help them (Gouldner, 1960); and the 
norm of conditional cooperation, which stipulates that you cooperate if others do, 
but defect if they do not (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). While all these might be 
relevant to altruism between agents within organisations, the first, that of 
dependency, should be particularly relevant for prosocial behaviour towards 
patients in healthcare settings. Problematically, however, the discussion on user 
diminishment in the previous section (3.1) shows how this might be subverted. 
Picking up on Jenson’s point about norms establishing to whom prosocial action is 
appropriate, reframing patients can obviate the applicability of such a norm to them 
as a group (Jenson et al., 2014). 
 
Organisational cultures in which prosocial behaviours are maximised for the benefit 
of the organisation as a whole are characterised by the adoption of a higher purpose, 
encouragement of employees to pursue overall group benefit rather than individual 
employee rewards and promotion of group identities or collaboration practices 
(Vieweg, 2018). Although the relationship that internal values have with altruistic 
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behaviours inside of organisations has not been well studied, the literature suggests 
that those which promote self-transcendence over self-enhancement are likely to 
play a role (Arieli et al., 2020). Organisations characterised by collectivist or team 
based cultures, for example, are shown to encourage more prosocial behaviour 
(Lievens, Conway and De Corte, 2008; Limpanitgul, Jirotmontree, Robson and 
Boonchoo, 2013). In their detailed study of helping in different cultures, Perlow and 
Weeks (2002) found that employee helpfulness is substantially influenced by the 
culture of their occupation, organisation and nation (Perlow and Weeks, 2002). 
Pertinently, however, they found that internal organisational culture had a 
potentially much greater effect than external societal culture, and could stimulate 
either ‘a generalized expectation’ of helping or a form of ‘restricted reciprocity’, in 
which staff are more likely to help those from whom they expect they will want help 
in return. Thus, it appears that organisational culture, as well as any integral norms 
and values, can promote altruistic behaviour, albeit to differing degrees.  
 
In considering altruism as an organisational construct, one also must take account of 
the potential interaction between members’ own personal norms or values and their 
organisation’s cultural norms and values. In their study of virtuousness within 
organisations for example, Bright and colleagues found that some members adapt 
pragmatically to internal contexts (and the norms within them) while others can 
transcend such situations with more virtuous behaviours (Bright, Alzola, Stansbury 
and Stavros, 2011). Similarly, in their study tracking the conduct of managers and 
employees over five years, Paarlberg and Perry (2007) found that the influence of 
organisational values upon staff motivation depended on the extent to which they 
aligned with employees’ own views, values and perspectives on reciprocity. So there 
is a duality to the influence of cultural norms, values and beliefs, which altruism as 
an organisational construct must concede.  
 
A number of the theoretical models seeking to explain altruistic or prosocial 
behaviour allow a role for organisational culture and associated norms or values 
(Kanov, Maitlis, Worline, Dutton, Frost, Jacoba and Lilius, 2004; Dutton, Worline, 
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Frost and Lilius, 2006; Treviño et al., 2007; Kish-Gephart, Harrison and Treviño, 2010; 
Lilius et al., 2011; Lilius et al., 2012; Clarkson, 2014; Dutton et al., 2014). Dutton and 
colleagues argue that values regarding the ‘holistic personhood’ of others and the 
permissibility of expressions of humanity within an organisation are more likely to 
increase the likelihood that members’ pain is collectively noticed, felt and responded 
to (Dutton et al., 2006). Similarly, Kanov et al., (2004) argue that organisations with 
humane cultures which value expressions of suffering, and encourage members to 
share their feelings, accordingly, will generate more action to address others’ needs 
or welfare, legitimising action fuelled by  feelings for others.  
 
In their exposition of relational responding, Lilius and colleagues also acknowledge a 
role for internal organisational norms which influence the boundaries between work 
and personal life and indicate that it is appropriate and important to put one’s 
humanity on display. This, they say, makes it permissible to openly share one’s pain 
or distress which, in turn, is likely to stimulate empathic concern (Lilius et. al., 2011; 
Lilius et al., 2012). Critically, what these models do is show that organisational 
culture might generate shared internal concepts of common humanity (see Monroe, 
1996), validating and disseminating them internally in ways which would encourage 
altruism between members. However, the valuable organisational element they add 
to Monroe’s theory is the importance of your ‘being’ human, that is modelling or 
sharing your common humanity, so others will follow, as well as ‘seeing’ common 
humanity in others. 
 
In healthcare, culture is shown to have a significant effect on patient safety and care 
(Pronovost, Berenholtz, Goeschel, Needham, Sexton, Thompson, Lubomski, 
Marsteller, Makary and Hunt, 2006; Kaplan, Brady, Dritz, Hooper, Linam, Froehle and 
Margolis, 2010; Reader and Gillespie, 2013; Jacobs, Mannion, Davies, Harrison, 
Konteh and Walshe, 2013). Those cultures which appear particularly pertinent for 
care include cultures of compassion, in which users are humanely treated, cultures 
of blame which constrain transparency about harm to patients and cultures of 
bullying or unrelenting pressure to meet targets which generate unintended and 
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dysfunctional consequences (Herepath, Kitchener and Waring, 2015). Worryingly, 
however, in a study of prosocial behaviour amongst UK healthcare employees, few 
identified organisational culture as a common reason for acting prosocially, given by 
only 12 percent of those studied (Hyde et al., 2013). Even more problematically, in 
the NHS a large number of failures have been attributed to cultural deficiencies, such 
as club cultures, old boy’s cultures or cultures of secrecy and suppression, which 
enable patient mistreatment (Kennedy, 2001; Walshe and Higgens, 2002; Walshe 
2003, Walshe and Shortell, 2004; Walshe, 2003; Walshe, 2014; Kirkup, 2015; Gosport 
Independent Panel, 2018). Such cultures may be characterised as either exhibiting 
affective lapses, those in which users have been treated uncompassionately, or 
moral lapses, in which they have been treated unethically, or both.  
 
Considering the first type of lapse, in many of these cases, the organisations (and 
their staff) have been seriously criticised for cultures lacking in kindness, compassion 
or concern for the welfare of patients (Ballatt and Campling, 2011; Department of 
Health, 2012; Neuberger, 2013). Although we desire professionals to be empathic 
and compassionate, this appears to be rare in medical settings (Camel and Glick, 
1996; Firth-Cozens and Cornwell, 2009). In healthcare, depleted affective capacity, 
emotional exhaustion and compassion fatigue are both widespread and well 
evidenced in their negative impact on professional capacity and patient care (Leiter 
and Maslach 1988; Maslach, Schaufeli and Leiter, 2001; Cameron, Mazer, Deluca, 
Mohile and Epstein, 2015; Van Mol, Kompanje, Benoit, Bakker and Nijkamp, 2015; 
Cocker and Joss, 2016; Sorenson, Bolick, Wright and Hamilton, 2016; Papadopoulos 
and Ali, 2016; Sorenson, Bolick, Wright and Hamilton, 2017; Maslach and Leiter, 
2017). Worryingly, compassion fatigue can reach ‘zombie phase’ in which 
professionals completely lose sight of the needs of those they are there to help 
(Grant et al., 2019, p.2). 
 
The literature concerning individuals indicates that developing other-orientated 
feelings stimulates altruism, but that one’s level of affective resource can moderate 
any effect. Here, it appears that healthcare organisations are beset with employee 
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populations whose levels of affective resource are lowered. Critically, the emotional 
demands of working in human services industries exhaust employee capacity to 
engage with, or respond to, users’ needs, and those involved seek to manage the 
emotional strains of such work by distancing themselves from it, which can result in 
their becoming excessively detached from clients, dehumanising them or even 
treating them callously (Maslach, Schaufeli and Leitner, 2001). Exploring this 
problem in UK healthcare, Crawford and colleagues identify the erosion of 
compassion mentalities (Crawford, Gilbert, Gilbert, Gale and Harvey, 2013). They 
ascertained the presence of such a mentality in professionals’ reduced use of 
compassionate language, increased use of production line terminology, linguistic 
attempts to put emotional distance between them and their patients and adoption 
of a lexicon which indicates that their focus is on processing patients to meet 
organisational goals. All this suggests that the argument put forward by Ballatt and 
Campling (2011) that the culture of the modern health service is poorly suited to 
managing the emotional labour involved is correct. As shown in the discussion of 
individual affective traits, other-suffering emotions promote altruism. In a context 
where these are collectively muted, altruism is far less likely. So, an important 
question for altruism as an organisational construct, therefore, is how organisations 
can maintain a high level of collective affective resource, in particular those 
emotions, such as compassion, which promote altruism.  
 
Another theory put forward by Crawford and colleagues, which might explain the 
absence of concern for others’ suffering within healthcare is the presence of threat 
cultures (Crawford, Brown, Kvangarsnes and Gilbert, 2014). These are characterised 
by: 'discourses of insecurity’; significant pace or pressure, evident in employees’ 
perception of 'working to the clock' or 'under the eye of the clock'; their having to 
do so with strained resources or limited staffing capacity; and their having to handle 
the negative consequences of failing to meet organisational targets; as well as 
intensive approaches within clinical domains (Crawford et al., 2014, p.3592). 
Crawford and colleagues argue that such cultures actually create mental states 
which push employees to focus on their own self-defence and eschew other-
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orientated emotional stances inside organisations. So, reduced affective capacity or 
emotional resource may be attributable to contexts which are insecure or unstable 
and heighten their agents’ sense of vulnerability. Drawing on this model, one can 
speculate that collectively self-orientated, other-avoiding agent populations are the 
most significant early warning sign for affective lapse in healthcare settings. Though 
no systematic study of threat culture in the sector appears to have been undertaken 
as yet, evident cultures of blame and bullying discussed earlier appear to support 
their theory.   
 
Though it may play a very important role for altruism as an organisational construct, 
reduced affective capacity is unlikely to explain an absence of prosocial activity inside 
organisations on its own. Another explanation may be found in ethical breaches. 
Moral responsibility is an inextricable part of the healthcare sector’s identity 
(Pijnenburg and Gordijn, 2005). Problematically, in the UK a number of healthcare 
scandals or failures have been characterised by the unethical treatment of patients 
(Redfern, 2001; Dewar and Boddington, 2004; Knights, Wood and Barclay, 2013, 
Kirkup, 2015; Gallagher and Gannon, 2018). The organisational ethics underpinning 
healthcare can be framed as the need to provide care with compassion, an approach 
in which the healthcare organisation’s role is that of caregiver, its stakeholders are 
patients and its values are those of trust and compassion, but it might also be framed 
as acting in the public spirit, an approach in which its role is that of helping citizens, 
its stakeholders are the community and its values are those of community benefit 
and the common good (Winkler, Gruen and Sussman, 2005). Breaches of the former 
compassionate caregiving role may be seen as affective lapses, caused by reduced 
affective resources. Breaches of the latter public spirited treatment of patients as 
citizens may be considered as ethical lapses, potentially caused by a contraction of 
the organisation’s moral sphere to exclude outsiders.  
 
The previous chapter on individuals showed how their morally founded views about 
others may (or may not) promote altruism. Our beliefs can be neutral. So, 
organisational cultures might play a role in promoting or inhibiting altruistic 
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behaviour towards members by stimulating positive or negative moral evaluations. 
Organisation’s climates can incentivise ethical or unethical behaviour (Treviño at al., 
2006). The perception of organisational cultures as fair or just has a significant 
impact on altruism (Chahal and Mehta, 2010). By way of a highly illustrative example, 
in a correlational study of ten businesses (five family owned firms and five non-family 
firms), Ceja, Escartín and Rodríguez-Carballeira (2012) found that the perception of 
internal organisational contexts as balanced or positive correlated with high levels 
of altruism and low levels of mobbing (negative acts such as withholding 
information), whilst perceptions of them as unbalanced or negative led to the exact 
opposite, low altruism and high mobbing. However, studies have also shown that 
while perceiving organisational climates as just stimulates prosocial behaviour 
amongst employees who are already highly orientated towards others, the effect is 
much reduced amongst those with less well developed other-related stances (De 
Dreu and Nauta, 2009). So, an ethical climate may still be somewhat dependent for 
its influence upon the moral stances of employees.  
 
In their model of ethical behaviour inside organisations, Kish-Gephart and colleagues 
argue that whilst employees’ moral development will influence their ethical or 
unethical intentions or behaviour towards others, the process will be influenced by 
whether the culture is ethical and the climate is benevolent or principled (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010). According to this model, benevolent climates are those in 
which employees are altruistically concerned with the welfare of others. They found 
substantial evidence in the literature that organisations can function as ‘bad barrels’ 
with social environments that promote unethical choices within their boundaries. In 
particular, those with cultures that promote everyone for themselves encourage 
unethical actions towards others, whereas those which benevolently direct their 
employees’ attention to staff and customer wellbeing, or principledly direct them to 
follow rules which safeguard the organisation and its members, will promote ethical 
action. Although the model is not designed to explain altruism, the way it takes 
account of the moral tenor of organisational cultures in the mistreatment of 
members may help to explain ethical lapses within healthcare.   
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Affective explanations of healthcare failure indicate how prosocial behaviour may be 
undermined by a lack of positively directed other-orientated emotions within 
organisations. Moral or ethical models suggest how prosocial behaviour might be 
undermined by an absence of positively directed other-orientated values or beliefs 
inside an organisation. However Kish-Gephart’s model allows for both influences. 
This is very much in keeping with Canter et al.’s (2017) argument that affective 
motivations for altruism also require ethical toleration of, or principled stances 
towards, others if they are to be effectual, and vice versa. Both are required. Drawing 
on Kish-Gephart’s model, one can speculate that cultures which are characterised by 
a combined absence of principled or benevolent stances might explain healthcare 
organisations’ well-evidenced mistreatment of users in particular. For altruism as an 
organisational construct, it suggests that both the moral and emotional tenor of 
organisational cultures may be relevant.  
 
A couple of models more discretely explore the role of normative elements within 
organisational cultures on altruism. As already noted Clarkson (2014) gives 
normative influences considerable prominence, envisaging an interaction between 
individual and collectivist altruistic norms. Li, Kirkman and Porter (2014) develop a 
team based model of altruism, which pertinently depicts normative influences that 
might affect the development of altruistic team-level motives over time. In their 
workplace model, team-altruism is defined as: 
 
‘team members’ interdependent, voluntary actions benefiting others (e.g., 
fellow team members, their own team as a whole, those outside the team) 
that involve self- sacrifice and are not mandated by central authorities (e.g., 
team leaders, managers) or formal sanctions.' (p.541). 
 
By way of an example, they identify teams collectively sharing the work of a 
colleague who is ill. Within this model, altruism is prosocially motivated to enable 
team members to get along. In the initial stage, team members individual altruistic 
actions foster coordination processes which promote such behaviour at a team level 
between in-group members. The process is then normatively sustained, encouraging 
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followers to behave altruistically as well in order to meet their colleague’s 
expectations.23 Thus, although altruism may be initiated by just a few team 
members, norms arise in which it becomes more generally expected or accepted, 
and a motivational shift occurs in line with that, in which team members adapt to 
meet (and fit in with) expectational circumstances for reputational purposes. 
Although these models helpfully provide a normative foundation for altruism, they 
are perhaps somewhat limited in their applicability to the complexities of healthcare 
environments.  
 
A more useful exploration of how relevant cultural or normative influences might 
work together in this sector may be found in the research of Scott on institutions. 
Scott (2003) defines institutions as ‘a system composed of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that act to produce meaning, stability and order’ (p.879). 
According to his thesis, institutional order is underpinned by: regulative factors 
which influence behaviour by means of rule-setting, monitoring mechanisms and 
sanctioning systems; normative factors which establish social expectations, 
prescriptions and obligations and cultural-cognitive elements which create shared 
meaning (Scott, 2003). Importantly, for a study of altruism, institutions establish 
patterns of social interaction which could involve behavioural expectations of 
prosociality or reciprocity between organisational agents or between agents and 
users, as well as towards the organisation as a whole.  
 
Within Scott’s regulative dimension one might speculate that people help as a 
matter of expediency, doing so because of rules that require it, their legitimacy 
coming from formal sanctions associated with inaction. Helping in such 
circumstances would not be considered altruistic, since potential givers’ actions are 
a matter of egoistic compliance.24 Importantly, however such rules could make 
 
 
23 Somewhat along the same lines as Kish-Gephart, this model allows for moral principles as well as positive 
emotional orientations towards others, though the latter construct is conceptualised as empathy rather than 
benevolence. However, it does not explore their interaction deeply.  
24 Despite this are Civil assistance laws may oblige bystanders to provide first aid or assist someone in danger (e.g. 
in Germany and France). More pertinently, Good Samaritan laws (e.g. Canada) can protect bystanders who seek to 
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altruism more or less costly. For example, a ‘Duty to Speak Up’ in healthcare would 
make whistleblowing less costly. Moving on to his normative dimension, people 
might help others as a matter of social obligation, with the legitimacy arising from 
moral stances about helping, such as those discussed in the section on individual 
beliefs (see. 2.2.2). In such circumstances, helping could be egoistic, altruistic or 
both. Lastly, within the cultural cognitive dimension, helping others may (or may not) 
be a taken for granted action, prompted by certain schema, with legitimacy arising 
from broader cultural conceptualisations about helping others.  
 
One can draw on Scott’s modelling of institutional theory in healthcare to theorise 
about the nature of institutional influences on altruistic helping (Ruef and Scott, 
1998; Scott, 2008). The effects he predicts might be seen in a consideration of the 
elderly. Hospital routines, for example, could have protocols or standards related to 
the increased dependencies of the elderly, covering aspects such as falls or 
dementia. These might be legitimised by hospital rules, professional bodies or 
national regulators. Following these could not be deemed altruistic. However, 
alongside those routines there may be normative drivers. Certain roles, such as 
nursing, may be infused with expectations about compassion, which morally or 
socially oblige postholders to behave towards patients in a certain way. In addition, 
there may be broader cultural aspects which enhance this. There could be certain 
scripts about how the elderly should be treated, for example with respect or 
deference. Thus, a healthcare assistant might undertake more small acts of personal 
kindness towards senior citizens on the ward than other patients because of their 
age. What is lacking in such an assessment is the feelings which staff may have about 
the elderly. Alongside certain shared schema about this group which stipulates 
respectful or courteous treatment will be employees’ affective responses. Sympathy 
for an older person’s genuine frailty could promote altruism. However less positive 
social emotions, such as disgust precipitated by their physical symptoms could 
 
 
help victims from being sued for wrongdoing.  
 62 
inhibit it. Scott’s model does not necessarily align easily with affective explanations 
of altruism.  
 
Despite this, explanations of why altruistic or prosocial behaviour is inhibited in 
healthcare may be found in conflicts between Scott’s pillars. In healthcare, there is 
a definite clash between the institutional espousing of humanistic norms of altruism 
and compassion and some of the more implicit customs or cultural practices evident 
in medicine (Burks and Kobus, 2012). Crawford and colleague’s model of threat 
culture (2014), for example, implies that the NHS is a site of conflict between the 
regulatory pillar, in the form of institutionalised targets, and the cultural pillar, in the 
form of shared beliefs about treating patients compassionately. Just such a dialogue 
is evident in their studies of health care practitioner language which reveal moral or 
normative imperatives to act in particular ways alongside rules-based recognition or 
acceptance that one might not necessarily be free to do so (Crawford et al., 2013). 
Employees’ language indicated tensions between their professional norms about 
patient care and the organisation’s formal expectations of performance. Helpfully, 
Scott (2003) recognises that different pillars may predominate in different settings. 
What this indicates for altruism as an organisational construct is the need to allow 
for different cultural or institutional elements directing staff in directly contradictory 
ways that might compromise helping.  
 
Arguably, these tensions expose organisational members to significant conflict. 
Firstly, internal psychological conflict might arise as staff seek to balance the 
different imperatives or constraints created by these different pillars within their 
workplace environment. That might promote negative affective states, such as 
feeling guilty, or negative cognitive states, such as feeling inefficacious. The former 
might constitute a form of self-sanctioning.25 Importantly for altruism as an 
 
 
25 There is a substantial body of evidence in that positive or negative sanctioning (or norm enforcement) is one of 
the main methods used to compel prosocial behaviour from others within groups and institutions (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
Negative sanctions might include informal actions, such excluding or ostracising employees, as well as the exercise 
of more formal penalties. Positive sanctions might include informal actions such as casual praise or tacit approval, 
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organisational construct there are significant self-imposed sanctions associated with 
not helping others. Staff may, for example, experience shame, blame themselves or 
feel responsible for inaction (Shroeder et al, 1995). The discussion of such personal 
traits at the individual level (see 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) has already illustrated the 
inhibitory influence of such traits for altruism. A second source of internal conflict 
might be that between legitimating authorities seeking to uphold elements within 
different pillars. This would create a negative relational environment. The negative 
impact of relational conflict on prosociality was established earlier in this chapter 
(see 3.1). In healthcare, the fight between professional and managerial legitimacy 
identified by Scott is likely to be a significant source of such conflict (Scott, 1998; 
Scott; 2008). It may generate intense other-sanctioning inside organisations as 
different authorities seek to enforce compliance. Intense sanctioning could create 
an environment in which prosocial action is much more costly. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, where the costs for helping imposed by an organisation are high, 
altruism is likely to be inhibited.  
 
3.3 Organisational Architecture and Altruism   
 
As physical entities, organisations are constituted by means of interlocking 
structures and systems through which their activities are led, managed, resourced 
and delivered. For the purpose of this study, such features are called an 
organisation’s activity architecture. As this section will show, altruistic or helping 
behaviour is influenced by the autonomy allowed to (or the constraint exercised 
over) organisational members by this architecture, as well as the resources available 
within it and any costs or rewards for helping members that it creates (see Figure 5 







as well as official rewards, awards, titles and so on 
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Starting with organisational governance, leaders wield significant influence over 
prosocial behaviour. Support from leaders, their rules, or our power to influence 
them, govern how we manage tensions between our personal interests and the 
broader group’s collective interests (Van Lange et al., 2013). In theory, leaders might 
promote prosocial behaviour by modelling it as acceptable or desirable, by 
supporting, rewarding or penalising employees who undertake such actions or by 
means of the constraints and restrictions they impose on staff. Leadership itself has 
a significant and consistently positive relationship with prosocial behaviour inside 
organisations (Organ and Ryan, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 2000; Asgari, Silong, Ahmad 
and Samah, 2008; Chahal and Mehta, 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2014; De Geus et al., 
2020). Styles of leadership associated with altruism include: authentic leadership, 
which demonstrates or encourages prosocial behaviour by means of moral or ethical 
factors such as transparency; spiritual leadership, which does so by means of virtues 
such as justice or compassion; transformational leadership, which does so by means 
of visions or values; and servant leadership which models prosocial behaviours such 
as stewardship or healing (Vieweg, 2018).  
 
A number of the models seeking to explain altruistic or prosocial behaviour 
incorporate a role for organisational leaders to some degree (Kanov et al., 2004; 
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Dutton et al., 2006; Treviño et al., 2007; Lilius et al., 2011; Lilius et al., 2012; Clarkson, 
2014; Dutton et al., 2014). In their model of relational responding, Lilius and 
colleagues acknowledge a significant role for leadership (Lilius et al., 2011; Lilius et 
al., 2012). They argue that it promotes organisational members’ responsiveness to 
colleagues’ suffering by modelling, demonstrating or legitimising the value of 
noticing pain, feeling empathic concern for those experiencing it and responding 
compassionately. How they arrange organisational resources to lessen members’ 
feelings of uncertainty or vulnerability about helping forms a part of this (Lilius et al., 
2012). Importantly, leaders may have a two-fold role in relation to others’ suffering. 
They can direct employees’ attention and empathy to others suffering by modelling 
such behaviour, or they might control and direct the size, breadth, rapidity or 
modification of organisationally co-ordinated responses to that suffering (Dutton et 
al., 2006). According to Clarkson (2014), leaders not only institute organisational 
social norms regarding the desirability of prosocial behaviour but might also teach 
staff that these are necessary for the group’s success or survival. What this means 
for organisations is that leaders can play a multi-faceted role in promoting altruism 
which can be broadly divided into normalising prosociality as desirable or practicably 
enabling it through their creation of an internal architecture which authorises, 
supports and resources it.  
 
Prosocial, altruistic or helping behaviour in the workplace is also strongly  associated 
with organisations’ construction of internal roles, tasks or routines (Podsakoff et al., 
2000; Chahal and Mehta, 2010). For organisational agents the autonomy to 
undertake extra-role activity or discretionary effort is particularly significant. Job 
autonomy plays a substantial role in generating prosocial behaviours inside 
organisations as well as enhancing service quality (Bell and Menguc, 2002). In their 
study of prosocial behaviour in the hotel industry for example, Lee, Nam, Park, and 
Lee (2006) found that empowerment had a significant impact on employees’ extra 
role behaviours. Similarly, in a study of business employees, Lee and Lee (2010) 
found that helping others is more likely when employees feel free to decide whether 
to help or not. However, conflict or ambiguity generated by one’s roles and 
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responsibilities, as well as the routinisation of those tasks associated with them, can 
also exert a strong negative influence on prosocial behaviour inside organisations 
(Podsakoff et al., 2000). What this means for organisations is that those which 
construct staff roles narrowly, or disempower employees more generally, are likely 
to reduce altruism within their boundaries (and vice versa). So, altruism as an 
organisational construct needs to take account of the level of autonomy, or restraint 
over responsiveness to others, which organisational architecture creates.  
 
Broader organisational pressures may also present employees with constrictive 
choices between meeting expected levels of task performance and undertaking 
extra role activities or altruistic contributions (Bergeron, 2007). In a detailed study 
of work-related stressors and employee altruism, Jex and colleagues found such an 
effect (Jex, Adams, Barchrach and Sorenson, 2003). They identify a range of 
organisational constrictions which negatively affect altruism, including reduced 
budgets, insufficient equipment or materials and interruptions. Contemplating the 
effect, they argue that these make it harder for employees to meet the requirements 
of their roles, effectively forcing them to exclude discretionary activity. The factors 
which they believe are most likely to inhibit altruism are those which restrict 
performance in some way or oblige staff to adopt trade-offs between different 
elements of it. However, they did find that levels of affective commitment to the 
organisation could moderate the process. Organisational commitment itself is an 
established predictor of altruism (Organ and Ryan 1995; Chahal and Mehta, 2010; 
De Geus et al., 2020). What this means for organisations, however, is that altruism 
is likely to be promoted by contexts in which roles are designed to be autonomous 
and structures or systems allow flexibility. Conversely, those which are more 
constrictive will create conflicts which inhibit it.26 For this reason, altruism as an 
organisational construct needs to reflect the importance of organisationally enabled 
autonomy as a promoter and organisationally enforced constraint as a potential 
 
 
26 They may even create rigidities which encourage more anti-social treatment of users (Zimbardo, 2004; Zimbardo, 
2007). 
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inhibitor. Arguably, it is the extent to which these two opposing forces infuse internal 
roles, routines and so on that affects altruism rather than those roles or routines per 
se.  
 
A number of the models seeking to explain altruistic or prosocial behaviour inside 
organisations acknowledge a role for their design of internal roles and routines 
(Kanov et al., 2004; Madden et al., 2012; Dutton et al., 2006; Lilius et al., 2012; 
Clarkson, 2014; Dutton et al., 2014). According to Kanov et al. (2004), in an 
organisation where job roles are constructed in a flexible manner, and associated 
responsibilities are wide or broad ranging, staff are more likely to see further than 
their formal boundaries and act above and beyond their position. By way of a 
somewhat different example, Dutton et al., (2006) argue that roles or routines which 
are associated with other-orientated services (such as customer service) can 
encourage responses to suffering by facilitating attention to pain and increasing 
empathy or concern for it. According to Madden et al., (2012) new roles and routines 
which promote action to address others’ needs can emerge informally inside 
organisations in response to suffering. A process is envisaged in which organisational 
agents who see others’ pain or distress modify their roles to notice, feel and respond 
to that pain, interact with each accordingly to reshape internal norms about 
suffering and then coordinate amongst themselves to generate compassionate 
responses. As these are collectivised, the organisation itself will actually change, 
altering its structure to accommodate such roles, changing its culture to evolve 
compassionate norms, expanding its routines to include compassionate responding 
and adjusting its scanning mechanisms so that pain and distress is noticed.  
 
There is an elegance and logic to such models. They explain how and why 
organisations might generate collective responses to need and coordinate them by 
means of emerging routines. However, they are perhaps less helpful in organisations 
where pain and distress are a constant source of background noise, and other-
orientated emotions are collectively reduced as a result. Such factors are evident in 
healthcare (see 3.2). They might also be less helpful in sectors where working outside 
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of established routines and practices routines is costly, irrespective of whether that 
benefits members or not. So, the architecture associated with different industries 
may be relevant in this regard. The architecture of UK healthcare delivery has 
changed substantially in recent years. Constraining forces include mechanised 
processes and delivery systems, as well as increased control over clinical activity by 
means of performance management (Ballatt and Campling, 2011; Campling, 2015). 
Professional activity has become substantially more routinised, disaggregated, 
standardised and systematised (Susskind and Susskind, 2015). However, a significant 
number of failures in patient care have been attributed to the way in which internal 
systems, processes or routines are operated (Walshe and Offen, 2001; Walshe and 
Higgens, 2002; Walshe, 2003; Walshe and Shortell, 2004). 
 
Notably, the sector is subject to increased target driven activity and performance 
management. These can subvert the primacy of patient need, replacing it with the 
requirement to reach targets or reduce costs (Berwick Report, 2013). The 
management of healthcare organisations by means of performance measurement 
systems has been associated with dysfunctional consequences for patient care, such 
focussing staff on narrower aspects or targets at the expense of more holistic 
attention to patient need or their welfare as a whole (Mannion and Braithwaite, 
2012).27 What such features do is structurally and systemically reduce the autonomy 
of what one does, how one does it, when and where to do it, as well as to whom and 
in what order. Critically, such constraints significantly erode the discretion for 
altruism which Szulc (2020) identified as individually necessary, but at a systemic or 
organisational level. Moreover, altruism requires attention to, or appreciation of 
need, which such constraints may also obviate through a collective narrowing of 
agents’ concentration or the attentional scanning which Madden et al., (2012) say is 
 
 
27 There are 12 such consequences arising from poor measurement (measurement fixation, tunnel vision, myopia, 
ossification, anachronism and quantification privileging), from misplaced incentives and sanctions (complacency, 
silo-creation, overcompensation, undercompensation, insensitivity and increased inequality), from breach of trust 
(misrepresentation, gaming, misinterpretation, bullying, erosion of trust and reduced staff morale), and from the 
politicisation of performance systems (political grandstanding and creating a diversion),’ (Mannion and Braithwaite, 
2012, p.569). 
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needed. In healthcare, failing to scan for patient need would erode good care as well 
as inhibit altruism. Critically, this is an expansion of the regulatory pillar 
conceptualised by Scott (2003). It may be seen as an increase in this pillar’s 
importance, as well as the driver of increasingly complex rules, regulations and so 
on, which constrain the autonomy evidently needed for altruism. Certainly, some of 
the dysfunctional consequences identified by Mannion and Braithwaite might be 
associated with that. By way of example, fixating on certain targets might arise as a 
result of external regulation 
 
Another constraint which emerges in healthcare is that of resources. Their relevance 
to altruism concerns their influence on employees’ collective capacity or capability 
to help, or their perception of such. Transposing the importance of personal 
resources for altruism identified at the individual level into an organisational context 
raises questions about the collective abundance or scarcity of internal helping 
capacity. In UK healthcare, jobs are characterised by high workloads, conflict 
between different aspects of this and significant time pressures (Ballatt and 
Campling, 2011). Stressful or strained internal conditions reduce agents’ collective 
cognitive or affective capacity (Leiter and Maslach, 1988; Maslach and Leiter, 2017). 
Studies show that misalignment between the mental, physical or emotional 
demands of healthcare roles and the personal, social or organisational resources 
available to meet them create disengaged, exhausted and emotionally depleted staff 
populations, who exhibit reduced self-worth (Lee and Ashforth, 1996; Demerouti, 
Bakker, Nachreiner and Schaufeli, 2000; Zapf, Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini and Holz, 
2001; Tsang et al., 2012; Reader and Gillespie, 2013).  
 
Thus, organisations may arrange their architecture in ways which are unconducive 
to altruism. This is twofold. Firstly, there is their impact on employees’ collective 
personal resource, their personal capacity with which to help others, by means of 
how work is organised or arranged. Importantly for altruism at an organisational 
level, structural or architectural features can be arranged or combined in ways which 
deplete employee capacity. Secondly, there is their control over the provision of 
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other tangible or physical resources, that is the time, money, colleagues, equipment 
or facilities with which to help others. Altruism as an organisational construct needs 
to allow for the possibility that prosocial activity can be undermined by a 
misalignment between helping need and helping resource. Such misalignment is 
likely to lessen the belief that one is able to help others at a group or organisational 
level. There is a question about why prosocial organisational practices do not always 
emerge as Madden et al., (2012) envisaged even when internal organisational 
architecture allows an element of freedom and flexibility. Reduced resources, or 
helping demand-resource misalignment, is one logical explanation of why this might 
not happen.  
 
Another logical explanation is the extent to which organisational architecture 
(combined with organisational culture) creates costs or rewards for acting 
altruistically. Thus, when one is free to act, an associated reward might encourage 
you to help others, while an associated cost might deter you from doing so. Reward-
related patterns inside organisations increase prosocial behaviour when employees 
value the rewards being offered, see their leaders as controlling those rewards, and 
believe they are contingent upon behaviour (Podsakoff et al., 2000). However, 
helping is generally a loss-making activity in which rewards are likely to be 
outweighed by the combined physical or psychological ones of responding (Latané , 
Nida and Wilson, 1981). Piliavin and colleagues identify a cost-reward matrix which 
governs altruism (Piliavin, Rodin and Piliavin, 1969; Piliavin and Charng, 1990;  
Piliavin, 2009). Within this matrix, the costs of helping include the effort you need to 
put into it, the harm which might arise out of it, the unpleasant, disgusting or 
distasteful experiences which might occur whilst doing so and any psychological 
costs associated with that, such as embarrassment. The costs for not helping include 
the blame you ascribe to yourself or the censure you receive or expect from others 
for your inaction. Rewards include praise from yourself or others for helping, or the 
freedom or capacity to continue with other activities for not helping. For 
organisations, the cost and reward matrix created by their internal operating 
environment is likely to have a significant impact on employee altruism. Those which 
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impose high costs for helping (such as burnout or compassion fatigue) as is the case 
in healthcare are likely to inhibit altruism.  
 
According to Piliavin and colleagues’ model, helping is likely when action is cheap 
(but inaction is expensive), unlikely when helping is expensive (but inaction is cheap), 
or open to both possibilities if both choices are costly, when it is likely to be swayed 
by normative influences (Piliavin et al., 1969; Walster and Piliavin, 1972). 
Transposing this matrix into healthcare, a nurse might experience a high cost for 
whistleblowing. A significant physical cost for this might include the loss of one’s 
livelihood or even the ejection from one’s industry. There might also be social costs, 
such as censure or ostracization by one’s colleagues. Because patient welfare is 
being neglected, there would also be a high cost for not whistleblowing, the 
potential guilt precipitated by inaction. In these circumstances, norms about how 
patients should be treated might sway the decision to act. However, norms about 
not undermining one’s peers might encourage the opposite. One can see how the 
scales might work in favour of silence in the absence of any strong moral or ethical 
convictions. Similarly, not adhering to internal policies and systems which 
compromise care could come with a high cost, such as negative feedback from 
supervisors or more formal employment sanctions, whilst adhering to them might 
create feelings of shame.  
 
Arguably, an altruistic doctor would dismiss any costs to themselves for acting 
prosocially without a thought (McGaghie at al., 2002). However, healthcare 
environments appear to create excessive mental, physical and emotional costs for 
responding to the need or distress of others. Compassionate or empathic behaviour 
is not rewarded in this context (Camel and Glick, 1996). It would take a brave 
professional to ignore internal prescriptions concerning their roles, routines or other 
expectations such as targets, which appear to take precedence over need in certain 
healthcare environments. Unsurprisingly therefore, in a study of nurses working in 
acute care, for example, Slettmyr, Schandl and Arman (2017) found that the costs 
for altruistic acts, such as criticism from peers, made staff ambivalent about acting, 
 72 
though they also exhibited a marked sensitivity to rewards, such as feeling positive, 
being appreciated by patients (or their relatives) or seeing their contribution as 
meaningful. What is important then for altruism as an organisational construct is the 
internal structuration of costs or rewards for helping or not. The particular matrix 
which is created by the culture and the architecture of an organisation that will 
govern helping interactions. 
 
3.4 Organisational Practices and Altruism 
 
A number of models put forward to explain prosocial behaviour identify the 
emergence of certain organisational practices or collective behaviours which can 
promote action to relive another’s suffering inside organisations. This section 
synthesises the main practices which emerge from these models that appear capable 
of promoting or inhibiting altruism. These are: noticing, seeing or perceiving the pain 
or distress of others inside organisations; emotionally appreciating that pain or 
distress in ways which affectively motivate helping; and cognitively assessing those 
needs in a way which induces a belief in the need to address them (see Figure 6).  
 




Effectively, altruism should be promoted when organisational members (as a group) 








which motivate them to help and judge that it is appropriate to do so. In adopting 
the term appreciating, it is believed that both feeling and concern are relevant to our 
affective engagement with others. In adopting the term assessment, judgements 
concerning both the one in need of help and the one who could provide it are 
encompassed, as well as assessments of the costs or rewards for acting. In some 
models, responding is theorised as a practice itself, in others it is positioned as the 
effect of such practices, a placement adopted here for logical presentation and 
parsimony. 
 
Starting with the practice of perception, all models of altruistic or prosocial 
behaviour recognise the importance of noticing another’s need in the first place (see 
Table 1). Schwartz’s theory of personal norms, for example, conceptualises helping 
as a sequential decision-making process which starts with ‘attention’ (Schwartz, 
1973). Importantly, this sequence is activated by need perception, helping unfolds 
as we become aware of a situation’s potential consequences (Schwartz and Howard, 
1981). 
 







Schwartz (1973) Attending Motivating  Evaluating Helping  
Darley and Latané (1968) Noticing  Identifying Considering  Acting  
Kanov et al., (2004) Noticing  Feeling   Responding  
Dutton et al., (2006, 2014) Noticing  Feeling  Sensemaking Acting  
Miller (2007) Noticing  Connecting   Responding  
Ballatt & Campling (2011)  Attending Attuning  Kindness  
Lilius et al., (2011, 2012) Noticing  Feeling   Responding  
Way and Tracy (2012) Recognising  Relating   Reacting  
 
The importance of noticing an event, and classifying it as an emergency which 
requires action, is a practice which is also identified in bystander models. According 
to these, potential helpers must (somewhat hurriedly) go through a sequential 
decision-making process which initially involves noticing an event and identifying it 
as a situation in which help is needed, however they see the process as potentially 
inhibited by our reliance on others for social cues or signals that someone’s welfare 
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is imperilled (or not) and that action is appropriate (or not) (Darley and Latané, 1968; 
Latané and Darley, 1968; Latané and Darley, 1969).  
 
Importantly, what these models indicate is that seeing a situation as one in which 
another’s welfare is being comprised is an essential initial step. There is a primary 
and precipitating need for situations in which help is required to be recognised as 
such (Latané and Nida, 1981). However, contextual factors complicate the process 
and may even draw our attention away from noticing those who need help. The 
influence of others on our cognition that help is needed, and the attentional or 
perceptual cues or signals they provide about helping, exert a well-evidenced 
influence over the recognition process (Fischer, Krueger, Greitemeyer, Vogrincic, 
Kastenmüller, Frey, Heene, Wicher and Kainbacher, 2011; Fischer and Greitemeyer, 
2013; Hortensius and De Gelder, 2014). What this means for organisations, is that 
employees may rely on their colleagues’ behaviours for their interpretation of the 
need for altruism. So, if peers within organisations send signals that helping is 
appropriate then altruism should occur, however the opposite should happen if they 
do not.  
 
This raises some key questions for altruism as an organisational construct. Firstly, 
what internal factors will affect the cues and signals that help is needed. Thinking of 
an organisation’s cultural fabric, internal norms concerning the need for scanning 
might play a role in promoting attention to such cues. Thinking of an organisation’s 
relationships, perceptions about the significance or importance of those giving such 
cues (i.e. as being worthy of attention) might also promote noticing. Thinking of an 
organisation’s architecture, the organisation of this might increase the visibility of 
those cues and signals that helping is needed, or obscure and undermine them. In a 
hospital setting, for example, the visibility of patient cues or signals that help is 
needed might be affected by ward layouts which enable staff to see them easily, or 
the construction of routines which incorporate more holistic assessments of their 
condition. The point about need visibility in the physical workplace environment is 
worth extending.   
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Need perception is not only enhanced by the clarity or vividness of the need itself, 
but can also be reduced by any excessive environmental stimulation (stimulus 
overload) which diminishes its prominence (Shroeder et al., 1995). Studies indicate 
that noisy distractions which overload our senses, diminish altruism or helping 
(Sherrod and Downs, 1974; Mathews and Canon, 1975). Importantly, for 
organisations, uncontrollable stressors such as these can also reduce our 
interpersonal sensitivity (Cohen, 1980). That may make us less attuned to others’ 
welfare needs or distress signals. So, although the attention-grabbing noisiness of 
the need or event itself may be important, so is the potentially attentionally-
distracting environmental noise which surrounds it. As a construct, organisational 
altruism should, therefore, take account of the possibility for such noise and 
interference. An issue for organisations will be what noise they create. At this point 
such a factor is presumed to arise from a combination of culture and architecture. 
 
The process of noticing is reflected in practically every subsequent model of altruism. 
Most pertinently for healthcare, Ballatt and Campling identify a process of cyclical 
kindness in healthcare settings which is precipitated by attentiveness (Ballatt and 
Campling, 2011; Campling, 2014; Campling 2015). In this model, a prosocial cycle of 
agent behaviour towards patients follows in which staff attentiveness to patients 
generates attunement which builds trust between them, generating a better 
therapeutic alliance that leads to improved outcomes, ultimately fostering a sense 
of kinship which promotes kindness.28 Within the model, attentiveness is extremely 
broad, including noticing, thinking, feeling, learning understanding. Attunement 
concerns factors such as warm engagement and caring. Critically, Ballatt and 
Campling argue being more attentively kind to patients itself increases employees’ 
attunement. What all these models usefully indicate is how important the nature of 
attentiveness is. It is not enough for members to notice need, perceiving events as 




28 In kindness they incorporate warmth, generosity, sympathy and compassion. 
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One must, however, ask what factors in healthcare might create attentionally 
distracting environmental noise that could subvert the attentional element upon 
which altruism is founded. The literature is somewhat silent on this aspect, but this 
review indicates that the emotional distress of agents or users might be one such 
factor. For healthcare, there may be a very particular problem where altruism is 
concerned, in that traditional signals of someone’s need for aid, their shouts, cries 
or expressions of pain, are both widespread and potentially indistinguishable. So, 
how can an emergency be visible in a field of emergencies, where distress is 
endemic? How does one notice need in a sea of suffering? The normal cues and 
signals which promote altruism may be completely undermined such a context. It is 
hoped the study can shed light on this. It may be a particularly sectoral feature 
wielding influence over organisational altruism.  
 
Turning from noticing to appreciating, some of the altruistic practices which emerge 
from within organisations are affectively formulated. Ballatt and Campling’s 
attunement is just such a feature. However, the most useful depictions of affective 
practices that promote prosociality come from the field of workplace compassion. 
Such models concern themselves with how other-orientated actions or emotions 
emerge and are collectively practiced, propagated and legitimised inside 
organisations in response to member suffering. While these models also begin with 
the practice of noticing, this is also followed by a well-defined and clearly articulated 
practice of feeling. In Kanov and colleague’s foundational model in this field, 
organisational compassion occurs when ‘members of a system collectively notice, 
feel, and respond to pain experienced by members of that system’ (Kanov et. al, 
2004, p.810). According to the model, processes become collective when they are 
both legitimated by an organisation’s context and widely shared amongst, or 
propagated by, its members, as well as cooperatively delivered. They argue that 
collective feeling is more likely to emerge when organisational culture, routines, 
practices and leadership endorse the articulation or sharing of suffering and less 
likely in those which force their members to hide or suppress such feelings. 
Importantly, they acknowledge that organisational features, such as shared values 
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or set policies, can inhibit the degree to which those inside them see each other’s 
suffering, believe it is deserving of such notice and share their awareness of it 
amongst the membership.  
 
There is a growing body of evidence to support these patterns which are often 
termed compassion organising, however in a recent review Kanov and colleagues 
concluded that empathic responses cannot fully explain how or why compassion 
develops in some workplaces (but not others) leading them to speculate that 
organisational uncertainties might do so (Kanov, Powley and Walshe, 2017). They 
argue that personal, relational and organisational uncertainties will all affect focal 
actors’ uncertainty about suffering and can lead them to miss, avoid or even dismiss 
cues of others’ suffering. Such a feature is intimated in Crawford and colleague’s 
(2014) theory of threat cultures, whereby organisational uncertainties, and the 
potential for blame or instability they create, reduce collective affective capacity to 
discern, cope with or respond to other’s suffering. For this reason, the highly 
prevalent instabilities and uncertainties evident in healthcare settings may be 
another source of attentionally-distracting noise which inhibits altruism. The study 
may be able to show if this is the case.  
 
Other theorists have extended the Kanov model, albeit retaining the central 
importance of feeling. In a study of how compassion emerged in the wake of a fire 
on a university campus, Dutton and colleagues found that students and faculty 
collectively noticed the fire, exhibited feelings of empathetic concern for those 
affected and then coordinated action to relieve their distress, organising 
accommodation, clothes and so on (Dutton et. al, 2006). However, in their model 
they elevate the prominence of contextual factors in explaining this, with an 
extended consideration of organisational systems, values, routines and networks. 
Terming these factors social architecture, they argue that they direct attention to 
others, aid the development of concern for their suffering and provide the means to 
obtain and utilise resources to address it. This is one of the few models in the 
literature that gives real parity to processual and organisational factors.  
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On the back of a recent review of the literature for such a model, Dutton, Workman 
and Hardin (2014) extended it further to take account of focal actors’ sensemaking 
in conjunction with those who need help and in response to outcomes. The process 
is located inside three potentially influential, but increasingly distal domains, which 
span out from that central process. One includes the actor’s personal context, their 
individual differences or organisational roles. Another concerns their relational 
context, which includes their similarity or closeness to beneficiaries, as well as any 
power dynamics. The last is the organisational context, which incorporates shared 
values, beliefs, norms, any internal practices, as well as leaders and the structure and 
quality of internal relationships. This modelling gives much greater emphasis to the 
interaction between potential givers and helpers through sensemaking, which both 
affects, and is affected, by the central noticing, feeling and acting processes. It 
ascribes a significant mutuality to need assessment which is missing from other 
discussions of compassion organising.  
 
Drawing on interviews with a wide range of service professionals, Miller (2007) 
concluded that compassionate communication between organisational agents and 
users is underpinned by processes which involve not just noticing a need for help, 
but also active information-gathering about those who need it and the context 
within which they are located, leading to the argument that the feeling element 
might be better framed as a connecting process because of its combination of 
cognitive elements (i.e. perspective-taking) with affective ones. Framed thus, 
connecting combines various cognitive aspects evident in Ballatt and Campling’s 
(2011) attentiveness domain, such as learning and understanding, together with 
some of the affective aspects from their attunement domain, such as empathy. In an 
attempt to transpose the Kanov model into health and care settings, Way and Tracy, 
(2012) found evidence to support a refinement of practices into recognising (rather 
than noticing), relating (rather than feeling) and reacting (rather than responding). 
Drawing on the practices of nurses, social workers and other care related 
occupations they argue that noticing practices are too confined to matters of 
awareness or observation, whereas recognising indicates a much richer 
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understanding of other cues and features which might undermine them. The 
argument has merit. Similarly, they felt that feeling is better replaced by relating 
since that allows for both cognitive connections and affective associations.29 Both 
these models helpfully extend the Kanov one with a more distinct (and somewhat 
separate) delineation of the evaluations which might underpin a decision to address 
another’s suffering as opposed to a desire to do so. 
 
One of the limitations of the models which emerge from the field of compassion 
organisation is their reliance on those structures which are used to deliver work day-
to-day. While this is essential for capturing the multiplicity of internal factors, it does 
not necessarily yield an understanding of the more dysfunctional elements within 
organisations which might inhibit responses to other’s suffering. Moreover, their 
emergence from one emotion could be said to hamper their consideration of 
cognitive matters, such as beliefs or values. If one turns from how one feels to how 
one thinks, it raises the matter of what other cognitively based practices might 
emerge inside organisations, and, by being internally collectivised, legitimised and 
propagated, promote prosociality. Way and Tracy do recognise the need to add a 
stronger cognitive element alongside affective factors. However, while their 
combination of these two elements under ‘relating’ addresses a weakness in 
affectively based expositions of compassion organising models, conceptualising 
them separately might make it easier to distinguish between organisational factors 
which promote or inhibit altruism by means of their impact on our affective qualities 
or capacities and those which do so by means of their influence on our cognitive 
qualities or capacities.  
 
Evidence at the individual level, which indicates that beliefs about oneself or others 
can promote altruism (even if they do not always do so), certainly suggests that there 
is a strong case for including an evaluating or assessing practice in any consideration 
 
 
29 They a prefer  (Re)Acting  since their studies suggest that the processes are not linear. 
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of altruism as an organisational construct. A few of the models already explored do 
seek to explain altruistic or prosocial behaviour to some extent by means of the 
moral judgements we make about ourselves or others (Schwartz, 1973; Treviño et 
al., 2007; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Clarkson, 2014). Schwartz’s theory of personal 
norms for example, identifies how motivation, which is precipitated by value-based 
expectations of oneself, leads to an ‘evaluation’ of the associated costs or benefits 
of helping which might even prompt thoughts of ‘defence’ which could inhibit 
helping (Schwartz, 1973). Along these lines, McGaghie and colleagues’ (2002) layer 
of discernment and judgment, which sits between professionals’ compassionate 
core and the external world, and helps them navigate decisions about the 
appropriateness of altruistic responses, might be reconceptualised as an 
evaluational practice. This would make sense given its role in managing altruistic 
under or over commitment. Drawing on these models, assessing is included as a 
practice alongside noticing and appreciating, even though it has not been as 
fulsomely and discretely studied for its potential. 
 
Importantly for such a practice, altruism does not emerge in a vacuum, it is not 
without interference or resistance. We assess users, who may be collectively valued 
or devalued inside organisations, as worthy or unworthy of help. We assess 
ourselves as able to, or responsible for, providing that help. We assess situations as 
likely to impose costs or rewards upon us for doing so. What is especially important 
for altruism as an organisational construct, is that there are many ways in which it 
appears that our evaluation or assessment of helping need can be stymied by 
organisationally stimulated defensive practices. According to Schwartz’s (1973) 
model, defensive actions absolve us of helping by denying that help is needed, that 
there is an effective remedy, or that one is able to help and responsible for doing so. 
In Lerner’s just-world hypothesis, one can defend oneself from having to help by 
distorting one’s perceptions of the situation, devaluing the victim or lessening the 
perceived harmfulness of actions performed against them (Lerner and Miller, 1978). 
In this way, absolving oneself of censure for moral misconduct can make altruism 
unnecessary or avoidable. Even if our assessments lead us to recognise a situation 
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as one in which help is required, we can still evade responsibility by means of 
defensive evaluations. Studies show that we absolve ourselves of self-censure or 
blame by: conceptualising our harm of others as having a righteous function; 
disclaiming responsibility for the harmful effect of our behaviour; or repudiating the 
value of those harmed (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara and Pastorelli, 1996). 
Importantly, if the costs of not helping are transformed, altruism may be reduced. 
The reason this is important is that where such distortions become an integral part 
of organisational members’ assessment practices, it could inhibit altruism.  
 
For altruism as an organisational construct, defensive practices may provide a 
primary source of explanations for why helping does not occur. In their model, Ballatt 
and Campling (2011) argue that a cycle of kindness can reduce staff defensiveness. 
However, defensive practices in healthcare can thwart the very attentiveness or 
attunement upon which their model stands. In her ground-breaking study of social 
structured defence mechanisms in hospitals, Isobel Menzies-Lyth (1960) identified 
nurses’ depersonalisation of patients and detachment from their own feelings. The 
former mechanism is characterised by their denial of patients’ significance as 
individuals, categorising rather than personalising them.30 Detachment is 
characterised by their suppression of feelings or attachment to others. Another 
related practice is splitting up of the nurse patient relationship so that one does not 
deal with the totality of the patient. These might be called emotionally-detaching or 
other-distancing practices and are particularly relevant for altruism in their potential 
to obviate the ‘appreciation’ of need. They would preclude the feeling or 
appreciating practices identified in this section. Further practices Menzies-Lyth 
identified include ritualistic task performance, diffused or generalised responsibility 
and an avoidance of change. These might be conceived of as cognitively detaching 
or responsibility-avoiding practices, since they obviate specific ownership of 
decisions about care or organisation. They would preclude the evaluating or 
 
 
30 Calling a patient the ‘liver in bed ten’ rather than by their name is an example. 
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assessing practice outlined above. Other caring professionals show similar patterns 
of defensiveness (Krantz, 2010; Whittaker, 2011). 
 
What this suggests for altruism as an organisational construct, is that assessment 
may be partly characterised by protecting or defending oneself from any calls upon 
one’s resources or obligation to help others. Employees may collectively adopt 
protective or defensive assessment strategies to minimise the impact of the needs 
of their colleagues or clients, dampen their feelings about others’ suffering and 
better manage their own anxieties or uncertainties. Thinking of an organisation’s 
cultural fabric, internal norms concerning the worth of others are likely to influence 
the assessment practice, by the significance (or unimportance) they attach to the 
needs of different groups, thereby generating positive or negative evaluations of the 
requirement to help them. Similarly, thinking of an organisation in terms of the 
relationships between its members, these might create an emotional closeness 
which alter the significance of such assessments, promoting greater or lesser 
altruism as a consequence. Thinking of an organisation’s activity architecture, the 
different costs or rewards for helping may influence the outcome of such 
assessments.  
 
Drawing all this to a conclusion, a number of factors appear capable of promoting or 
inhibiting altruism within the organisational context (see Figure 7). These include: 
the quality of relationship between organisational members, which might encourage 
or discourage helping; the cultural fabric of an organisation, the extent to which its 
culture, climate, norms and expectations encourage or normalise altruism; and the 
architecture which structures or governs internal activity, including the extent to 
which this constrains helping and aligns helping need with helping resources. Costs 
or rewards, which might make helping expensive (or not), will arise from an 
organisation’s culture and architecture combined.   
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Figure 7: Organisational Altruism Constructs 
 
These factors can affect altruism by means of their impact on organisational 
members’ collective helping capacity or resource. They can also stimulate or subdue 
the emergence of altruistic practices inside the organisational context. The emergent 
practices which appear most likely to encourage altruism are those in which 
members are collectively more inclined or enabled to: notice another’s need, 
appreciate it and assess it as worthy of redress (see Figure 8 on the next page). 
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What is most notably absent from the literature is a model which explains how and 
why altruism is inhibited. One can speculate from a number of strands in this review 
that altruism would be inhibited by practices in which organisational members 
collectively: ignore or avoid other’s needs; are or become unable to appreciate or 
enter into their distress, responding instead with indifference; or eschew any moral 
or ethical responsibility to respond. These are captured in Figure 9 and provisionally 
termed ignoring or un-noticing, detaching or distancing and disengaging or 
defending. 
  






















A conceptualisation of the combined or collective effect of such practices is not 
modelled in the literature. This provides a significant gap which this study will focus 
on addressing. Questions related to this gap which the study may shed light on 
concern what noise or distractions organisations create which interfere with the 
visibility of user need and how organisational agents manage that noise in ways 
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4 CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 The Choice of a Case Study 
 
This chapter sets out the rationale for adopting a single case study design and 
explores any pertinent issues arising from that. A case study design is best suited to 
the author’s theoretical intentions and philosophical stance. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Jackson (2012), whose definition is adopted, define case study research as:  
 
‘a detailed investigation…of phenomena, within their context.…to provide 
an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate the theoretical 
issues being studied. The phenomenon is not isolated from its context….but 
is of interest precisely because the aim is to understand how behaviour 
and/or processes are influenced by, and influence context.’ (p.323).  
 
Case study methodology supports the author’s aim to generate insight into altruism 
as an organisational construct. As a form, it is particularly appropriate when: context 
is relevant or pertinent to the subject being studied; situations are complex or 
unclear; boundaries are blurred, with numerous inter-relationships; and existing 
theory is not adequate or sufficient (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley, 2000; Yin, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2009). Such features are evident in the chosen case and field of study 
where drivers of altruism are complex, unclear and likely to be inter-related. 
Moreover, existing theory in relation to the study of altruism as an organisational 
construct is limited. Thus, case study research is a suitable methodology for 
developing conceptual and theoretical understanding of altruism at this level. In line 
with the above definition, the method supports the author’s desire to develop 
altruism as an organisational concept, shed light on it in a specific organisational 
context and illuminate the organisational factors which promote or inhibit it. 
 
This method can lack rigour, be difficult to generalise from or produce results which 
are long, unwieldy and difficult to read (Yin, 2003). However, case studies are 
flexible, and able to generate theories which are credible, unbiased and open to 
testing (Hartley, 2000). If the most common pitfalls of case study research are 
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avoided, the method can provide a rigorous approach (Pratt, 2009).31 Moreover, 
case studies can generate thought-provoking questions, sharpen or illustrate existing 
concepts and even generate new theories (Siggelkow, 2007). Importantly, building 
theory from case studies not only helps researchers to understand issues that do not 
have clear answers but also enables them to tackle grander challenges (Eisenhardt, 
Graebner and Sonenshein, 2016).  
 
Case study research also suits the author’s philosophical stance. Despite 
sympathising with an objectivist position on reality, the author believes that 
identifying a single, fixed, identifiable ‘truth’ is practically impossible, since views 
about the nature of existence are influenced by human perspectives shaped by 
psychological and/or situational factors. The author shares the view that objectivity 
is a label we attach to our own certainty about the world and that the arguments or 
propositions which we put forward as ‘rational’ are not so much evidence of what is 
rational in the world as an attempt to impose our own way of seeing it on others 
(Haraway, 1988). The author sympathises with the view that ‘truth’ is socially 
constructed by those observing it, with the social world created by individuals 
through their own subjective experiences (Burrell and Morgan, 2005). However, the 
author does not see the world as created by social actors, but rather as interpreted 
by them within the ambit of their own experiences. The author believes that 
individuals are shaped by the situations and systems in which they develop or form 
their consciousness. On this basis, the author occupies a realistic middle ground 
between the extremes of positivism and constructionism. Cross-cutting in nature, 
case study research suits either stance (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Moreover, given 
its ability to work well with either orientation, it is not only suited to the author’s 




31 According to Pratt, the most common pitfalls are striving to make qualitative elements appear quantitative and 
failing to balance data and theory. 
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4.2 The Choice of Stafford Hospital  
 
It was a specific case that first attracted the author’s attention to the subject of 
kindness, compassion and altruism. This was the case of Stafford Hospital (Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Trust). This case was the subject of two national inquiries (one 
independent and one public), running over a period of seven years (from 2007 to 
2013), which investigated events at the hospital between 2005 and 2009. It involved 
two governments and four Secretaries of State for Health. It is an extreme case which 
catapulted the subject of kindness and compassion towards patients into the public 
arena at the time. It has dominated policy-making in health care ever since. Before 
settling on this case, the researcher considered nine other possible sites (see 
Appendix 1: Case Sampling). Six were drawn from healthcare. Four were drawn from 
other sectors for the purpose of contrast and comparison. This review showed that 
healthcare would be a particularly suitable sector for this work, with significant 
relevance to the study’s chosen subject.  
 
In the UK, healthcare organisations can be conceived of as having an altruistic 
purpose or prosocial mission, given altruism’s position at the core of medical practice 
(Feldman, 2017) and the National Health Service’s (NHS) foundation upon altruistic 
principles of collective provision for those who need it (Mathers, 2016). As outlined 
in the literature review, however, in this country there has been a series of 
‘egregious events’ or ‘failures’ in healthcare organisations followed by major public 
inquiries over a lengthy period of time (Walshe, 2014; Walshe, 2003). In many of 
these cases, there has been a significant lack of kindness, compassion or concern for 
the welfare of patients (Ballatt and Campling, 2011; Crawford et al., 2014; 
Department of Health, 2012; Neuberger, 2013). Theoretically, within such situations, 
the inhibitors of altruism ought to more visible.  
 
Of course, there is no single explanation for healthcare failures: rather there is a 
complex interplay of elements (Department of Health, 2000). The existence and 
repetition of failures in healthcare may be considered a grand challenge. Solving such 
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challenges requires an understanding of how effective, and ineffective, human 
interaction emerges within organisations (Eisenhardt et al., 2016). However, modern 
healthcare failures share some common themes. They tend to cause significant 
harm, to be well-known, to be longstanding, to be located in poorly functioning 
organisations and to re-occur (Walshe and Shortell, 2004). Organisational pathology 
plays a critical role in such failures, with many showing evidence of poor leadership, 
ineffective or incomplete management systems, insular cultures and disempowered 
staff or patients (Walshe, 2014). Some of these concepts, such as leadership, are 
shown to promote altruistic action. Others, such as insular cultures, have not been 
considered and may provide new sources of explanation for altruism. There are 
many barriers to the discovery of these failures, including cultures which foster 
secrecy and individual or organisational self-deception (Walshe and Shortell, 2004). 
While this complexity has no bearing on the suitability of a healthcare organisation 
as a site for this study per se, it does underscore the pertinence and value of case 
study design, with its ability to develop holistic understanding through the use of 
multiple lenses, as well as its facility to study the illicit (Hartley, 2000).  
 
Stafford Hospital is also suitable site for this study in its own right. Firstly, it is the 
most well-known and well-recorded of all of recent cases. As the subject of two 
inquiries, it also has a considerable volume of data (from a diverse range of lenses) 
compared to other cases, including oral transcripts from hearings, witness 
statements from individuals (both in and outside the hospital) and formal exhibits 
(correspondence, complaints, etc.), which makes it viable from a practical 
perspective. Moreover, since the two inquiries focus on the organisation as a whole, 
as well the behaviour of the individuals within it, the data available is broad enough 
to encompass altruism at all levels, with information about social, contextual and 
relational features as well as individual behaviours. Secondly, the extensive 
consternation this case generated about the apparent lack of kindness and 
compassion shown towards patients receiving care at the hospital makes it suitable 
in its own right for exploring questions about altruism. The case is one in which the 
organisation (as a whole), as well as its members (as individuals), was severely 
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criticised for lacking this, making it theoretically appropriate terrain. Arguably, it may 
be a ‘critical case’; one which according Flyvbjerg has ‘strategic importance in 
relation to the general problem’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.229). The alleged lack of kindness 
and compassion of its employees, which featured prominently in the inquiry, and 
was highlighted by the media and public commentary at the time, is highly relevant 
to the general problem of how organisations promote or inhibit altruistic emotions, 
actions and behaviours, giving it more strategic importance than comparable cases. 
Thirdly, the extreme nature of the case also offers prospective theoretical value. 
Extreme cases provide a valuable means of understanding how social actors operate 
within institutions and use them as a means of oppression (Martí and Fernández, 
2013). Stokes and Gabriel (2010) highlight the challenge of understanding the 
organisational and managerial processes which make genocide feasible, as well as 
the extent to which those processes apply in other circumstances. Along parallel 
lines, extreme cases of failure in healthcare are likely to be made feasible by 
organisational and managerial processes. Understanding those processes may shed 
light on what factors promote or inhibit altruism in organisational settings.  
 
Finally, a pilot study undertaken using the hospital showed that many of the 
antecedents for altruism present in the literature could be discerned in Inquiry 
material. In particular, the pilot showed high levels of help-inducing personal arousal 
or distress at the individual level (see Appendix 2: Pilot Findings). It indicated that 
patients and their relatives tended to notice the pain, suffering or distress of others, 
identify it as requiring a response and (at times) take responsibility for responding. 
This group also demonstrated a level of empathy towards others. They appeared 
able to put themselves into another’s position and appreciate their feelings. These 
factors emerged as potential altruistic promoters. Amongst employees, three factors 
emerged as possible altruistic inhibitors. These were the internal organisational 
culture, the associated stresses and strains attached to working within it and a 
perceived lack of support for staff. Overall, the emergence of such themes indicated 
that the case was a suitable and viable site for the research topic itself. 
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4.3 Design and Methodology 
 
The study began with some initial concerns, some questions, and a tentative group 
of constructs drawn from the literature. The main question is ‘what factors promote 
or inhibit altruism in organisations?’. A lack of kindness, compassion or altruism in 
organisations can harm those they actually exist to serve (their users) or those they 
employ to serve them (agents). Detecting the features which promote or inhibit 
altruism in organisations, and developing understanding of them, could identify 
ways to reduce organisational failures and decrease the harm they cause. For this 
reason, the author is especially interested in factors which inhibit altruism. The case 
has been theoretically sampled for its capacity to illuminate such questions. It is 
considered capable of making the promotion (or inhibition) of altruism visible.  
 
However, single cases have limitations. They may not turn out as expected (Yin, 
2003). They can be difficult to generalise from (Hartley, 2000). Despite this, they do 
capture the complexity of a situation (Johansson, 2003). They can also be 
tremendously powerful because of their ability to underscore the necessity of the 
research question, inspire new ideas from the rich immersive research process and 
illustrate the conceptual analysis being pursued (Siggelkow, 2007). Importantly, 
single case studies are appropriate when the case itself is unique, extreme or 
revelatory and potentially suitable for testing established theory (Yin, 2003). 
Extreme cases are well placed to address grand challenges, because they facilitate 
research which is rich and deep, advance the generation of insight that typical cases 
would obscure and help identify means of challenging the underlying problems 
(Eisenhardt et al., 2016). For that reason, the author believes that a single case is 
justified for this work. The chosen case has extreme and revealing features capable 
of illustrating the theoretical terrain under consideration.   
 
The data itself comes from documents and archival records. It includes government 
reports and organisational materials. To make selection manageable, documents 
were chosen on the basis of their usefulness in aiding the researcher to trace history, 
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check facts and counteract biases (Meyer, 2001). The archival records used for this 
work are those generated by national inquiries.32 Public inquiries offer a suitable site 
for case study research, because they provide a significant volume of material which 
is wide in range, deep in texture and easily accessed (Brown, 2005; Ainsworth and 
Hardy, 2009). Inquiry reports themselves are a credible source of information about 
cases, comprehensive in both data and analyses (Herepath and Kitchener, 2016). The 
data sources for this work were generated by the independent and public inquiries. 
The data included written statements and their accompanying physical exhibits (e.g. 
written correspondence, formal complaints) from individual witnesses. Such 
statements may be considered as falling between interviews or archival records. 
Such data can provide an understanding of how people think or behave individually, 
their perceptions or mind-sets, as well as build a picture of how an organisation 
functions (Yin, 2003). So, they are a rich source for understanding organisational 
factors. 
 
However, there are problems associated with such data. There are challenges to 
working with any narrative. Analysis requires considerable skill and diligence, as well 
as sensitive interpretive work (Boudens, 2005). Inquiries themselves constitute a 
form of sensemaking, in which different parties may present conflicting narratives in 
an attempt to impose their own interpretation of events, creating an illusion of 
agreement rather than consensus (Brown, 2004; Brown, 2005; Brown, 2018). Those 
undertaken in medical environments may seek to play down the role of medicine 
generally or its practitioners individually (Brown, 2000). Those concerning healthcare 
can be characterised by potentially distracting narratives of horror or suffering which 
detract from causes (Dewar and Boddington, 2004). They can be subject to 
languages games in which witnesses seek to ascribe legitimacy to themselves or 
other parties (Kewell, 2006). Moreover, within organisations, different voices jostle 
 
 
32 see https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150407084003/http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/ 
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to dominate and control internal narratives, in a constantly shifting and unstable 
process, while potentially offsetting each other (Brown, 2006).  
 
Brown (2000, 2004, 2005) identifies a number of strategies which can help manage 
the problem of working with secondary data within an inquiry framework. One is 
reading and re-reading the material over a lengthy period of time, while becoming 
more and more familiar with the content and increasingly selective with one’s 
attention. A second is breaking texts down into more easily managed parts, while 
creating lists of interesting features or categories. Codes adopted should allow for 
constant comparison of the material, supported by memoranda which explore their 
textual implications in reference to the questions concerned. A third strategy is 
adopting a deliberately deconstructionist approach which recognises the dualities 
present in these narratives. Such dualities might include insider versus outsider or 
positive versus negative. This strategy is intended to reveal ambiguities and 
contradictions that must then be teased out by the researcher. A fourth strategy is 
developing hypotheses gradually while continually questioning the nature of the text 
and contesting any potential underlying motivational elements inherent in it. This 
final strategy should help the researcher explore any ‘seemingly hermeneutically 
closed plot’ (Brown, 2000, p.50). The study design takes account of these four 
strategies, which will be referred to here as deep familiarisation, selective 
categorisation and coding, textual deconstruction and narrative questioning.  
 
The most intensive part of this study involved reading and analysing the witness 
material. The material is voluminous and coding was a lengthy and complex process. 
Using the learning from the pilot, the study was modified in a number of ways. The 
pilot showed the impracticality of reading all texts three or four times and reviewing 
all material appended to witness statements. This was not unexpected and indicated 
the need to choose what material to code carefully and judiciously. Steps were taken 
to ensure that the volume of material would be manageable. Some sampling was 
adopted. Sixty-eight witness statements were selected from those available. This 
included those statements available for internal witnesses (patients, relatives, 
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friends, employees and non-executives), together with a small sample of external 
witnesses (ten out of a possible 112). This selection is justified on the basis that the 
focus of the study is on internal matters and external statements were generally 
concerned with the study of wider healthcare structures and systems at the time. 
The selection then allowed the researcher to pursue the first strategy of deep 
familiarisation. It ensured a clear focus on the most relevant material. That material 
was then read and re-read over the course of the study, allowing the researcher to 
acquire a more and more nuanced understanding through that immersive process. 
 
The second strategy of developing more and more selective categorisation and 
coding over the course of the study was also adopted. The author considered both 
content analysis and grounded analysis for the study. In line with the approach 
advocated by King (2000), the study drew on predetermined codes from the 
literature and developed new ones from the data throughout the coding process. 
When it comes to the data analysis, given the complex nature of the precipitating 
case, grounded theory could be suitable because it is good for capturing complexity, 
linking research with practice and investigating areas that have not been well 
explored (Locke, 2001, cited Bryman and Bell, 2007). Reviewing data without prior 
constructs allows constructs to emerge, but this does not fully align with the 
researcher’s interest in enhancing existing theory. Content analysis provides the 
opportunity to interrogate data with previously defined constructs. However, these 
approaches do not have to be a stark choice, they can be a continuum along which 
to place a study (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Both are used for this work, adopting 
a middle-range approach between content and grounded analysis. Thus, witnesses’ 
statements and other data was coded against a set of defined constructs drawn from 
the literature, whilst freely emerging codes were also captured during the process. 
This generated a set of initial first order codes that were, over the course of analysis, 
amalgamated into a more abstract set of higher-level themes from which a scheme 
of narratives was produced (see Appendix 5a: Code Summary and Appendix 5b: 
Complete Code Amalgamation). 
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The pilot was a key means by which the initial approach to coding was tested. It drew 
on a diverse combination of informants, witnesses with different roles from different 
tiers of the organisation.33 34 These were chosen to test the richness of material, and 
work with the range of witnesses available to identify tensions from their respective 
positions within the inquiry, comparing and contrasting different perspectives 
accordingly. Initially, statements were read without coding to become familiar with 
the data. This step indicated the immense volume of data. Some statements ran to 
three hundred pages, with numerous attachments. It confirmed that the case was a 
viable site, showing statements to be a rich source of material and highlighting the 
presence of a small number of highly significant (but unanticipated) stories. As a 
second step, statements were freely coded. This demonstrated the potential for a 
large number of emerging codes.35 It demonstrated that emerging themes could be 
a source of antecedents or counter-arguments not located in the literature. It also 
revealed that themes could be either positive or negative.36 Thirdly, statements were 
reviewed using predetermined codes from the literature and categorised in relation 
to the dimensions drawn from analytical models or frameworks.37 This provided a 
comprehensive set of codes for the study.  
 
Case study research requires parameters for summarising, categorising and 
structuring data in a logical way (Saunders et al., 2009). Pertinently, since case 
studies generalise through analytical or theoretical propositions rather than through 
statistical ones, it is important to have a logical means of linking your data to your 
propositions and rational criteria for interpreting your findings (Yin, 2003). The 
 
 
33 These were: a patient, Anonymised Patient 02; a relative, Anonymised Relative 19; a nurse, Anonymised Employee 
23; a doctor Anonymised Employee 15; and a non-executive, Anonymised Non-Executive 01.   
34 To aid the comparison of the witnesses, codes were created to identify the organisational tier in which they were 
located as well as their role or perspective. The final codes for organisational tiers are executive, expert, external 
individual or organisation, inquiry, non-executive and professional. Those for roles are board member, doctor, 
friend, manager, nurse, other employee, other role, patient, regulator, relative and senior executive. 
35 It highlighted a number of themes which had been strongly identified in the literature, such as ‘time’, as well as 
some, such as ‘fear’ which were not so prominent. 
36 For example, there were 19 references to ‘fear’, all of which negative, however there were eight references to 
‘speak out’, three of which were positive and the rest negative. 
37 During this step, statements were cross referenced to ensure that the free codes generated from the second 
readings were captured for all five witnesses. Any codes considered vague or unclear were tightened or combined. 
For example, references to time (e.g. time, lack of time, etc) were combined into one theme. 
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author drew strongly on the literature to create such parameters for categorising, 
structuring and comparing the data in a thematic way, to provide this logical linkage. 
Importantly, case study research differs from other forms of qualitative research in 
being more open to guiding analysis through the use of conceptual categories or 
theories (Meyer, 2001). Using an iterative approach, the literature review was 
organised in various phases (see Appendix 4: Literature Review Process). The first 
one familiarised the researcher with the scale and scope of the literature, showing 
that a multidisciplinary approach to altruism was needed. A second phase identified 
showed that a large body of altruistic research, for example that relating to non-
human altruism, would be irrelevant. The first two phases indicated that there were 
individual, contextual and social or relational approaches to altruism, all of which 
would need to be explored. A third phase was undertaken alongside the pilot study 
to refine the core constructs for the study. Importantly, the emerging codes from 
the pilot often supported constructs in the literature codes. They also fleshed out 
understanding of them and brought out narrative nuance and dualities. Engagement 
with the literature then continued alongside the data analysis in order to address 
these nuances, iteratively generating understanding of the emerging themes. In this 
way, constant cross-fertilisation between the two sets of codes was used to drive 
the strategy of increasingly selective categorisation advocated by Brown (2000).   
 
In the pilot, some codes from the literature were less evident than expected, 
suggesting the need to ensure all constructs were systematically and consistently 
coded for. So, additional steps were taken to aid the consistency and 
comprehensiveness of the coding process. Template analysis was the main means 
by which case data was structured. Ideally suited to the author’s philosophical 
approach, template analysis can be used with either epistemology, being ‘located at 
the interface between content analysis (predetermined codes) and grounded theory 
(where codes emerge during the analysis)’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p.165). Three 
different templates for manually collecting this data were tested through the pilot. 
These may have worked if the volume of material had been less. However, given the 
scale of data, the pilot identified the need for a different approach. For this reason, 
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coding was undertaken electronically through NVivo, using a single standard 
template of all codes. This enabled data to be more easily searched and annotated 
than the manual process originally envisaged would have allowed. Shifting data 
capture from a manual to an electronic process allowed for the creation of number 
of table formats to facilitate the retrieval and analysis of data coded in the NVivo 
database (see Appendix 6: Data Output Samples). However, to ensure consistency of 
coding, a printed copy of the template sheets for both literature codes and emerging 
codes was used when undertaking coding activity. This also helped to reduce the 
potential for duplicating codes. Finally, a coding tracker was created to track changes 
and ensure internal conceptual coherency of the overall set of codes throughout the 
process (see Appendix 7: Coding Tracker Excerpt) 
 
Turning to the witness data itself, a deliberately deconstructive strategy was 
adopted for textual analysis along with narrative questioning. To support this a 
number of number of elements were identified which might combine to affect the 
narratives in this particular case. Firstly, the motivation of unconscious emotions was 
acknowledged; emotions might influence witnesses’ statements or prompt them to 
act in certain ways. Although those involved in this case merit our compassion, some 
caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from their statements. 
People’s perspectives are not neutral. Any observer, whether involved in the inquiry 
or not, could be tempted to interpret events or their own role within them in a way 
which is psychologically reassuring. Witnesses might be experiencing a range of 
emotions prompting them to act, think or feel in a particular way in an inquiry 
setting. They could be feeling guilt or self-recrimination. The situation itself (as 
opposed to the specific witnesses) also merits caution. People have personal and 
professional conceptualisations of themselves, as well as reputations, which they 
wish to protect. The stories they tell may be underpinned by a desire to reassure 
themselves about their own character and behaviour which could compromise the 
telling. Similarly, protecting the reputation of your organisation may be a means of 
protecting yourself. This is a possible limitation of the study.  
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Such factors had to be kept in mind whilst analysing statements. Witnesses who 
were relatives or carers, in particular, might feel a sense of personal omission for 
harm done to their relations, and thus be motivated to cast events in a way that 
minimises their exposure to such feelings. They might also be experiencing anger, 
feeling motivated to punish those who they feel harmed, or failed to prevent harm 
to, their relatives. Analysis of such statements had to be treated with caution and 
sceptical enquiry. Theoretically, employees in such a highly public case of abuse 
might also wish to disassociate themselves from the practice it indicates or minimise 
their involvement in it. Of course, this does not mean that the factors employee 
witnesses identify are automatically suspect or invalid, but one must, at the very 
least, acknowledge the possibility that their recollections, assessment or sense-
making might be more focussed on external factors outside of their control as 
opposed to internal ones within their own ambit. It might be natural for any witness 
in this position to recollect mitigating factors, or contextual constraints, more 
strongly.  
 
Being an employee of a publicly criticised institution inevitably generates strong 
feelings. Staff witnesses were employed working for a hospital which is now 
internationally known for failing to provide proper care for patients. In this position, 
they might (in retrospect) wish to explain or justify their own behaviour to 
themselves as well as others. They might be inclined to ascribe responsibility to 
external factors such as other individuals, patients, colleagues, managers and so on, 
or contextual features, such as time, resources, and so on. They might also want to 
bring to light any barriers to providing good care that they experienced, including 
others’ behaviour towards them. Alternatively, employee witnesses might be feeling 
guilt or self-recrimination over a sense of personal omission in relation to their 
professional practice or willingness to complain at the time, and thus potentially be 
motivated to cast (or retrospectively recast) events in such a way which minimise 
any painful feelings this engenders. They could also be experiencing anger, directed 
towards those who put them in the spotlight or aided in the creation of events, and 
thus potentially motivated to punish them. Anger might be especially likely for 
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whistle-blowers who made complaints that were not addressed. Those who 
complained or blew the whistle might have been emotionally depleted by the 
experience, possibly prompting feelings of moral outrage and a desire to punish 
those who retaliated. 
 
Such dangers can be partially mitigated with the data itself. Using the full range of 
inquiry material, including witness statements, contemporary records and formal 
complaints helped to counteract problems of retrospective sense-making or 
protective recasting. Some mitigation was possible through cautious analysis and 
careful study of conflicting views, drawing on a wide range of alternative 
perspectives to uncover where emotions could theoretically influence witnesses’ 
statements and prompt them to re-interpret events with hindsight in an inquiry 
setting. Additionally, it was possible to address the potential biases inherent in 
witness statements by contrasting a varied range of these from patients, friends, 
relatives, employees, non-executives and external parties. Comparing them helped 
to counteract biases through an investigation of their differing perspectives. 
However, narratives still had to be carefully analysed with a level of scepticism, to 
deconstruct individual motivations.  
 
To assist with this, a set of specific coding specific questions was created. This was 
intended to ensure that potential motivations or interpretations would be identified 
and could then be questioned or challenged (see Table 2 on the next page). These 
questions were used whenever a coded theme was identified in the text. So if, for 
example, a theme such as compassion was identified, further questions would be 
asked, such ‘who is identifying the presence or absence of compassion’ or ‘what 
perspective do they hold’ and so on. Questions would also then be prompted about 
why they, in particular, held such a position, whether it was common amongst their 
in-group and to what extent it was supported by other in or out-groups.  
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Table 2: Data Coding Questions 
 DATA CODING MOTIVATIONAL CHALLENGES  
1 Who is involved in (or articulating) the situation (their tier within the 
organisation). 
2 What is the perspective of those involved in (or articulating) the situation 
(their specific roles within the organisation). 
3 What actions are those involved in (or articulating) the situation performing.  
4 What actions are those involved in (or articulating) the situation seeing others 
performing. 
5 How are those involved in a situation related or relating to each other. 
6 How are those involved in (or articulating) the situation behaving. 
7 How are those involved in (or articulating) the situation perceiving others as 
behaving. 
8 How are those involved in a situation feeling or thinking about events.  
9 How are those involved in a situation perceiving others to be feeling or 
thinking about events. 
10 What organisational routines, systems or processes are involved in this 
situation. 
11 What other contextual features or situational effects could be identified. 
 
Going through this process ensured that contrasting narratives were consistently 
taken account of and questioned during the analysis. It also helped to ensure that 
any ascriptions which witnesses were making about other individuals were also 
challenged. Whether events were considered positive or negative (or both) was built 
into this process. This identified some key dualities in the narratives.  
 
The validity of the approach is considered to lie in its ability to reveal certain charged 
self-protective or defensive narratives amongst those using or working at the 
hospital. By way of example, employee witnesses refer to a wide range of alternative 
explanations for the situation at the hospital which could be said to recuse them 
from responsibility and absolve them of guilt. These narratives can make another 
source liable or culpable for the situation at the hospital. The various rationalisations 
are set in Table 3 (on the next page) to illustrate the effectiveness of the approach 
in teasing out such narrative strategies. These were taken account of when testing 




Table 3: Rationalising Unhelpfulness 
 SOURCES    RATIONALISATION NARRATIVE 
1 PERSONAL 
LIMITS  
Agents were not able to act (i.e. they 
are time constrained) or responsible for 
acting. 
I am not to blame as I was 
unable to act. 
2 FINANCIAL 
LIMITS 
Agents lacked the resources with which 
to act. This limited, constrained or 
undermined their ability to act. 
I am not to blame as I 
lacked resources to act. 
3 EXTERNAL 
LIMITS 
External rules or regulations 
constrained agents’ ability to act, 
skewering their actions or focussing 
them elsewhere.  
I am not to blame as others 
outside the organisation 




Internal goals or expectations 
constrained agents’ ability to act, 
skewering their actions or focussing 
their attention elsewhere. 
I am not to blame as others 
inside the organisation 




Action by agents was not required. The 
problem is partly fictional or non-
existent and criticism is politically 
motivated.  
I am not to blame; others 




Action by agents is not required. The 
problem is created by inaccurate, 
unbalanced or exaggerated reporting.   
I am not to blame; others 
were blaming me falsely. 
 
Alongside these coding questions,  a number of models were used to supported the 
analytical challenges of potentially charged narrative data. A preliminary model or 
organisational altruism was produced from the literature to assist with 
categorisation. This model was used in two ways during the analysis. Firstly, 
narratives which emerged from the case could be compared against it to locate the 
source of promoters or inhibitors. Secondly, from this process, any specifically 
organisational elements will be captured. As well as using this model created from 
altruistic constructs in the literature, the author also drew on other organisational 
models and analytical frameworks to help describe and categorise the data, organise 
it around themes or topics and identify patterns or groupings within it. This provided 
a basis for analysing data, making thematic comparisons and interpreting findings.38 
Other models were used as a means by which to manage the analytical challenges 
of the study, by providing diverse and conflicting ways of looking at data which would 
 
 
38 The author set up an expert panel to generate further insight should it be necessary but dispensed with this 
after careful consideration of the findings. A case write up was also deemed unnecessary. 
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challenge the author’s perspective or prejudices and illuminate tensions in the data. 
During the pilot, four such models were tested for their usefulness as a means of 
categorising and structuring the data and assisting with the analysis of themes. One 
was Gabriel’s poetic modes model, as a means of analysing stories for their 
protagonists, characters, plots, predicaments, poetic tropes and emotions (Gabriel, 
2000).39 This model proved extremely useful. It was effective in assisting the author 
with their analysis of stories and narratives, proving particularly useful for 
illuminating witnesses’ emotions and attribution of qualities to themselves or others 
in their narratives. Consequently, it was used in the study. Another was Brief and 
Motowidlo’s (1986) Typology of Prosocial Behaviours. This proved somewhat 
promising during the pilot for identifying relevant organisational routines and 
practices which might promote or inhibit altruism. For this reason, the behaviours 
were incorporated into the coding template.  
 
The author also tested Keller and Price’s (2011) Organisational Health Index as a clear 
way of structuring the data in relation to organisational culture, contexts or features. 
This provided a comprehensive list of the constituent elements (or parts) of 
organisations which could be used to consistently categorise, structure and analyse 
data along organisational lines.40 Though validated as an instrument of assessing the 
health of organisations (Keller and Price, 2011) it proved difficult to apply, generated 
 
 
39 His model includes a full framework of: characters (including those of deserving victim, fool, non-deserving victim, 
hero, love object, trickster, villain, supportive helper, rescue object, assistant, villain, gift-giver, lover, and injured or 
sick person); plots (including misfortune as deserved chastisement, underserved misfortune, trauma, achievement, 
noble victory, success, love triumphant, misfortune conquered by love); predicaments (including accident, mistake, 
coincidence, repetition, the unexpected and unpredictable, crime, insult, injury, loss, mistake, misrecognition, 
contest, challenge, trial, test, mission, quest, sacrifice, gift, romantic fantasy, falling in love, reciprocation, 
recognition; poetic tropes (including providential significance, unity, agency before misfortune, denial of agency 
during misfortune, malevolent fate, blame, motive, agency and credit); fixed qualities associated with these 
(including nobility, courage, loyalty, selflessness, honour, ambition, gratitude, caring, loving, vulnerabil ity, pathetic, 
pomposity, arrogance, vanity, being decent, worthy, good, devious or mean); and lastly emotions (including mirth, 
aggression hate, scorn, sorrow, pity, fear, anger, pathos, pride, admiration, nostalgia, envy, love, care, kindness, 
generosity, and gratitude).  
40 The model has nine elements of organisational health, which are: ‘direction’, ‘leadership’, ‘culture and climate’, 
‘accountability’, ‘coordination and control’, ‘capabilities’, ‘motivation’, ‘external orientation’, and ‘innovation and 
learning,’ (Keller and Price 2011, pp.34-35). Each element has a number of management practices which underpin 
it (37 in total). For example, one element of organisational health which may be relevant in this case is ‘external 
orientation.’ This has four management practices underpinning it, which are ‘customer focus,’ ‘competitive insights,’ 
‘business partnerships,’ and ‘government and community relations,’ (Keller and Price 2011, p.35). The model has 
clear descriptors for each of these management practices. The practice of customer focus, for example, is described 
as ‘understanding customers and responding to their needs,’ Keller and Price, 2011, p.35).  
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little understanding and was discounted.  Lastly, the author tested Morgan’s 
Organisational Metaphors (Morgan, 2006). This identifies eight metaphors for 
thinking about organisations.41 This model proved difficult to apply, with few 
instances identified during coding. However, it occasionally assisted in generating a 
richer understanding of more charged narratives and was incorporated into the 
coding process on the assumption that it might enable the author to identify and 
explore any starkly contrasting ways witnesses positioned or made sense of events. 
The additional value of this model is that it provides diverse lenses for viewing 
organisations in fresh, novel and contrasting ways, together with metaphors that can 
be used to generate new insight or theories (Morgan, 2006). Thus, it supported the 
author’s interest in developing theory, as well as challenging the author’s own way 
of thinking about organisations. 
 
4.4 Summary  
 
The work takes the form of a single case study: an approach suited to the 
consideration of complex phenomenon in organisational settings. It incorporates 
questions (and concerns) about what factors promote or inhibit altruism in 
organisational settings. The chosen case itself was theoretically sampled for its 
capacity to answer those questions. The main sources of data are the public and 
independent inquiries. Five inquiry reports, three summaries of oral evidence, two 
expert reports, one regulatory report and sixty-eight witness statements were used. 
Witness data was analysed using organisational models and constructs drawn from 
the literature, supported by a template of predetermined codes. In addition, 
emerging codes which appeared relevant to the study questions were 
opportunistically collected. The author overlapped data collection and analysis and 
iterated continuously between case data, emerging theory and the literature. When 
analysing the data, the author captured themes, events and stories using 
 
 
41 These are as: ‘machines’, ‘organisms’, ‘brains’, ‘cultures’, ‘political systems’, ‘psychic prisons’, ‘flux and 
transformation’, or ‘instruments of domination’ (Morgan, 2006). 
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predetermined codes for altruistic constructs (from the literature) and created 
additional codes for any new or emerging themes relevant to the study questions. 
The study exploits the full value of an inductive approach, drawing on: a deep 
immersion in the case to comprehend all its aspects; theoretical sampling to 
illuminate conceptual features; and grounded theory building processes. The author 
adopted a ‘flexible’ and ‘opportunistic’ approach to data collection, overlapping data 
collection with data analysis and undertaking iterative comparisons of the case data, 
the theory emerging from it and the literature. Iterating between constructs and 
(multiple sources of) data helped the author to hone constructs, tighten their 
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The four themes which emerge most strongly in this case are an emotionally noisy 
organisation, a climate of conflict between organisational members, a significantly 
demanding organisational context and unresponsive organisational agents (see 
Figure 10). Above all, the hospital is a site of extensive emotional noise, characterised 
by a high level of user need, distressed members and organisational uncertainty. 
 
Figure 10: Organisational Narratives 
 
Foremost among narratives is the pain, suffering and distress of organisational 
members. Members are broadly comprised of the hospital’s user group, which 
includes its patients as direct users and their friends or relatives as indirect users, as 
well as organisational agents, which includes staff, managers, leaders and non-
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executives. The term organisational agents will be adopted when referring to staff 
as a group. The term organisational users will be used when referring to patients and 
their relatives as a group. At times, the terms patients, relatives, managers, 
employees and so on, will be used when the more discrete aspects of these 
groupings are relevant. The term organisational members will be adopted when 
referring to both agent and user groups together.  
 
The two groups are, at times, excessively aroused. That is partly caused by users’ 
condition, partly by agent practices and partly by internal organisational conditions. 
The emergence of emotional noise as a factor indicates the importance of givers and 
recipients’ moods, emotions or affective states in promoting or inhibiting altruistic 
or helping behaviour. It is explored in Chapter 5 of this section. The climate of conflict 
within the hospital is characterised by friction between organisational members and 
the derogation or ‘diminishment’ of organisational users. It is explored in Chapter 6. 
The emergence of conflict as a factor indicates the importance of internal 
organisational relationships and social structures. The demanding context within the 
hospital is characterised by a high strain on organisational agents, coupled with low 
levels of support for them with which to meet those demands. It is explored in 
Chapter 7. Its emergence demonstrates the importance of contextual constraints for 
altruism.  
 
These factors combined reduce organisational agents’ collective helping capacity or 
resource. They also precipitate practices amongst them which are unconducive to 
altruism. Those practices are agents’ avoidance of users’ needs, their inattentiveness 
or indifference towards users themselves and their deterrence of users from 
approaching them or seeking their help. Such practices are explored in Chapter 8. 
Their emergence shows how organisational agents become disengaged or detached 
from users. In this case, that leads to their not noticing or seeing users’ needs or 
distress, not appreciating their condition or situation and consequently, not 
assessing the need to help them. This is an organisation-wide effect in which such 
practices align to make user need less noticeable or significant.   
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5 CHAPTER 5: AN EMOTIONALLY NOISY ORGANISATION 
 
Distress is one of the most prominent aspects to emerge in this case. The articulation 
of organisational members’ pain, suffering and distress is foremost among 
narratives. There is a marked pattern of arousal in the hospital, characterised by 
strong moods, emotions and affective states. Emotional noise arises from that 
distress, as well from as broader threats and uncertainties (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Emotional Noise in the Hospital 
 
As will be seen in this section, users are distressed by illness, its treatment and 
associated indignities, while employees are distressed by workplace conditions and 
organisational threats or insecurities. Collectively, the distress of both groups 
creates extensive emotional noise and strong affective tension.  
 
5.1 A Distressed Organisational User Group  
 
Significant levels of patient distress are evident in this case (see Appendix 8a: User 
Distress Narratives). Unsurprisingly, patient distress arises from the pain or suffering 
they experience as a result of their condition. Hospital users exhibit a natural fear of 














examples, patients are depicted as ‘terrified’ or ‘extremely fearful’.42 43 Relatives 
exhibit similar feelings as a consequence of seeing a family member’s illness or 
injury. They talk of being ‘frightened’ and ‘upset’ by their kin’s pain and suffering, as 
well as their own uncertainties about what is happening.44 45 46 Relatives, in 
particular, articulate extremely strong and intense emotions. By way of examples: 
 
‘I put my hand on my Mum’s head and I filled up with tears because my hand 
didn’t fit round the lump on my Mum’s head.’ 47  
 
‘…she was in agony….. My Mum was in absolute agony, I can hear her 
screams now, as I walked into the ward.’ 48  
 
These last two instances Illustrate how distressed patients create a population of 
extremely aroused relatives. For them, a family member’s suffering is highly 
noticeable and perceived as significant. Understandably, it is as an emergency. 
Importantly, in such cases, users’ distress is precipitated by their own situation. 
Healthcare is characterised by inevitably distressed users. In this way, the strained 
internal emotional terrain of the hospital is partly attributable to the structure of the 
sector itself.  
 
A second source of user group distress is the way patients and their relatives are 
treated by the hospital (see Appendix 8a: User Distress Narratives). Treatment 
deficiencies are systemic. There are deficiencies in the organisation of hospital 
systems, processes or routines. These are characterised by delays, uncertainty and 
confusion. Next, there are deficient attitudes amongst those operating these 
systems or delivering services. Some organisational agents exhibit a lack of concern 
for patients or indifference towards service users as a whole. Then there is the 
deficient management of patients themselves. Their progression through clinical 
 
 
42 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.45. 
43 Relative, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1. 
44 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par54, p.65. 
45 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 09 Witness Statement, par9. 
46 In witness statements pages and paragraphs are usually numbered, but sometimes omitted.  
47 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par70, p.70. 
48 Relative, Healthcare Commission Report, par25, p.56. 
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pathways, or any ancillary caring processes that they require, is poorly organised or 
administrated. The latter feature is partly characterised by organisational agents’ 
apparent neglect or abandonment of patients and partly characterised by chaotic 
and uncertain organisational conditions.  
 
Concerns about such deficiencies are widespread amongst users. By way of example, 
a patient explains how waiting  for three hours for pain relief or help was ‘ traumatic 
and stressful’ for them and their family.49 Along the same lines, a relative explains 
how waiting for cancelled treatment was ‘extremely worrying’ and ‘distressing’.50 51 
Systemic inadequacies generate significant affective tension, amplifying an 
emotional terrain which is already strained by anxieties about illness. Some  
examples which illustrate the point are:  
 
‘I had to keep asking for his syringe-drivers to be refilled when they emptied. 
It just didn’t seem to be a priority. On two occasions, I waited for over an 
hour for a reply to the call-button and eventually I just had to go and find a 
nurse and insist that they left the patient they were with to come and help... 
He was crying by that time and in great distress.’ 52  
 
‘I noticed that the urine container under the bed was full and needed 
emptying…...there was also a dirty nightie under the bed, which had 
obviously been either concealed or forgotten. I found [REMOVED] sitting in 
her own urine more than once. The bed was wet through. Whenever I asked 
nurses to come and change [REMOVED], I was upset.’ 53 
 
Instances such as these indicate a neglect of users as people who are frail or 
vulnerable, and as patients who are suffering pain and discomfort. Notably, 
treatment is often delayed, with patients experiencing a prolonged state of ‘waiting’ 
or discomfit. This intensifies or exacerbates the distress which they are already 
 
 
49 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.346. 
50 Relative, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2. 
51 Independent Inquiry Summaries of Oral Evidence have neither page nor paragraph numbers. 
52 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.394. 




experiencing as a result of their sickness. It also distresses their relatives. By such 
means, user distress may be deepened as well as lengthened and protracted, 
contagiously affecting other hospital users, both related and unrelated to them. For 
example, one patient says she was:  
 
‘bubbling with anxiety about what would happen to older people at the 
hospital.’ 54  
 
Systemic deficiencies amplify an already noisy emotional terrain created by sickness. 
Notably, however, the distress they precipitate cannot be attributed to the structure 
of the industry. Rather it is being caused by how the hospital itself organises and 
delivers its systems, processes and routines, as well as the behaviour of its agents in 
delivering them.  
A third source of user group distress is the indignities which patients experience as 
a consequence of their physical state, vulnerable position or disrespectful treatment 
by organisational agents (see Appendix 8a: User Distress Narratives). This includes 
them being placed or left in degrading or humiliating situations, such as naked or 
undressed in public view. It also includes their being derogated, disrespected or 
dehumanised. By way of illustration, relatives talk of how there was ‘no dignity’ or 
‘no respect for the patient’s dignity’. 55 56 This is generally accompanied by strong 
negative moods or emotions, such as shame or embarrassment, anger and outrage, 
or shock and horror. Illuminating examples are:   
 
‘She was absolutely shocked at the way a consultant would speak to a 
patient in the ward, would speak quite loudly so everybody could hear….. 




54 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement, par6, p.6. 
55 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par206, p.109. 
56 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.26. 
57 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par211, p.111. 
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‘Everyone could have seen her. That is why I was so distressed because my 
Mum would have been horrified if she would have known that people were 
walking past and could see her. The door was just left open all the time.’ 58 
 
What such instance show is that the position which organisational systems place 
patients in heightens their vulnerability and, in doing so, precipitates extremely 
strong affective responses from family members. Again, this escalates emotional 
noise.  
 
Consequently, relatives go on to make negative judgements about staff. Their 
narratives indicate that their moral beliefs or emotions are also aroused. They 
condemn events as ‘awful’ or ‘dreadful’. They express strong beliefs or personal 
convictions that patients are being inappropriately treated or positioned. In one 
illuminating example, a relative describes a family member as follows: 
 
‘He felt demeaned. He lost a lot of his dignity, his pride. There was so much 
taken away from him that – it was just unbelievable to see a man that was 
so full of life brought down to the – to the state that he was in, that he was 
frightened to say anything or to be able to stand up to people.’ 59 
 
The use of ‘unbelievable’ carries a sense of moral reproof. It shows a normative 
schism whereby user expectations are at odds with organisational practice. As well 
as noticing the patient’s predicament, and emotionally appreciating it, this relative 
assesses agent practices against their own expectations of care, or the caring 
process, and finds them wanting.  
 
Importantly, where indignities are concerned, it is not the structure of healthcare 
which is the source of such distress, nor is it the hospital’s operation of its systems 
and routines per se. Rather it is their operation in conjunction with the attitudes of 




58 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par21, p.55. 
59 Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par23.10, p.1501. 
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‘he couldn’t get to the toilet in time so he was in a wet bed. That is distressing 
enough anyway, let alone for a 77 year old that do [sic] not walk. The loss of 
dignity that he experienced was just awful; it was really embarrassing for 
him.’ 60 
 
‘there was a lovely old man in the bed opposite. He obviously had some type 
of dementia, but he was very gentle and kind, I witnessed him having to wet 
himself. He was all dressed up in a suit ready to go home. He begged and 
pleaded for the nurse to bring him the toilet bottle, but she said “You'll have 
to wait, I'm dealing with so and so's patient”. It would only have taken her a 
moment.… There wasn’t a curtain round him or anything. It was 
heartbreaking. There was no dignity. I will never forget it.’ 61 
 
Examples such as these reveal a set of noticing, appreciating and assessing practices 
which organisational users adopt in response to the undignified treatment of 
patients. Firstly, they notice patients’ situations and perceive them as undignified. 
Importantly, such events are ascribed considerable significance. Secondly, they enter 
into patients’ situations, displaying an ability to appreciate their perspective. This 
encompasses: perceiving patients’ physical incapacities, such as immobility or 
incontinence; recognising patients’ personal vulnerabilities, such as their aged state 
or dementia; and identifying any associated emotional states patients are 
experiencing, such as fear or embarrassment. The lexicon which users use, for 
example words such as ‘heart-breaking,’ indicates compassion towards those 
suffering. By way of a third step, users assess the situation, expressing judgements 
which indicate that they see patients as worthy and agents’ actions as misaligned 
with what patients deserve. Patients’ worthiness is indicated by terms such as ‘kind’, 
‘gentle’, ‘gentlemen’. Agents’ unhelpfulness is condemned by words such as ‘awful,’ 
‘embarrassing’ and a ‘loss’. 
 
It appears important that users do not just notice other users’ distress. They also 
enter into, or appreciate, it. They demonstrate concern for patients’ physical 
symptoms, their pain, diarrhoea, incontinence, weight loss, and so on. The also show 
 
 
60 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 20 Witness Statement, p.12. 
61 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 11 Witness statement, par11, p.4. 
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concern for their human frailties, such as their  age or mortality. And they pick up on 
patients’ moods and emotions. To illustrate such sensitivities, relatives talk of how 
their ‘father’s mental and emotional state was extremely low’62 or ‘patients were 
very anxious and distressed’.63 Importantly, users recognise patients’ mental or 
emotional states and attach significance to the fact that they are distressed. In this, 
they are displaying other-orientated perspectives and other-orientating emotions, 
both of which would be conducive to altruism. Alongside this appreciation of 
patients’ distress, users also appear to undertake situational assessments of their 
predicament. As a result of such assessments, they judge patients’ distress to be 
legitimate and see their dependency upon others for help as valid. By way of 
example, one patient describes how: 
 
‘it was worse, I thought, for the old lady next to me, who couldn’t get out of 
bed, and who was a very ill lady.’ 64  
 
Such assessments generate the belief that patients, as members of their group, are 
being poorly treated. This prompts users’ condemnation of organisational agents as 
responsible. Such conclusions are the resulting of their noticing, appreciating and 
assessing other users’ welfare. 
 
To summarise, the evidence of users’ pain, suffering and distress in the data is 
substantial. Unmanaged, it creates an internal terrain which is emotionally noisy and 
affectively tense. Critically, it is a collective feature with in and out-group effects. 
Hospital users are not only grieved or pained by their own illness, treatment 
deficiencies or indignities. They are also sensitive to, or concerned by, how others 
within the user group are treated by the organisation. Thus, patients become 
distressed at seeing other patients’ pain or suffering. Relatives become distressed at 
seeing the pain of those with whom they have no relationship. Users, as a group, 
 
 
62 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.311. 
63 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.313. 
64 Patient, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par23.11, p.1501.  
 
 116 
notice the pain, suffering or distress of members, enter into it, and appreciate its 
significance or importance, as well as assess it as worthy of redress.  
 
5.2 A Distressed Organisational Agent Group  
 
In this case, organisational agents also display high levels of personal arousal. 
However, different factors provoke this. In their case, the main triggers are their own 
challenging workplace demands or context, the difficulties faced by their colleagues 
within the same environment and broader organisational insecurities (Appendix 8b: 
Agent Distress Narratives).  
 
Starting with the first of these, in the same way that organisational users are 
distressed by their physical situation as patients, organisational agents are distressed 
by their professional, occupational or employment situation. They are conscious of 
the effects of this upon them mentally and emotionally. For example, they speak of 
being  ‘upset’, ‘worried’, ‘stressed,’ and ‘dispirited’.65 66 They describe their working 
context as having a deleterious psychological impact upon them. By way of an 
example, one doctor explains how they felt ‘exposed and vulnerable’, as well as 
‘uncomfortable at being forced to cut corners’.67 Another describes nurses as being 
‘very uncomfortable’ and working ‘outside their comfort zone’.68 Along the same 
lines, a nurse talks of feeling ‘very exposed and vulnerable’.69 Agents do, in their 
statements, occasionally mention how patients feel.70 However, there are far fewer 
instances of them picking up on the pain and distress of patients. So, the most 
prominent potential helpers in this situation appear conscious of their own 
vulnerable position. The direction of their attention to their own situation in this way 
is important for altruism.   
 
 
65 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par67, p.18. 
66 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Witness Statement Anonymised Employee 18, par19, p.6. 
67 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par43, p.10. 
68 Doctor, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par74, p.204. 
69 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par27, p.9 
70 The Healthcare Commission (2009) reports that some were distressed at being unable to deliver appropriate 
care (or spend enough time) with patients.  
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A second cause of agent distress is the occupational situation of their peers, 
members of the agent in-group (see Appendix 8b: Agent Distress Narratives). They 
are sensitive to the challenging circumstances faced by their individual colleagues. 
They also perceive them to be poorly situated or treated as a group. In articulating 
this, they speak of doctors experiencing ‘continual discontent’71 or having ‘lost 
heart’.72 By way of a typical example, one doctor describes how most hospital 
consultants were ‘unhappy’ and articulated this, but were ‘ground down’ 
nonetheless.73 Similarly, agents describe the nursing population or group as ‘under 
a lot of stress’.74 A pattern emerges in which agents perceive the situation of their 
peers as difficult and appreciate the emotional distress which that causes them. This 
is not the strongest theme in the case. Nor is intense distress always evident in such 
examples. However, there is a shift of focus from self to other, with the direction of 
organisational agents’ attention appearing to be anchored onto their own in-group.  
 
Sympathy or concern for their colleagues’ predicaments is strongly implied in this. 
Such instances indicate an ability to enter into a colleague’s situation, a capacity to 
appreciate their position or perspective and a sympathetic orientation towards 
them. Arguably, in line with the literature, those who perceive the pain and suffering 
of peers as members of their in-group should feel compassion for them (Mathur et 
al., 2010). This should promote altruism. However, in this case such feelings do not 
appear action-orientated. Instead, they indicate a sense of pity towards colleagues, 
a sympathetic recognition of their situation, underpinned by a level of passive 
resignation. That resignation might indicate acceptance of the situation which their 
colleagues are in. However, one could also see such descriptions as a means of 
articulating a level of cynicism about one’s own problems. Agents might be seeing 
their own difficult position reflected in that of their peers. Colleagues’ treatment 
might be reminding them of their own. Thus, one could see an agent’s narration of 
 
 
71 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par37, p.10. 
72 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par3, p.2. 
73 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par3, p.2 . 
74 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par48, p.13 
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a colleague’s difficulties as an expression of their own suffering. Irrespective of this, 
whether for oneself or others, pity is still likely to contribute to the affective fabric 
of the organisation. Importantly, it focuses the direction of organisational agents’ 
attention onto their peers’ negative state, or their own, rather than on patients’ 
negative states. 
 
A third cause of organisational agents’ distress is organisational threats or 
insecurities (see Appendix 8b: Agent Distress Narratives). The hospital’s internal 
terrain is both unsettled and unsettling. Organisational insecurities include internal 
organisational changes, such as new targets, system changes or ward 
reconfigurations, as well external organisational changes, such as new rules, 
regulations or requirements. Other destabilising uncertainties are financial 
instability, in the form of deficits and budget cuts, and staffing alterations, such as 
redundancies or restructuring. The latter are clearly intertwined. Notable 
insecurities which agents articulate include the prospect of failing to fulfil their roles 
or meet organisational expectations, the potential for being blamed as a result of 
that failure and the possibility of adverse repercussions or retaliation. By way of 
example, one manager speaks of how staff were ‘fearing for their jobs’ as a result of 
internal structural changes.75 Pertinently, they go on to explain that: 
 
‘A “fear factor” mind set was created when the workforce reductions came 
in, as people’s jobs were not safe and everybody became wary.’ 76 
 
Another manager reveals how such matters focus agents inwardly. Talking of 
internal upheavals they say ‘people were concerned about how it would affect them 
personally’.77 Drawing on instances such as these, one can discern an emotional 
pattern amongst organisational agents which is characterised firstly by their 
experience of negative emotional states, such as fear or anxiety, and secondly, by 
 
 
75 Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 11 Witness Statement, par31, p.9. 
76 Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 11 Witness Statement, par32, p.9.  
77 Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, par52, p.17. 
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the direction of their attention inwards towards their own position as a result of 
those affective states. 
 
Extending the point further, a pattern emerges in which organisational agents 
appear deeply conscious of organisational insecurities. They articulate a state of 
unsettling ambiguity and distracting turmoil. Their awareness of this is associated 
with uncomfortable or disturbing mental or emotional states. As a result, they 
appear to perceive the internal culture and environment as threatening. They 
present themselves as exposed by organisational forces and express generalised 
anxieties about the prospect of negative events occurring as a result of such forces. 
These factors would affect all those working at the hospital, whether they articulate 
them or not. The pattern is pertinent because it affects those who have the most 
visibly prominent roles within the organisation as helpers. It is possibly one of the 
strongest potential altruistic inhibitors in this case because of how it directs 
employees’ attention to their own, potentially self-absorbing, negative state. 
Cognitive or affective capacity to appreciate or assess users’ needs would be 
lessened by this.  
 
When the distress of both users and agents is considered in combination, a pattern 
emerges in which emotional noise is exacerbated by systemic neglect and 
unresponsive organisational practices. Within the hospital any member can help 
another member. Though organisational agents are not the only people in this 
situation who might aid others, they are the parties best placed to help users. 
However, in this case there is a noticeable cycle in which internal conditions 
stimulate agents’ adoption of introspective stances and kindle inwardly-orientating 
emotions. That, in turn, precipitates unresponsive behaviours towards users. These 
behaviours then provokes further distress amongst users as a group. Thus, distressed 
agents generate more distressed users. To explain the process, an employee who is 
worried about their job security might become more and more absorbed by that and 
consequently less and less attentive to patients. In turn, patients’ relatives may be 
angered by their behaviour and react indignantly. That could lead to tense exchanges 
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which might exacerbate the situation further. Such a pattern would escalate internal 
emotional noise.  
 
An example of that cycle is evident in the operation of the hospital buzzer system. 
This is a site in which affective tension is evident. Unresponsiveness towards patients 
is evident in the neglect of buzzers. This appears to be common or normalised 
organisational practice (see Appendix 9: Buzzer Routine). Such neglect may be a 
response to emotional noise or a means to manage its impact upon agents. However, 
it is also a potential source of continued affective tension. Buzzers are a means of 
communication which support the formal relationship between users and agents 
within the hospital. They mute the noise which would arise from patients having to 
call out for attention, obviating the need for their shouts or cries which would 
otherwise contribute to an emotionally noisy internal terrain. They should reduce 
emotional noise within the hospital. However, there is substantial evidence that 
employees fail to answer them. A tendency for buzzers not to be ‘heard’ or 
‘responded to’ was a significant feature of the organisational environment 
(Healthcare Commission Report, 2009). The Trust was in the worst 20 percent of 
hospitals for the time taken to answer them in the 2005 Patient Survey.78  
 
This pattern of neglect increases emotional noise. Firstly, it replaces the ostensibly 
neutral technical sound of buzzers with more emotionally or negatively toned shouts 
and cries of distress as patients’ main means of attracting attention. By way of 
example, one explains how: 
 
‘several patients in his bay buzzed for nursing staff but no one came. Instead, 




78 Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2. 
79 Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2. 
80 When relatives see buzzers unanswered they seek aid, for family members or unrelated patients. Their  response 
to buzzers is robust illustration of the way in which helping behaviour occurs within the hospital without the benefit 
of a personal connection or family relationship. For them, emotional noise appears to prompt help-giving or seeking.  
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A second feature of this neglect is that it can exacerbate patients’ conditions when 
their symptoms are neglected, or result in further injuries and embarrassments as 
they try to manage their own needs or help other patients without the aid of 
organisational agents. For example: 
 
‘He would also come in and find me lying in my own vomit, urine, and on one 
occasion, I was suffering from severe violent diarrhoea. I had been buzzing 
for some time as my Stoma bag had burst. I was embarrassed and ashamed 
when my mum walked in to see me in that state.’ 81 
 
‘she would sound the buzzer and it would just go off and off and off and then 
the same – it was the same thing, she would just call out for the nurse. When 
the nurse did come, she would be put on to the commode and it was 
obviously too late. The nurse would put her back into the bed, you could 
hear her – she would wait on the commode for half an hour and very often 
she would just try to make it herself and just go smack on to the floor.’ 82  
 
As these examples show, unnecessary distress arises from the additional 
complications caused by such neglect. In this, it is not the structure of healthcare 
itself which is creating the distress, rather it is the in-operation of organisational 
systems.  
 
A third consequence of buzzer neglect is that because they not being answered for 
protracted periods of time, the strength of patients’ shouts and cries intensifies in 
aural and emotional intensity. By way of a highly illustrative example:  
 
‘After about 20 minutes you could hear the men shouting for the nurse, 
“Nurse, nurse”, and it just went on and on. And then very often it would be 
two people calling at the same time and then you would hear them crying, 
like shouting “Nurse” louder, and then you would hear them just crying, just 
sobbing, they would just sob and you just presumed that they had had to 
wet the bed. And then after they would sob, they seemed to then shout 




81 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 01 Witness Statement, par15, p.5. 
82 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par14, p.53.  
83 Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par23.8, p.1500. 
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What such instances show is that staff adopt inattentive practices which exacerbate 
the emotionally noisy organisational environment. Not being responded to 
heightens users’ emotion and intensifies their affective signals. As a result, the 
organisation is creating a user population that is even harder to manage due to the 
increased level of emotional distress which being unattended to stimulates. 
Collectively, the distress which arises from this will be significant. Importantly, 
patients’ inability to secure help by means of a system designed to communicate 
their needs, is likely to: exacerbate feelings of distress associated with their condition 
going untreated; precipitate anxiety about whether they will be treated or not; and 
prompt anger or outrage amongst those observing the process. As a result, 
escalating user distress is likely to inject more and more emotional noise into the 
situation. This is pertinent and problematic since it increases the emotional demands 
placed upon staff within the workplace, some of whom might already be 
experiencing reduced affective capacity. 
 
5.3 Emotional Noise Conclusion 
 
Analysis of pain and suffering in the hospital reveals a site of significant emotional 
noise, created by a highly distressed and emotionally demanding user group, as well 
as a distressed and affectively strained agent group. Internal organisational 
instability and uncertainty also contributes to the effect. User distress, in particular, 
creates significant emotional noise. Some of that distress has no internal 
organisational basis. It arises from patients’ conditions. One should recognise that 
the structure of the healthcare industry is relevant in this regard, because of its 
inevitably distressed user population. However, much of the noise is also created by 
internal factors. One such factor is how organisational agents collectively (as a group) 
act towards patients (as a group). Both their attitudes towards patients, and their 
treatment of them, are perceived as deficient. Another organisational factor is the 
systemic deficiency of internal systems, processes or routines established to treat 
users. Combined, such factors elevate the distress which patients are already 
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experiencing as a result of their sickness, thereby intensifying internal emotional 
noise.  
 
In this case, organisational agents’ and users’ distress arise from very different 
sources within the hospital (see Table 4). They also respond very differently. Agents 
perceive themselves made vulnerable by organisational forces or pressures and 
exhibit negative emotions as a result. Organisational conditions induce an inward 
focus, anchoring their attention on themselves or their in-group. Being both aware 
of, and potentially absorbed by, their own negative state blocks or reduces their 
capacity to perceive or appreciate users’ distress. Their attention is diverted or 
distracted. As a result, collective internal capacity or helping resource would be 
reduced. That would be unconducive to altruism towards users because it reduces 
the likelihood of their needs being noticed or perceived. As will be seen later in this 
section (Chapter 8), agent distress is also accompanied by a pattern in which they 
are inattentive towards patients and avoid them.  
 
Table 4: Sources of Organisational Emotional Noise 
 TRIGGER DESCRIPTION 
1  HEALTH 
CONDITION  
Users are aroused or distressed by their own (or others’) illness and 
associated pain or suffering. 
2  HEALTHCARE 
TREATMENT 
Users are aroused or distressed by how they themselves (or others) 
are treated (physically, clinically or emotionally). 
3  SITUATIONAL 
INDIGNITIES  
Users are aroused or distressed by the indignities they experience 
or perceive patients experiencing. 
4 WORKPLACE 
CONDITIONS 
Agents are aroused or distressed by their experience within the 
organisation, their personal or professional situation (and/or 
interaction with others).  
5  COLLEAGUES’ 
SITUATION  
Agents are aroused or distressed by colleagues’ experience within 




Agents are aroused or distressed by perceived contextual threats 
and insecurities within the organisation.  
 
By way of an illuminating contrast, emotional noise is also clearly accompanied by a 
pattern in which users (as a group) pay attention to patients’ pain, suffering or 
distress, exhibit concern for them and respond. It is natural for family members to 
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respond in this way. However, there is a noticeable group effect. Users who see such 
inappropriate practices towards unrelated patients are also emotionally aroused. 
Moreover, they judge patients’ states or conditions as wanting, and condemn those 
whom they consider responsible for treatment of their in-group which does not 
meet their norms or expectations. This provokes angry responses which escalates 
internal affective tensions and promotes reparative responses to redress the 
wrongs. Such factors would promote altruistic or helping behaviour towards other 
users.  
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6 CHAPTER 6: A CLIMATE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN MEMBERS 
 
Another prominent narrative to emerge from this case is a climate of conflict. In the 
hospital high levels of friction or relational tension are evident amongst 
organisational members. This can be seen between the two main organisational 
groups, as well as within the agent group between managers, staff and peers. 
Alongside intense member conflict, there is also evidence of the derogation or 
diminishment of organisational users (see Figure 12). This chapter considers these 
two narratives.  
 
Figure 12: Member Conflict in the Hospital 
 
 
In the hospital, friction between agents and users is stimulated by: deficiencies in 
the clinical aspects of care, for example diagnostics, treatment, or medication; 
deficiencies in the personal aspects of care, such as grooming, toileting assistance 
and so on; and deficiencies in the attitudes of those delivering both of these aspects. 
The feelings which such deficiencies stimulate include: other-condemning emotions, 
such as anger, contempt or disgust; moral indignation, ire or outrage concerning one 
group’s perceived ethical breaches towards another; and more day-to-day 
expressions of irritation, annoyance or displeasure. The practices associated with 
this friction include avoidance, where organisational agents ignore or eschew users, 










contributes to the threatening culture evident within the hospital explored later in 
this section (see Chapter 7). It does so by helping to create a culture in which users 
feel unwelcome or unwanted and agents feel insecure or threatened.  
 
6.1 Friction between Organisational Agents and Users 
 
In this case, conflict between organisational agents and users is extensive (see 
Appendix 10: Member Friction). It is characterised by a number of features. Firstly, 
there are unfriendly or unwelcoming attitudes towards users. Secondly, there are 
general incivilities between the two groups. Thirdly, there is outright hostility, 
antagonism or aggression. Such hostility may be actively and overtly articulated, or 
more passively and covertly expressed.  
 
Starting with the first of these features, the hospital culture or climate is one in which 
users perceives themselves as unwanted or unwelcome. By way of one highly 
illuminating example, a relative narrates how:  
 
‘The staff were so unapproachable there. It was just the looks they gave 
when we came back in.’ 84 
 
‘….it was the eye roll, the tutting from the nurses that I remember, it was not 
what they said, it was the way they used to say it. It was the attitude and the 
looks and I can still remember that.’ 85 
 
‘I recall hundreds of instances of raised eyebrows or the flick of the head 
from the Hospital staff.’ 86 
 
This relative is picking up on organisational agents’ visual cues and signals, their facial 
expressions, non-verbal signs or gestures and body language. These instances 
indicate that agents are making users aware that they are not welcome or wanted, 
without speaking or acting. Instead they are conveying this through their general 
 
 
84 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par40, p.12. 
85 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par25, p.8. 
86 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par36, p.11. 
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demeanour or deportment. What the relative determines from all this is a sense of 
agents’ unapproachability. It implies that they should not be asked for help.  
 
Turning to the second feature of conflict between agent and users, the relationship 
between these two groups is also characterised by low level clashes  or generalised 
incivilities. There is substantial evidence of interaction between them which is 
inconsiderate or discourteous (see Appendix 10: Member Friction). Agents are 
characterised as curt, abrupt, off-hand or brusque. They are described as ‘rude and 
dismissive’ ‘uncommunicative’ or ‘extremely abrupt’. 87 88 Low level clashes are also 
evident in depictions of agents’ semi-audible expressions of annoyance, for example 
huffing, puffing and so on, or descriptions of their non-verbal actions, such as 
flouncing out, banging doors and so on. Typically, one relative describes an employee 
thus: 
 
 ‘she huffed and she puffed and she banged the door and she left … She just 
walked off’89 and ‘she seemed quite angry … So she flounced out.’ 90  
 
What users determine from this is a sense of agents’ antagonism. Again, it implies 
that they should not be asked for help. 
 
Extending the description of incivilities, the tensions between agents and users is 
also characterised by condescending or patronising attitudes. Agents are shown 
mocking or belittling users and behaving patronisingly or condescendingly. For 
example, one patient explains how they were stunned by the attitude of a consultant 
who said: ‘Now you’ve had your bed and breakfast, you can go home’.91 In a 
particularly illuminating example, a relative explains: 
 
‘I found the nurses’ approach very patronising….They were very flippant and 
 
 
87 Patient, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.22.   
88 External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.131. 
89 Relative, Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par295, p.134. 
90 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par15, p.154. 
91 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 03 Witness Statement, par42, p.12 
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were clearly just paying lip service to the issues. They were extremely 
patronising and asked me if, once I had got over my grief, I would be 
prepared to provide training to their nursing staff. I was outraged.’ 92 
 
In instances such as these, users are undermined or lessened in some way. In one, 
the implication is that the patient is a ‘malingerer’, there for personal benefit rather 
than sickness. In the other, a relative’s grief is characterised as a potential source of 
benefit to the hospital, as a training tool. Users’ ‘stunned’ and ‘outraged’ responses, 
indicate their anger or indignance towards those perceived to be making light of 
their situation.  
 
Flippancy or humour concerning organisational users’ pain and suffering as patients 
or as people is also evident. By way of example, one relative recalls that: 
 
‘the nurses were horrible at the time. They were laughing at patients who 
weren’t able to do anything for themselves.’ 93 
 
Along similar lines, another relative explains how her husband was not only ‘very 
upset’ to have heard a nurse ‘joking about her predicament’ but also to have found 
out that this was typical.94 Another speaks of how her husband explained to her that 
‘nurses were talking and laughing about the patients’.95 The humour in these 
instances is perceived as disrespectful. Critically, staff are laughing ‘at’ or ‘about’ 
patients and the predicaments that their illnesses cause them. Such a pattern 
indicates that even if employees perceive a patient as vulnerable, they do not have 
to appreciate, or enter into, their situation, nor assess it as deserving of respect or 
redress. Humour may be a means by which agents dissipate their irritation, or 
assuage themselves of guilt for being unable or unwilling to help users. However it 




92 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 07 Witness Statement, par42, p.10. 
93 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness Statement, par28,p.9. 
94 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.259. 
95 Relative, Public Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3. 
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Turning to the third feature of conflict between organisational agents and users, 
relationships between them are also characterised by more vigorous forms of 
hostility. The manifestation of such hostility is twofold. Firstly, agents are shown 
being directly and actively hostile towards those who need or seek help. Examples 
which illustrate this include: 
 
‘she was due to go on a break, and he said to her: I’m really sorry but I have 
done it, and with that she exploded. She threw the urinal down on to the 
bed and she pushed his trolley up against where he was with his dinner and 
she went out and she never came back.’ 96 
 
‘a very, very stroppy sister threatened to have me thrown off the ward 
altogether because I was being very emphatic in wanting to see somebody 
who had information as to what was the matter.’ 97 
 
This manifestation incorporates instances of organisational agents reacting angrily 
with physical aggression towards perceived demands placed upon them by users. 
Examples which typify this are:  
 
‘[REMOVED] told his wife that he had asked a nurse for help to go [sic] the 
toilet but the nurse had got angry before leaving to find a bottle. [REMOVED] 
was not able to wait and he told his wife that the nurse had ‘exploded’ and 
threw either the urinal or the food tray onto the bed and left.’ 98  
 
‘his daughter told the Inquiry that a nurse came in and literally threw 
documents at her that she said she would need for the funeral.’ 99 
 
Instances in the data, such as those above, depict staff abusing users verbally or 
physically. The latter is evident in examples of staff throwing urinals, food trays, or 
documents at users in ways that suggest intense anger or frustration and a lack of 
mental or emotional control. These actions imply that employees are over-stretched 
and over-whelmed, or are able to see themselves as such. What follows is a common 
 
 
96 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par15, p.154. 
97 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par281, p.130. 
98 Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1.  
99 Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3. 
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pattern or process. Firstly, patients seek aid or assistance, or their relatives do so on 
their behalf. Next, agents rebuff them for doing so, by verbal or non-verbal means. 
This leads hospital users to persist. Events then escalate. That can even result in overt 
bullying or aggression. Agents’ angry outbursts could, in this context, be seen as an 
unconscious attempt to re-assert control or address their own powerlessness. 
However, it is likely to deter organisational users from seeking help. As a 
consequence it protects agents from calls upon them to help others. It is a conflict 
riven power-struggle which is unconducive to  altruism.  
 
A second way in which hostility is manifested is by means of more indirect, covert or 
passive action. In these situations, agents appear to project their frustration onto 
users through subtler, less direct, but still aggressive means. By way of some 
examples: 
 
‘I went to see one of the nurses to explain that I thought it was something 
more serious and the nurse said to me “if you don’t think it is a panic attack, 
you find out what it is” and gave me a medical book to look through.’ 100 
 
‘they had a basket at the end of the bed that they would put sheets into, and 
we would go in and they were covered in urine, and they were covered in 
faeces and the smell. And we would constantly drag this out and put it 
outside of the room and said: please, would you not leave this in my Mum’s 
room because all of the germs are airborne and they are – as soon as we had 
gone, it would be put straight back in again.’ 101 
 
The first example might be seen as an employee expressing their aggression towards 
a ‘demanding’ relative indirectly by telling them to diagnose the patient. One can 
conceive of there being unspoken implication that ‘if you so know much why don’t 
you do my job’. The second is a kind of dance in which both parties engage in 
hostilities indirectly through the placement (and replacement) of  linen baskets. Such 
behaviours could deter help-seeking. By such means the presentation of need is 
blocked or reduced. That would inhibit altruism.  
 
 
100 Relative, Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 Witness Statement One, par36, p.14. 
101 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par39, p.61. 
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In another (particularly strange) example of passive aggression, relatives assert that 
nurses removed chairs from the ward at night so that visitors could not sit in them, 
characterising this as deliberately obstructive in intent. Thus: 
 
‘I do not believe that the staff were happy about the fact that I had raised a 
complaint, , because they did strange things like take the visiting chair away 
when my daughter went to sit with him .. she had to sleep on the floor when 
she visited.’ 102 
 
‘Despite family complaints, the nurses left the door to the room open and 
chairs from her room were frequently borrowed.’ 103 
 
‘the nights were dreadful. The first three or four nights there wasn’t even a 
chair for us to sit in. Whenever we did find one, we would go to the toilet 
and come back and find it gone. The nurses made it perfectly clear that they 
didn’t want us there… made it very clear they didn’t want us there at all.’ 104 
 
These examples imply that nurses are removing the chairs so that relatives cannot 
stay with their family at night. If this is the case, it would indicate a high level of 
passive aggression, with nurses’ hostility towards relatives’ attendance being 
expressed (or achieved) through the removal of certain objects rather than by 
directly confronting the subject of their ire or anger.105 Taken all together, one can 
see that such behaviours protect organisational agents from demands placed upon 
them, by reducing help-seeking or decreasing the presentation of need. This would 
be unconducive to altruism.  
 
Overall, instead of seeing a pattern in which agents see users as worthy or deserving, 
the case is characterised by the depiction of them as unwelcome or unwanted. 
Effectually, user needs, especially those of patients, may be characterised as a 




102 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 10 Witness Statement, par17.1, p.4/5. 
103 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.104. 
104 Relative, Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 Witness Statement One, par25, p.10. 
105 By way of counterargument, relatives could be misconstruing something as simple as a lack of chairs as 
intentionally hostile simply because they feel unwelcome more generally. 
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‘we were a nuisance. They didn’t really want us there. The whole attitude 
was “Don’t bother us, we’re busy. Don’t ask anything, we haven’t got the 
answers”. It was looks and shrugs of the shoulders and things like this if you 
made a query, you know, as to my mum’s health or was anything happening 
or – you know any query at all.’ 106 
 
Notably, users perceive a situation in which staff feel negatively about them. As one 
says ‘you know, you’re a pain.’107 Illuminatingly, one patient explains:  
 
‘The nurses made her feel like she was a burden.’108  
 
Thus, patients are seen as an encumbrance, their relatives are perceived as a 
nuisance and requests for help are treated as an interruption or inconvenience, that 
is something which agents do not have time to accommodate. In some examples, 
users’ presence itself is made wholly unwelcome. By way of illustration, one relative 
describes a nurse who says ‘we don’t like you visiting during mealtimes’.109 The 
general discourse evident in examples such as these is that relatives are in the way. 
Irrespective of whether agents are consciously or unconsciously seeking to deter 
users from approaching them, the point is that they perceive themselves as 
unwelcome or their requests for help and assistance as unwanted. Such effects 
would lessen altruism by reducing the presentation of need.  
 
The anger which agents direct towards users as a result of unwanted expectations is 
highly relevant. Users see it as an attitudinal deficiency. However, anger is also 
evident in the other direction. For example, one relative explains how, when a family 
member was moved into the uncleaned room of an infected prior occupant, they 
became very angry and called the hospital to complain.110 Another speaks of 
 
 
106 Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par25.30, p.1606.  
107 Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par25.30, p.1606. 
108 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.113. 
109 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par128, p.88.   
110 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 15 Witness Statement, par11, p.3. 
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becoming angry and complaining after seeing that the records were missing for the 
three days before their relative’s death.111 By way of a typical example of user anger:  
 
‘I felt that the meeting was completely useless. [REMOVED] and [REMOVED]  
just tried to fudge us off with protocol and it became clear that they had only 
agreed to meet with us to try and justify the Trust’s own version of events…I  
left the meeting feeling very angry….. crying with frustration.’ 112  
 
In the first two instances, anger prompts relatives to complain. Both concern support 
services, that is cleanliness of a patient’s room or the management of their records, 
rather than clinical care. Relatives would find such aspects easier to evaluate. In the 
third example, inadequate responses intensify a relative’s anger. This typifies a 
pattern in the data in which: relatives are angered by events; they complain about 
them; they receive an unhelpful response; and their feelings are elevated by such 
unresponsiveness. Thus, organisational users’ anger does not effect change, instead 
it becomes be a source of ongoing relational tension. An escalation of incivilities 
derives from this.  
 
To summarise, the anger and hostility agents direct at patients escalates conflict. 
Users become angered by the ill-usage of in-group members. Their anger is 
underpinned by a level of moral other-condemnation. This prompts opposition 
towards agents and spurs clashes. However, it is also protective in nature. Towards 
fellow users, it precipitates an other-orientated reparative moral force. It stimulates 
users’ assessment of other user group members’ needs and motivates them to repair 
or redress perceived injustices. There is a pattern in which users notice an event in 
which a patient is ill-used, feel angered by that ill-use, condemn that ill-usage or the 
person who is responsible for it (the-ill-user) and, at times, confront or denounce 
them. Their condemnation or disapproval is altruistically motivated. Their 
confrontation or denunciation of agents is a physical expression of that.   
 
 
111 When we saw the notes we got angry and complained. As well as some of the statements that we have 
previously referred to it looked like there were records missing for the three days before [REMOVED] death.’ 
(Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness Statement par36, p.9) 
112 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par23&24, p.6. 
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6.2 The Diminishment of Organisational Users 
 
The climate of conflict within the hospital is also evident in the derogation or 
diminishment of organisational members. This is most visibly manifested in agents’ 
disrespectful or undignified treatment of patients. The Independent Inquiry 
concluded that people’s humanity was not always recognised in the hospital.113 
Three elements are evident in this: the treatment of users as less human entities; a 
more active demeaning or denigration of them and their scapegoating as problems 
in and of themselves (see Appendix 11: Diminishment Narratives).  
 
Beginning with the first of these features, instances in the data show that patients 
may be diminished by their characterisation as nameless entities. Users provide 
examples in which agents do not recognise them or their individuality.114 Typically, 
one relative describes how: 
 
‘The nurses never offered me any conversation; they never even addressed 
me as a person. They never spoke to [REMOVED] either. They never 
mentioned his name, and they certainly never mentioned mine.’ 115 
 
Patients may be also characterised as having some reduced value or worth. By way 
of example, users describing their experiences at the hospital speak of how ‘you are 
a number’.116 Some highly illustrative examples are: 
 
‘their mother was not treated as an individual.…..none of the patients they 
observed were treated as though they were an individual person.’ 117 
 
‘When they did anything for [my father], it was never: […], I am going to do 
so and so; or Mr […]; or whatever. They just treated him as if he wasn’t there. 
 
 
113 ‘The attitude of staff could be variable, some demonstrating a commendable recognition of the humanity of those 
they engaged with while others did not. (Inquiry Chairman, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par205, p.109) 
114She hated being called [REMOVED] and, although we asked on numerous occasions that she was called 
[REMOVED], everyone kept calling her [REMOVED]. This upset me, as Mum had limited hearing and sight. If you call 
someone by a name that they are not known as, they are not going to respond.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Relative 07 Witness Statement, par5, p.2) 
115 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 11 Witness Statement, par7, p.3. 
116 Other Role, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par23, p.156. 
117 Relative, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3. 
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As if he was just – well, as I said, a log of wood or something like that.’ 118 
 
‘We didn’t see anyone treated as an individual. We were a commodity to be 
shifted through the system as quickly as possible.’ 119 
 
Critically, such examples indicate that patients are perceived as lesser. They are not 
individuals, but a ‘number,’ ‘log of wood’ or ‘commodity’. Importantly, inanimate or 
unhuman objects can be treated differently. That has implications for altruistic or 
helping behaviour. A patient who is not an individual does not require care or 
concern. They can be moved through the system without reference to their welfare. 
Knowing that one has been (or will be) denigrated would make them less likely to 
seek help. Diminishing patients makes them (or their needs) less worthy of aid. So 
even if employees perceive patients’ need for help, they can avoid appreciating it or 
having to assess their obligation to respond. Diminishing patients in this way allows 
organisational agents to avoid responding or respond in different, potentially less 
helpful, ways. The pattern fits with Bandura’s (2002) assertion that recasting the 
nature of the victim can absolve one of misconduct if one fails to act prosocially. 
 
Turning to the second feature of patient diminishment, they are, at times, more 
actively denigrated or demeaned. By way of example, one patient was told he was a 
‘dirty old man’ and that he should not expect to have his sheets changed each time 
he soiled himself.120 Another explains how staff made ‘derogatory’ comments about 
her partner being young enough to be her son.121 Illuminatingly, a patient explains: 
 
‘There were two nurses that were actually talking about the patients, and 
they were laughing about them...They had just come out of the ward and 
were laughing and saying about the smell in there, and they were talking in 
general, thinking that because he had had a stroke, he wasn’t able to 




118 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par27, p.157. 
119 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par294, p.133. 
120 Independent case notes review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.126.   
121 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.270. 
122 Patient, independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par28, p.257. 
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In two of these examples, patients are characterised as physically unclean, dirty or 
smelly. In another, there is an implication of sexual impropriety or misconduct 
indicated by the age gap between sexual partners. All three indicate a level of 
disgust. An other-condemning emotion, disgust obviates the need to help by making 
the one needing aid unworthy of receiving it. If one can deny that a need is genuine 
because its recipient is unworthy one can avoid calls upon one’s altruism. Demeaning 
those who need help also reduces the cost of inaction. One does not need to feel 
guilt or shame because they are undeserving. Dehumanising users in this way is 
unconducive to altruism.  
 
According to Haidt (2003), disgust is plausibly prosocial since it might make us 
ostracise those guilty of moral infractions. It could play a similar role in safeguarding 
or protecting the social order when elicited by moral breaches or personal offences 
(Rozin, Haidt and McCauley, 2008). Here, however, the use of disgust appears more 
in line with Harris and Fiske’s (2006) studies, in which it is used to identify an 
undeserving out-group, one that is perceived with lower levels of warmth. In the 
above examples, patients are recast as unclean, dirty or sexually deviant. This allows 
agents to adopt a morally disgusted stance towards them. As a result, the 
assessment of users might be negative, deeming them underserving, while any 
assessment of agents’ own obligation to help them would be reduced and could even 
be obviated altogether.  
 
Organisational agents’ responses towards alcohol in the hospital are highly 
suggestive of such an effect. For example, one relative explains how, after her 
mother told staff about having consumed alcohol ‘the doctor’s attitude changed and 
she was not treated with the same care’.123 In a particularly illuminating example, 




123 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.71. 
 137 
‘Her husband was unhappy with the consultant’s attitude, primarily as he 
seemed to be convinced that his wife was suffering from alcohol-induced 
pancreatic disease. Her family constantly emphasised that she only 
consumed alcohol occasionally and never to excess, and indeed had drunk 
very little since her first pregnancy in 1978. The family believe that the 
consultant’s assumption and refusal to listen …… clouded his judgement.’ 124 
 
An alcoholic is someone who can be accorded blame for bringing about their 
condition. You could frame their illness as underserving of treatment because they 
brought it on themselves. By such means, you might deny that their need is genuine. 
You could also deny that there is a suitable action you could take to help them since 
they will continue to drink and thus undo any treatment you provide. Notably, in 
Piliavin et al.’s (1969) study a drunk is less likely to be helped because the cost is 
higher (i.e. more disgust) whilst the costs for not helping is lower (i.e. less self-
censure because a drunk is responsible for his own condition). In this way, lessening 
patients, or making them culpable, obviates the need for altruism because they 
‘brought it on themselves’ or may undo your treatment.  Once again, in keeping with 
Bandura’s (2002) arguments, by shifting blame onto patients, organisational agents 
can reduce the cost of inaction, including any self-sanctioning that would normally 
arise from their not acting. By reducing user worth, any assessment of the need for 
altruistic or helping behaviour towards them is likely to be simultaneously eroded.  
 
Taking this one step further, users may be re-framed as the problem in and of 
themselves. This is the third element visible in the diminishment of patients. This 
time the problem is not patients’ sickness or symptoms. Nor is it their pain and 
suffering. Neither is it any ill-usage to which they have been subjected by agents. 
Instead, the patient, or their family, are the problem. The Independent Inquiry, for 
example, concluded that patients who suffered from states of acute confusion were 
treated as if they were behaving badly, rather than being unwell.125 Typical examples 




124 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.148. 
125 Inquiry Chairman, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par21, p.401. 
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‘I said why – you have rushed the blood through… and she said – she said – 
no, she said, what has happened is I have had to come in and give the blood 
and don’t moan, she said, because I have had no break today.’ 126  
 
‘Following her husband’s death his wife was spoken to by a nurse in the pub 
who said “her husband was disgusting to get so fat, he needed every porter 
in the hospital to move him”.’ 127 
 
In one of these, asking a question is reframed as having unreasonable expectations 
of staff in the light of other demands upon the particular employee concerned. In 
the other, a patient’s physical condition (as opposed to actual illness), and the 
difficulties that causes these employees in handling him, is the problem. His weight 
is a reason not to appreciate his situation. The emotional costs of not helping him 
are reduced because one does not have to feel sympathy or compassion for him as 
a less worthy human being. By way of a particularly illuminating example in which 
agents blame users, a patient explains how: 
 
‘The same nurse who was previously reprimanded for her unacceptable 
behaviour came back into my room. She said “you’ve made me ill! I have 
been off sick with stress because you reported me”.’ 128 
 
In this instance, the employee is arguably projecting their sickness onto the relative, 
indicating that it was caused by their complaint. Blaming or problematising users in 
these ways makes them less worthy of help. Such patterns align with Faust’s (2009) 
claims that healthcare professionals can absolve themselves of compassion by 
deeming patients as undeserving. 
 
A significant effect associated with the dehumanisation or diminishment of patients 
is other users’ moral responses. Righteous, moral or empathic anger derives from a 
perception that there has been a violation or breach of moral standards towards 
oneself or others (Tangney et al., 2007). Empathic anger arises from seeing someone 
 
 
126 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par6, p.153. 
127 External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.106. 
128 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 01 Witness Statement, par11, p.4. 
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else being unjustly or unfairly treated and has the capacity to turn your empathic 
distress into a sense of injustice, angering you at those who ill-use others and 
motivating you to address their ill-usage (Hoffman, 2008). There is a clear pattern of 
such moral responding in the data. Firstly, users express distress about other users’ 
situations. Secondly, they articulate a sense of injustice. They judge the situation as 
wanting. For example, they say: ‘I was outraged’ and ‘I was absolutely stunned’. Their 
anger is provoked by behaviour they disapprove of and consider unjust or unfair. 
There is a sense of condemnation, either of the ill-user, the ill-usage, or both of 
these. Thirdly, there is evidence of action which is associated with their anger, such 
as complaining. So, user group members’ moral or righteous anger is also associated 
with some specific reparative actions that indicate altruism towards patients.  
 
Such actions may be active or passive and directly or indirectly aimed at helping the 
patient or punishing organisational agents who mistreat them. One action 
commonly associated with morally-infused ire or anger is users’ condemnation of 
organisational agents. That condemnation may be undertaken mentally or verbally 
and carried out in public or private. Another associated action is confronting 
organisational agents about their actions, emotions or behaviours, complaining to 
(or about) them within the hospital or raising the matter of their perceived 
misconduct with another source. Importantly, one also sees reparative action 
targeted at addressing perceived injustices. So, the mistreatment of its users by an 
organisation provokes altruistic or helping behaviour on their behalf. For example: 
 
‘she said to my Mum:… what medication have you had today? Is Mum 
supposed to remember that?... and my Mum had said: sorry, what did you 
say? And she snapped: I said, what medication did you have? I said: excuse 
me, I didn’t understand what you said, you’d mumbled it.’ 129  
 
‘I went later to find this lady and said: excuse me, don’t treat my Mum like 
an elderly idiot. She is a 67-year-old lady who is fighting for her life. All she 
wants to do is get mobile and go home and be with her family.’ 130  
 
 
129 Relative, Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par295, p.134. 
130 Relative, Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par295, p.134. 
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‘Unfortunately the room he moved into was not cleaned after the previous 
person had moved out. The previous person had also suffered from C. 
difficile. I was very angry at this and called the Trust to complain about the 
condition of the room and was told that the room would be cleaned the next 
morning. My sister and I stayed at the hospital all that morning and no one 
came to clean it. In the end we bleached the entire room ourselves.’ 131 
 
In the first two examples, one sees a relative confronting agents about the 
inappropriateness of their behaviour. In the third, one sees relatives attempting to 
redress the poor treatment of a family member, placed in a dirty, potentially 
infectious room. Firstly, they seek to address this by complaining to staff. Secondly, 
when that fails to redress the situation, they clean the room themselves. Such 
examples suggest that the anger which users express or exhibit is moral and 
empathic in nature. It prompts feeling as well as judgement. The observers are 
clearly emotionally stimulated by, and concerned about, the treatment of patients 
as people with human frailties, as well as their treatment as patients with clinical 
needs. Importantly, this appears to precipitate reparative or correction action. That 
action also has a cost, such as having to confront people, which may be 
uncomfortable, or going and tracking people down to obtain help, which may take 
time. This is not confined between family members. Importantly, there is a clear and 
strong altruistic in-group effect operating between users as a whole. However, this 




131 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 15 Witness Statement, par11, p.3. 
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6.3 Conflict Climate Conclusion  
 
The hospital is characterised by extensive internal conflict. User group members are 
angered by the perception: that patients (both related and unrelated) are being 
poorly treated; that their care is physically, clinically or attitudinally deficient; or that 
employees’ actions, emotions or behaviours do not meet expected norms or 
standards concerning the caring process. Agents are angered by apparently 
unwanted, unmeetable or unwarranted expectations others are perceived to be 
placing upon them. Their anger is directed at users, as well as at the organisation and 
its agents, including peers, managers, leaders and so on. The differing triggers are 
summarised below (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Sources of Organisational Member Conflict 
 SOURCE DESCRIPTION  
1 TREATMENT 
DEFICIENCY 
Conflict caused by perceived fallings in clinical (or other) forms of 
treatment, such as basic care.  
2  ATTITUDINAL 
DEFICIENCY  
Conflict caused by someone’s perceived attitudinal failing (and/or 
related behaviours).  
3 UNMET 
EXPECTATIONS  
Conflict caused by expectations you have of someone which they 
have failed to meet. 
4 UNWANTED 
EXPECTATIONS 
Conflict arising from expectations placed upon you which you feel 
you cannot or should not have to meet. 
 
The result of all these tensions is an organisational context that is characterised by a 
climate of conflict and poor quality member relationships. The two groups respond 
to this in different ways. Where agents are concerned, conflict undermines their 
responsiveness towards out-group members. Importantly, agents are angered on 
their own behalf as the subject of perceived ill-use. Their ire or frustration is directed 
at those whose demands are conceived of as unreasonable in some way and thus a 
form of ill-usage. A self-orientated, defensive personal force appears to arise out of 
this, a force aimed at protecting staff from unwelcome demands. A significant part 
of this is their diminishment of patients. This is likely to inhibit altruism by means of 
its influence on their assessment of need. Psychologically lessening users, for 
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example, means that even if their needs are ‘seen’, they do not necessarily have to 
be ‘felt’ or ‘judged’ worthy. This would make altruistic action less necessary or likely. 
 
By way of contrast, where users are concerned, conflict leads to a kind of promotive 
morality. Users are angered by perceived failures to help them in line with expected 
norms and standards of care. Unmet expectations stimulate anger on their behalf 
which is moral, empathic or righteous in form. It has the power to prompt action 
which is reparative, that is providing redress for someone who has been ill-used. It 
also prompts more punitive actions, punishing those who perpetrated the ill-usage. 
Effectually, user group members notice in-group members’ mistreatment, perceive 
it as significant or important, appreciate the distress it causes them, undertake an 
assessment of such treatment and judge it as wanting or worthy of redress. Such 
factors can promote altruistic or helping behaviour, by motivating in-group concerns 
for other patients.    
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7 CHAPTER 7: A DEMANDING ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Another final prominent narrative to emerge from this case is the hospital’s 
demanding internal context. In this case, the organisational terrain is characterised 
by a high strain on agents to meet internal demand coupled with low levels of 
support or resource with which to meet it (see Figure 13). These factors add to the 
pressure on organisational agents which already arises from their working with 
highly distressed and distressing organisational users (see Chapter 5) as well as the 
climate of relational tension and conflict within which that work must be done (see 
Chapter 6).  
 




This context is also characterised by a threatening culture which diminishes the 
cultural, social or relational support for organisational agents from their managers, 
peers or supervisors inside the hospital. 
 
7.1 High Organisational Strain  
 
As an organisation, the hospital places significant demand upon its staff. The internal 











demands of one’s role, operate within set routines and meet managerial or 
organisational goals, as well as any targets and deadlines which govern how those 
should be met. If it was only generalised statements about the pressures generated 
by the hospital’s context, one might conclude that this narrative is a form of self-
justification, evidence of a post-hoc defence, articulated this way in the light of 
inquiry witnesses’ hindsight. However, there are many specific or detailed examples 
of such pressures in the data. Moreover, such issues were raised by staff before the 
inquiries. The 2007 NHS staff survey concluded that only 17 percent of hospital 
employees felt that there were enough staff to do the job properly, whilst 52 percent 
felt they did not have enough time to carry out their work.132 Convincingly, users 
perceive the same pressures.  
 
The high level of demand in the hospital is evident is intensive working patterns. 
These are characterised by long hours, double or back-to-back shifts and late nights. 
It can also be seen in staff taking work home. By way of example, one nurse describes 
being up until 1.00 am working on a report, despite having 7.00 am shift.133 Another 
explains that nurses, as a group, were often forced to work long hours and then take 
their paperwork home with them because there was not sufficient time to complete 
it when they were at the hospital.134 The breadth and depth of physical demand 
which employees must meet in the time available, both in terms of the quality and 
quantity of their work, generates an exacting pace. One nurse describes an ‘average 
shift’ as ‘pressure, pressure, pressure’.135 The intensity of all this is articulated in an 
anonymous letter staff sent to management stating:  
 
‘unmanageable workloads, going without breaks, not getting off on time, 




132 Public Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par2.367, p.234.  
133 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par19, p.6. 
134 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par72, p.20. 
135 Nurse, HealthCare Commission Report, 2009, p.49. 
136 Anonymous Letter, Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par78, p.205. 
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Such intensity will have consequences for organisational agents’ capacity to respond 
to patient need. There are significant costs to such practices which undermine 
organisational agents’ responsiveness. These costs make altruistic or helping 
behaviour less likely.  
 
Notably, this way of working places a high mental, physical, temporal or emotional 
strain on organisational agents as a group. By way of an example, one nurse 
describes how their feeling ‘upset,’ ‘worried’ and ‘stressed’ resulted in asthmatic 
attacks and weight gain.137 Along similar lines, a doctor explains that undertaking 
ward rounds gave them palpitations due to the pressures associated with these.138 
Organisational agents also exhibit symptoms of fatigue and depletion. In their 
anonymous letter to managers, staff  state that:  
 
‘We all [sic] exhausted, mentally and physically. ……The environment is 
neither safe for patients or staff.’ 139  
 
Patients also perceive this effect. By way of example, one patient explains that  
 
‘there were not enough staff and the nurses were clearly exhausted.’ 140  
 
Such conditions would strain the collective capacity of organisational agents as a 
group. It would deplete their mental, physical or emotional energy with which to 
help users and squeeze the time available within which to do so. Such scarcity would 
reduce internal capacity to perceive organisational users’ needs or appreciate and 
enter into them. It could also negatively impact on the likelihood that user needs are 
being actively monitored or fulsomely assessed. Such conditions would be 
unconducive to altruistic or helping behaviour and are therefore likely to lessen it. 




137 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par67, p.18. 
138 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par43, p.10. 
139 Anonymous Letter, Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par78, p.205. 
140 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.70. 
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Time constraint is one of the most visible manifestations of organisational strain on 
agent helping capacity. Time constraint is referenced by almost all types of witness 
who provide statements to the Inquiries. An expert report on the case confirmed 
that hospital staff did not have time to perform their work well and were ‘rushed off 
their feet’ (Alberti 2009, p.13). The temporal strain of acting, and any related costs, 
are clearly very keenly felt by hospital agents as a group. Many refer to time 
limitations of one sort or another (see Appendix 12: High-Strain Narrative). Typically, 
one doctor states: 
 
‘We were all working crazy hours, perhaps 70 to 80 hours per week and we 
were on call on top of this.’ 141  
 
Another talks of how nurses felt the pressure of caring for patients in a given 
timeframe.142 Managers share this perspective. One says ‘There were not enough 
hours in the day’.143 Another explains that ‘People were busy running around, doing 
three things at once and not taking breaks, or lunch’.144 The point is that this context 
requires one to work without self-determination or respite. 
 
Organisational agents are not the only group who describe this pattern. 
Organisational users also depict staff at the hospital as having insufficient time within 
which to carry out their work. By way of some typical examples, users say: 
 
‘I was concerned that there was a lack of staff to provide adequate care and 
found that nurses often worked double shifts.’ 145  
 
‘They didn’t really have time. There were not enough around.’ 146  
 
‘I waited for four and half hours while one extremely harassed doctor raced 
around like a headless chicken.’ 147   
 
 
141 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par67, p.21. 
142 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 21 Witness Statement, par66, p.15. 
143 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 06 Witness Statement, par43, p.12. 
144 Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, par5, p.2.  
145 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.236. 
146 Patient, Public Inquiry, Patient A Witness Statement, p.101. 
147 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement par3, p.2. 
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‘There were also very few nursing staff on the ward and they came across as 
overworked.’ 148 
 
The presence of many examples like these in the data indicates that users also 
believe that the hospital is a temporally pressured organisation, characterised by 
high levels of demand, which places a high strain on agents.  
 
Importantly, too little time is unconducive to altruism.149 In this case it appears that 
being hurried can take precedence over users’ welfare needs. Organisational agents 
appear, or claim to be, ‘too busy’ to help when asked. They rush around, walk 
quickly, hurry past users and so on (see Appendix 12: High-Strain Narrative). The 
state of being or feeling ‘too hurried’ has the power to lessen their ability to ‘see’ 
patients’ needs. This consequently reduces the likelihood of agents developing any 
‘feelings’ for patients as a result of their situation or making any judgements about 
the need to act. Hurrying through situations lessens agents’ exposure to the 
emotional noise present in this environment. It reduces their interaction with users 
with whom they may be in conflict. The latter is especially pertinent where patients 
are perceived as demanding. Critically, it enables organisational agents to pay them 
less attention and thereby avoid seeing their cues that help is needed or having to 
experience the emotional tenor of such signals. That, in turn, removes the need for 
agents to assess patients’ needs or condition.150 In this way, organisationally induced 
pressures could reduce altruistic or helping behaviour by initially lessening agents’ 
perception of users’ needs, subsequently lessening the chances that users’ needs are 
appreciated and finally obviating any need for assessment of those needs. 
 
Certain cognitive and affective states are associated with this demanding context. 
High-strain conditions appear to generate inward focussing mental or emotional 
 
 
148 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.119. 
149 Being hurried is shown to reduce altruistic or helping behaviour (Darley and Batson, 1973). 
150 It would also preclude employees’ from developing the knowledge and understanding of patients which is 
conducive to good care. Emotional labour with patients, for example, requires time and demands substantial 
knowledge of the patient as a person (James, 1992). However, reduced understanding of patients themselves 
impair employees’ ability to judge whether their needs are genuine and require a response. 
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states which direct organisational agents’ attention away from patients. Starting 
with the cognitive effects of working in such as context, the terminology used to 
describe agents’ state indicates significant mental strain. For example, doctors say:  
 
‘I was working under pressures that would have broken most people.’ 151   
 
‘you work a team that hard for so long you begin to break people.’ 152 
 
Language such as ‘break’ or ‘broken’ indicates the presence of considerable cognitive 
strain. Such strain would deplete staff of the mental resources they might draw upon 
to quickly identify patients’ needs and speedily determine suitable responses. As a 
group, their mental band-width with which to assess organisational users’ distress 
would thus be weakened or contracted.  
 
Alongside evidence of a mental strain upon organisational agents associated with 
the demanding internal context is evidence of an accompanying emotional strain. 
Hospital staff are clearly an anxious group. By way of one illuminating example, a 
relative describes the effect of time on a hospital porter’s mental state:  
 
‘The porter told me that he was struggling to find an oxygen cylinder that 
actually contained some oxygen as they were all empty. The porter was quite 
anxious and he told me that he had a 15 minute slot in which to move mum 
or he would be in trouble.’ 153 
 
This example shows an underlying sense that services are measured in units of time 
(as opposed to care). Significant anxiety is clearly attached to this. Such inwardly 
orientating moods or emotions direct employee attention to their own state. In this 
way, demand might reduce agent attention to user needs and stimulate inattentive 
practices. However this context is not merely an anxious one for employees, it is also 
fearful. As one nurse explains:   
 
 
151 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par14, p.4.  
152 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par88, p.26. 
153 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 Witness Statement One, par18, p.8. 
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‘Many of the new recruits had no experience and were terrified at the level 
of work they were asked to do.’ 154  
 
The Healthcare Commission (2009) said staff believed that they were ‘in the firing 
line’ if they did not meet organisational goals or targets and consequently liable to 
blame. Clearly, the requirement to meet hospital demand, together with the 
prospect of repercussions for failing to do so, is a destabilising cultural force, 
generating negative emotions in the face of such threats. At times, hospital staff 
become overwhelmed. For example:  
  
‘He found one nurse crying as she had worked for 12 hours without a break 
and at the weekend.’ 155  
 
‘The nurses were overwhelmed with the number of patients, one crying with 
exhaustion and frustration.’ 156  
  
Working in an intense environment such as this would drain organisational agents of 
affective resource. As a group, their emotional band-width, that is their resources to 
appreciate others’ distress, would also be weakened or contracted. Critically, they 
may lack the rich capacity to feel with (or for) others which is able to stimulate 
altruism. The absence of such richness would also undermine the potential for 
compassionate patient care.  
 
Another evident feature of high strain within the hospital is the conflict which 
organisational agents experience about which elements of their roles to prioritise in 
the light of organisational expectation. Their descriptions indicate that trying, or 
being expected, to meet the responsibilities attached to one’s formal organisational 
role and deliver the requirements of tasks and routines associated with it, places a 
significant pressure upon them. The Healthcare Commission, for example, speaks of 
how: ‘junior doctors were put under pressure to make decisions quickly without 
 
 
154 Nurse, Independent Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement Number, par3, p.2. 
155 External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.135. 
156 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.45. 
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advice and support from more senior doctors.’157 These organisational constraints, 
and the pressures associated with them, force agents to make unpalatable choices 
or compromises regarding what they do for patients. In one illuminating example, a 
doctor says: 
 
‘People were trying to satisfy pressures on them and minimise the hard time 
which they were given by managers and this became the sole priority.’ 158  
 
Picking up on the previous point about depleted cognitive and affective resource,  
such conflict also generates emotional discomfort and mental discomposure 
amongst organisational agents as they strain to decide which aspects of their roles 
to deliver. By way of some typical examples: 
  
‘…nurses felt very uncomfortable. They felt outside their comfort zone. They 
felt that they were not very happy, there was a lot of unhappiness and [sic] 
felt that they were not doing the best to their patients.’ 159 
 
‘I would go home in tears because people were being treated so badly in that 
Hospital and were suffering so unnecessarily.’ 160  
  
Clearly, demand limits organisational agents’ autonomy. It forces them to make 
choices about which aspects of their work they perform, restricts the time they can 
spend responding to patients’ welfare needs and limits their ability to undertake any 
additional voluntary or discretionary effort where that is concerned. As well as being 
acknowledged by internal witnesses, such constraint is also perceived by external 
witnesses.161 Importantly, it would be unconducive to altruism. 
 
Finally, this demanding organisational environment also appears detrimental to 
organisational agents’ sense of personal efficacy. In the hospital one sees examples 
of them expressing, exhibiting or articulating a resigned stance that raising their 
 
 
157 Healthcare Commission Report, 2009, p.7. 
158 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par12. 
159 Doctor, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par74, p.204. 
160 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Witness Statement Anonymised Employee 23, par9, p.4. 
161 External Individual, Public Inquiry, Anonymised External 96 (GP) Witness Statement, par10, p.3. 
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concerns will not have an impact. Those reporting to the Healthcare Commission 
(2009) express a lack of confidence that doing so would effect change. Incident 
reporting, in particular is described as a ‘black hole’ and a ‘waste of time’. There is a 
clear assumption that raising issues and concerns will not change the situation. As 
illustrated below:  
 
‘if clinicians took problems to the hospital management the criticism would 
fall straight back to them. I remember ringing one consultant and he told me 
that if I copied in the chief executive to my letters, the chief executive would 
simply hand the letter straight back to him and nothing would change.’ 162  
 
Arguably, such cynicism is fuelled by denying that your actions are, or will be, 
effective.163 It is also a potential means of escaping a situation. It may be a method 
by which one can cognitively reframe or reappraise it. To illustrate this point, if one 
sees the organisation (or its agents) acting improperly or making mistakes, then one 
is arguably obligated point this out to them. If one can say to oneself that this will 
not rectify the mistakes or prevent further impropriety from occurring then 
complaining about it becomes an action of no value. Thus, one can deny that there 
is a suitable action which one can carry out. This would make speaking up, or 
speaking out about matters, an action which would be high on cost because of the 
social penalties involved, but low on reward or benefit because it changes nothing. 
Feasibly, a culture characterised by such a mood would be unlikely to create 
conditions conducive to altruism. Agents may come to feel inefficacious about their 
ability to take effective action in order to meet patients’ needs. This may not be so 
much in relation to patients’ needs individually, but rather collectively. Thus, they 
may feel unable to meet patients’ needs as a group. Moreover, the altruism required 





162 External Individual, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par 2.144, p.178.  
163 However, while resignedly saying that complaining will not change anything is a reason not to raise any 
concerns, it is also a means of justifying not doing so. 
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7.2 Low Organisational Support  
  
Alongside the depiction of the hospital as a site of high organisational strain, there 
is its presentation of it as a site of low organisational support. It an environment in 
which staff can see themselves as poorly resourced to meet demands. A lack of 
sufficient resources with which to deliver the physical aspects of the job within the 
expected timeframe to the expected level of quality is a prominent narrative (see 
Appendix 13: Low Support Narrative). Constrained or limited resources referred to 
in this case include: peers, who are perceived as too few in number (or lacking in 
skill); equipment, which may be faulty, outdated or scarce; facilities, which includes 
antiquated buildings and unhelpful ward configurations; and finances, which may be 
the underlying cause of all these. Thus, alongside organisational agents’ reduced 
personal resources discussed in the previous section, is a lack of organisational 
resources which might erode their efficacy or capacity further. 
 
In this case, insufficient staffing with which to deliver the work emerges as one of 
the most important internal organisational resource constraints. This includes 
staffing numbers, skills mix, seniority or experience and availability. Agents clearly 
see themselves as under-resourced to carry out their roles or meet their 
responsibilities. They talk of staff groupings as being ‘denied the basic tools they 
need to do their job properly,’ and describe teams or departments as ‘hideously 
under-resourced,’ ‘understaffed,’ ‘under resourced’ and ‘horrendous.’  164 165 166 
There are many examples of organisational agents, both managerial and 
professional staff, indicating that there are insufficient numbers of staff. They say: 
 
‘there were simply not enough people to provide basic care.’ 167  
 
‘I saw lots of examples of simply not enough nursing care.’ 168   
 
 
164 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par40, p.10. 
165 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par47, p.14. 
166 Manager, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 1 , par2.341, p.277. 
167 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement, par78. 
168 Doctor, Public inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness statement, par35, p.100. 
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Importantly, these claims are backed up by statements from hospital users. They also 
perceive an inadequate number of employees. Notably, awareness of the problem 
extends beyond the hospital bounds into the local healthcare environment. By way 
of example:   
 
‘there was certainly great and increasing disquiet regarding the pressure of 
work on nurses following staffing cuts at the Hospital….It was clear that 
there was increasing disquiet .. regarding inadequate levels of staffing.’169  
 
Insufficient or inadequate human resource is particularly perceived to be associated 
with unresponsive patient care. In this regard, factors which are unconducive to 
altruism would also be unconducive to good care. 
 
Resource constraint is also evident amongst staff employed within the managerial 
hierarchy. Organisational agents working in management roles  are also affected by 
resource pressures, albeit of a different kind and from a different source. Financial 
constraints are imposed upon them internally by hospital leadership, as well as 
exercised over them by external agencies. Commenting upon such matters, doctors 
say:   
 
‘I believe this requirement to cut the budget would have come right from 
the top.’ 170 
 
‘In my view [REMOVED] had his hands tied. He had to balance the books; he 
had to get FT status and he had to sort the problems out at the Trust 
notwithstanding that money had been taken out.’ 171 
 
These instances Illustrate the role of leadership in imposing such constraints, as well 
as the role external factors play in creating the need for them. Pertinently, managers 
are not exempt from inadequate resource with which to meet organisational 
demand. Though the source is different, they experience similar constraint. This 
 
 
169 External Individual, Public Inquiry, Anonymised External 96 (Witness Statement, par10, p.3.  
170 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 19 Witness Statement, par14, p.5 
171 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 19 Witness Statement, par15, p.5. 
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struggle could absorb their attention, have the power to direct it inwardly and 
potentially reduce their appreciation of employees’ predicaments as a result. In this 
regard, the potential impact of context on their capacity for altruism towards staff 
would mirror the impact of context on employees’ potential for altruism towards 
patients. 
 
Alongside a lack of physical resources with which to meet workplace demands, there 
is a lack of cultural or relational support for those delivering them which might 
assuage the strain they feel. The organisational context is one in which contact 
between agents is infused with conflict. Their relationships are strained, tension 
between them is high and conflict is continuously present. There is evidence of 
fractious day-to-day interaction amongst organisational agents. There are 
ascriptions of ‘clear clashes of ethos, ego, and basic philosophy’ between peers.172 
There was tension within or between different tiers or professional groups. There 
were, for example, claims of ‘factions’ within the management team.173 Similarly, 
interpersonal relationships between certain professional groups was seen to be 
‘poor’.174 More junior groups of staff were described as ‘intimidated’.175 Conflict 
infused both formal and informal terrains. Meetings were described as 
unpleasant.176 They could even become hostile and aggressive. By way of example, 
one doctor describes a colleague who was supposed to be at the top table in a 
meeting sitting instead at the back and ‘haranguing’ those who were.177 Instances 
such as these indicate that there is friction between members of certain teams, that 
different groups of organisational agents are at odds with each other, that 
relationships are generally weakened and impoverished and that interaction can 




172 Doctor, Public inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15, Witness Statement, par6, p.2. 
173 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 06 Witness Statement, p.15 
174 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 22, Witness Statement, par84, p.24. 
175 External Organisation, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 2, par18.173, p.1243. 
176 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 22, Witness Statement, par84, p.24.   
177 Doctor, Public inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15, Witness Statement, par29, p.9. 
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The literature indicates that support from organisations (or their leaders) can 
promote altruistic action. In their meta-analytic review, for example, Organ and Ryan 
(1995) found that altruism correlated with leader supportiveness. However, the 
hospital environment is characterised by low levels of relational support for staff 
from leaders and managers. At the time, the provision of relational support would 
have been challenged by the internal context. At various points within the timeline 
studied, the hospital was undergoing organisational restructuring, staff reductions 
and turnover. Frequent changes in management led to a lack of leadership or 
support for employees.178 There was inadequate clinical supervision for medics and 
nurses, with junior doctors not adequately overseen due to shortages of senior and 
middle grade consultants (Healthcare Commission, 2009). Lack of certain 
management or supervisory tiers particularly left nurses unsupported and exposed 
to demands which they could not meet or manage.179 Although there are instances 
of supportiveness at the hospital, unsupportiveness is far more strongly manifested 
in the data. References to leadership supportiveness are more likely to be negative 
than positive, whilst those to organisational supportiveness are substantially more 
likely to be negative.180  
 
Organisational agents, as a group, articulate the sense that support from the 
organisation (or its leaders) is lacking. Rather than being a supportive mechanism, 
the organisational hierarchy inside the hospital, and formal management or 
supervisory relationships within it, are characterised as a depleting organisational 
force, rather than a sustaining one. The relationship between management and 
employees is particularly strained. Employees cite management expectations, the 
pressures they bring to bear upon staff to meet targets and the implicit (or explicit) 
threats they make regarding any failure to do so, as sources of difficult interaction. 
 
 
178 Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1 (2010). 
179 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement.   
180 References to leadership supportiveness are around twice as likely to be negative as positive, whereas references 
to organisational supportiveness are nearly six times as likely to be positive as negative. 
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As a consequence, contact between these groups can be hostile or aggressive. Some 
typical descriptions of relations with management are: 
 
‘an endemic atmosphere of aggression in meetings with the [REMOVED]. I 
think that a lot of the tension focused around money. Whenever we talked 
about money the conversation became hostile.’ 181 
 
‘She didn’t like to be criticised at all. If something was happening that she 
didn’t approve of, didn’t like, then your life was made hell..…the nursing staff 
who came to talk to me about their problems they had got with her were 
saying: I can’t do any more because if I do she will just make my life hell.’ 182 
 
The first example indicates a general atmosphere of conflict, whereas the second, 
which concerns a particular manager, indicates day-to-day conflict within internal 
supervisory structures. Such examples indicate the intensity of relational difficulties.   
 
More broadly, the hospital, as an organisation, is characterised by an unresponsive 
culture which underpins the unsupportiveness of its management hierarchy and the 
poverty of its internal employee relations. This is characterised by: staff concerns 
about being unheard and unacknowledged; the more active suppression of their 
voices, views, concerns or opinions; bullying or harassment of them; as well as 
associated sanctioning of any behaviour which is deemed inappropriate or out of 
alignment with organisational norms and expectations (see Appendix 13: Low 
Support Narrative).  
 
Starting with the first of these four cultural features, there is discourse which 
characterises the organisation, and its leaders or managers, as discounting staff 
members’ views or opinions. By way of some typical examples, managers and 
executives explain that: 
 
‘the medical staff felt that they didn’t have a voice. I think they felt they were 
 
 
181 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par41, p.12. 
182 Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par39, p.160. 
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not listened to so therefore there was no point speaking up.’183  
 
‘I was upset, and my staff were upset but unfortunately I as their manager 
was unable to assist them as members of the Executive team were not 
listening to anything I was saying.’ 184  
 
A contemporary culture audit showed that the majority of staff did not feel listened 
to.185 Amongst clinicians there was a view: that the hospital did not respond to 
problems they raised; that when changes were planned their views were not 
considered; that risks and concerns they raised were ignored; that criticism was not 
welcome; and that they were marginalized or even steamrollered into accepting 
changes that they disagreed with (Healthcare Commission, 2009). This problem is 
also seen to operate at board level. A new director seeking to make changes is 
described as ‘faced with an unwilling board,’ ‘swimming against the tide’ and ‘telling 
the board what they didn’t want to hear’.186   
 
Extending the point about steamrollering, a second feature of the internal culture is 
a more general sense of suppression. This is an environment in which employees 
consider themselves as more repressed or disempowered by management. By way 
of example, one doctor states:  
 
‘there appeared to be a general lack of engagement between the 
management and the senior clinicians due to the fact that the clinicians were 
feeling disenfranchised.’ 187  
 
The use of ‘disenfranchised’ is telling. On the one hand management might not be 
listening, but on the other hand they might be listening but not agreeing. Effectually, 
the hierarchical structures delineating relationships between management and 
employees may be the site of a power struggle. Such a struggle can be seen in the 
perception of a fixed internal view or ‘party-line’ to which managers are supposed 
 
 
183 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement, p.67. 
184 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par67, p.18. 
185 Senior Executive Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 12 Witness Statement. 
186 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement. 
187 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 17 Witness Statement, par11, p.4. 
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to adhere. Staff describe or characterise managers as expecting employee 
representatives to adopt the same fixed internal view. For example they say:  
 
‘Consultants who were involved in management would have nothing to do 
with the dissent.’ 188  
 
‘I was surprised that the [REMOVED] wasn’t more supportive to us but she 
towed the party line.’ 189  
 
Instances such as these in the data show staff characterising themselves as being 
expected to: follow a party line; back up the hospital management accordingly; 
accept matters without criticism, complaint, or disagreement; and be positive about 
changes irrespective of their opinions. This means that if they felt conditions were 
unconducive to helping, they would be discouraged from expressing that.  
 
Moving on to a third feature of the organisational culture and its hierarchies, in this 
case one sees even more aggressive treatment of employees, such as bullying or 
blaming. The sense that agents feel threatened by the organisation’s culture 
emerges in explorations of emotional noise (see 5.2). It is not unusual for them to 
depict leaders as villains in some way, describing them as: speaking of staff in a 
derogatory manner; bullying or harassing employees; and sanctioning or labelling 
anyone who disagrees with them.  A culture audit (at the hospital) indicated that 30 
percent of its employees had seen or experienced bullying or harassment from 
colleagues or managers and 85 percent of staff in the hospital perceived a blame 
culture.190 Typically, staff say: 
 
‘There was a culture of bullying and harassment towards staff.’ 191  
 
‘There was a blame-led culture, the attitude being that problems had to be 
fixed or nursing jobs would be lost.’ 192   
 
 
188 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par3, p.2. 
189 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par46, p.12. 
190 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement. 
191 Doctor, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par1.241, p120. 
192 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par9, p.3. 
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‘..their response was extremely aggressive, basically telling me that they 
were in charge and accusing me, and anyone else who agreed with me, of 
not being team players.’ 193 
 
‘…all of the staff were scared of the [REMOVED] and afraid to speak out …..in 
case they incurred the wrath of the [REMOVED]’ 194 
 
Bullying can be a dysfunctional consequence of performance measurement 
(Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012). It is widespread in the NHS (Hands, 2013). It 
generates insecure emotional states, such as a sense of vulnerability or feeling of 
exposure (Burnes and Pope, 2007). As shown in this section, such states are evident 
amongst organisational agents in this case. In keeping with the latter study, 
employees, as a group, are depicted as feeling insecure, distressed and powerless. 
The presence of bullying, alongside their fears of retaliation, provides clear evidence 
of a threatening culture within the organisation.195 Importantly, it is linked to staff 
not delivering organisational demands or meeting managerial expectations. 
Critically, in respect of the relational tension evident in this case, failing to meet 
internal norms or deliver expected goals can lead to costly repercussions. 
 
This point leads on to a fourth, related feature of the cultural or relational 
unsupportiveness evident in this case. This is sanctioning, that is social punishments 
for failing to uphold or deliver management expectations. Failing to meet these, or 
expressing any dissent concerning them, can provoke costly social penalties. These 
include being excluded in some way by one’s peers, for example being ignored or 
ostracised, as well as being reproached or condemned by them. By way of some 
typical examples:  
 
‘I had the impression that the [REMOVED] did not like me objecting to things 
 
 
193 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par13, p.5. 
194 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par8, p.3. 
195 There are a few examples of agents in this case who query this state of affairs. For example, one senior executive 
says: ‘I never saw any evidence of this during my time at the Trust’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Employee 07 
Witness Statement, par173, p.45). However, there is sufficient evidence to indicate such pressures were evident in 
the internal context. 
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and that they found me a nuisance.’ 196’ 
 
‘though I raised concerns revealed by incident reports at JNCC meetings and 
these issues were raised at surgical directorate meetings, there was a 
general perception by the Executive team that the nursing staff were 
moaning.’ 197  
 
The point is that those who reject internal organisational norms can end up being 
labelled as awkward or difficult. A strong sense of threat can be attached to this. 
Employee reports instances of managers advising staff to be ‘careful’ about what 
they say, since ‘moaning’ will not help them keep their jobs and making formal 
complaints could actually lead to their losing them. Typically, a nurse explains that 
the ‘culture’ was that staff should be ‘careful about what they say’. She goes on to 
explain how one manager would frequently say that if staff valued their jobs then 
they should stop moaning.198 In one illuminating instance, a nurse says:  
 
‘when nurses raised issues about staffing levels not being safe [REMOVED] 
put pressure on them to not raise their complaints formally… she would 
advise staff that if they considered staffing levels were unsafe that this was 
a breach of the NMC Code of Conduct for the nursing profession, and they 
should be very careful about what they put in a formal complaint as it might 
lead to them losing their job.’ 199  
 
Examples such as these underscore the potential for costly penalties. Some imply 
that making formal complaints might precipitate negative personal consequences 
through formal means. Others imply that they might generate negative personal 
consequences through much more informal means.  
 
The process of labelling those who ask questions, challenge accepted norms or query 
practices illustrates the latter effect. Labelling is evident in tacit implications that 




196 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par15, p.5.   
197 Senior Executive, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par58, p.16. 
198 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par72, p.20. 
199 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par59, p.16. 
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‘I myself was made to feel, by senior management, that I was whinging and 
that my views as a senior nurse were not to be respected.’ 200  
 
‘at the first Annual General Meeting for the [REMOVED], the Chair at the 
time, [REMOVED], stood upright at the beginning and said “We’ll have no 
whinging or whining about the Hospital”.’ 201  
 
There is an important implication in the use of these expressions. Behind such 
pejorative words is the implication that there is no substance to the criticisms being 
expressed. Moaners and whingers are people who complain (unjustifiably) about 
nothing or very little. The classification suggests that they have nothing of 
importance to say. Evidently, this discourse provides a useful defence mechanism 
for managers. It is a means of denying that a problem exists or is genuine. Labelling 
diminishes the people who complain, lessening them as individuals, and thereby 
infers that their complaints are not genuine. Thus, one can deny that there is a 
problem which requires a response. Diminishing those who complain in this way 
should also actively deter them from complaining. Thus, the structural hierarchy is 
infused with an unsupportive and suppressive discourse which deters employees, as 
a group, from challenging managers, as a group. This means that employees could 
not easily challenge the organisational conditions which they believe are 
unconducive to patient welfare. However, doing so in the face of such potentially 
costly penalties would be altruistic.  
 
The four features explored above, that is disregarding employees’ voices, 
suppressing their views, and bullying or sanctioning them, indicate a high level of 
conflict between employees, an unsupportive organisational hierarchy and a 
threatening internal organisational culture. There is a clear discourse of 
repercussions and retaliation underpinning all of these features (see Appendix 13: 
Low Support Narrative). That discourse reveals that organisational agents perceive 
both real and imagined threats for raising concerns, disagreeing with internal norms 
 
 
200 Nurse, Public Inquir,  Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par72, p.20. 
201 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 03 Witness statement, par14, p.4. 
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or evading organisational constraints in favour of patient welfare. Employees 
anticipate negative consequences from their managers and supervisors for doing so. 
By way of some examples:  
 
‘you just didn’t put your head above the parapet because you would be in 
trouble if you did.’ 202 
 
‘if you asked a Ward Sister for example “do you have enough staff?” she 
would always respond “yes” as the staff do not want to get into trouble.’ 203 
 
One very clear penalty which can be discerned in the data is that of being ignored or 
excluded in some way by one’s teammates or colleagues. There is evidence that 
those who sought to stand up for appropriate standards were discouraged and 
isolated (Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3). Staff within the hospital faced social 
sanctions from their peers or supervisors as a consequence. For example:  
 
‘I had tried to raise this issue but by this stage I was completely ostracised 
by the Hospital anyway.’ 204 
 
‘whenever I actually said something at the meetings the rest of the 
attendees would carry on as if I had never said anything.’ 205 
 
‘I was completely ignored and they carried out inspections without using the 
sheets prepared. To say that I felt ostracised would be putting it mildly.’ 206 
 
As well isolating, ostracising or ignoring colleagues, employee sanctioning includes 
subtler, more underhand criticism. Taking an ‘oppositional’ or ‘critical’ stance, for 
example, can lead to one being labelled awkward or difficult. Doctors describe 
situations in which their disagreement with internal conditions or practices leads to 




202 Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par76, p.168. 
203 Non-Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Non-Executive 06 Witness Statement, par8, p.3. 
204 Other Role, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Non-Executive 07 Witness Statement, par68, p.21. 
205 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par25, p.7. 
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‘The response was always that we had to do what we were told and were 
“naughty boys” for objecting.’ 207  
 
Raising concerns can cause one to be branded a troublemaker. Typically, another 
doctor describes ‘intimidating’ responses when they raised concerns and being 
‘viewed as being a troublemaker, rather than someone raising genuine concerns.’208 
What all this censure effectually does is characterise those who complain as difficult 
and condemn them as unreasonable. This diminishes the character or worth of the 
complainant and by association lessens or discounts the complaints that they are 
making. 
 
The operation of such features can be seen in whistle-blower statements. For 
example, complaining about the internal environment resulted in one individual 
becoming heavily censured. They became labelled as ‘not a team player’ and a 
‘troublemaker’. As a consequence of such disapproval, this employee was not only 
sanctioned, but also felt threatened. To illustrate the point:  
 
‘If you care about your patients and your work, you had a problem (you were 
deemed as a problem!).’ 209 
 
‘I really had to fight for this issue, and felt vilified and intimidated for raising it.’ 
210 
 
This instance of whistleblowing indicates that the possibility of being censured by 
others for complaining, and the fears or anxieties associated with this (whether real 
or imagined), could be a significant deterrent from challenging internal norms which 
compromise responsiveness to patients’ welfare needs. Dozier and Miceli argue that 
whistleblowing is prosocial rather than altruistic since it may benefit the whistle-
blower (e.g. reputationally), may not benefit others and may be required by certain 
roles (Dozier and Miceli, 1985). However, this argument appears to be potentially 
 
 
207 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par2, p.4.   
208 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par95, p.21. 
209 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par41, p.10. 
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undermined by the extensive potential losses which whistleblowers may experience 
or perceive to be in place. Notably, moral rebels, who oppose the prevailing state of 
affairs by refusing to be silenced by it, are intensely disliked by their more obedient 
colleagues, who might  not only accept the status quo, but also safeguard or protect 
it (Monin, Sawyer and Marquez, 2008). Those who rebel may be resented and vilified 
by those who comply (O'Connor and Monin, 2016). The presence of such antagonism 
towards this whistle-blower supports the argument that moral rebels may be 
intensely disliked or vilified by more compliant colleagues. 
 
What this indicates is the possibility that an organisational agents’ prioritisation of 
patient welfare over organisational expectations could contravene internal norms 
and precipitate strong sanctioning as a result of their doing. Where this is the case it 
would generate costly penalties for the altruistic prioritisation of patient need. These 
penalties might affect organisational agents’ assessment of their ability to do so. 
They may be severe. They might even extend beyond the informal social action 
outlined above into more formal or legal action. Thus:  
 
‘One of my colleagues who also complained regularly was suspended after 
something happened on a ward. He had been fairly vocal in criticising the 
Hospital and I suspect the real reason behind his suspension was because he 
was becoming a problem.’ 211 
 
Fear is clearly associated with such narratives. Organisational agents are fearful of 
being blamed or penalised. They are alive to the threat of being punished for 
complaining about having to deliver services in a particular way or varying the way 
such services are delivered in favour of meeting patient need. Importantly, their 
fears are stimulated by the intangible prospect of such events happening, not just 
their actual occurrence or reality. Such fears would be unconducive to altruism by 
means of their power to direct organisational agents’ attention to the prospect of 
 
 
211 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par52, p.14. 
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costly penalties for breaking rules or eschewing expectations, even where doing so 
favours patient care. 
 
Fear can lead individuals to contract their mental focus, concentrate on potential 
risks or threats and adopt avoidant behaviours (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño and 
Edmondson, 2009). In this case, there is evidence of organisational agents exhibiting 
such behaviours. One sees them contracting their attentional focus onto themselves, 
extracting themselves from situations, for example, becoming silent or withdrawing, 
and avoiding others. Whilst a causal relationship between employees’ fears and such 
behaviours cannot be proven by the data, it is certainly plausible. Such fears would 
inhibit altruism by focussing agents’ attention on their own state at the expense of 
users or making certain actions, such as complaining, much costlier than they might 
be. The costliness of an action can deter altruism. Feasibly, an organisation 
generating substantial fears or anxieties about the effect of one’s actions could 
inhibit altruism by making it seem or feel too expensive.  
 
7.3 Demanding Context Conclusion 
 
In this case, high strain is evident in the extensive temporal or physical demands 
placed on organisational agents, as well as associated mental and emotional drains. 
Alongside that, low support within the hospital is characterised by a lack of tangible, 
organisational, cultural or relational support. The absence of relational support is 
evident in the suppression, bullying or sanctioning of organisational agents. The 
combination of high organisational strain, coupled with low organisational support, 
places significant demand upon staff. It creates an internal operational environment 
which has the power to significantly reduce agents’ collective potential for altruism 
by means of its effect on their helping resources (see Table 6). The High-Strain-Low-
Support dynamic encourages internal organisational practices or adaptions which 
inhibit altruistic or helping behaviour. Effectually, it constitutes a misalignment 
between users’ helping needs and organisations’ helping resources which is 
unconducive to altruism. The sense that one is under-resourced or supported is likely 
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to undermine one’s altruism. It could damage the sense that one has capacity to 
help. High mental or emotional strain, in particular, leads staff to feel overtaxed or 
overwhelmed. It drains their affective or cognitive resources with which to help 
others. Alongside this, organisational agents also lack tangible physical resources. 
Cultural or relational support which might help them mitigate the strain they feel is 
also absent. 
 
Table 6: Helping Resources in High-Strain-Low-Support Context 
 STRESSORS INFLUENCE ON ALTRUISTIC RESOURCES  
1 TEMPORALLY 
OVERSTRETCHED 
Organisational agents experience time pressures. Excessive 
temporal demands may reduce the time they have available with 
which to notice, appreciate, assess or respond to others’ needs. 
2 PHYSICALLY 
OVERLOADED 
Organisational agents experience fatigue. Excessive physical 
demands may reduce their energy or capacity with which to 
respond to others’ needs. 
3 MENTALLY 
OVERTAXED 
Organisational agents  experience mental stress (or anguish). 
Excessive mental demands may reduce their cognitive capacity 
with which to notice and assess others’ needs. 
4 EMOTIONALLY 
OVERWHELMED 
Organisational agents experience emotional distress. Excessive 
emotional demands (or over-arousal) may reduce their affective 
capacity with which to appreciate (or enter into) others’ need. 
5 ORGANISATIONALLY 
CONSTRAINED 
Organisational agents experience increased organisational 
constraint. Reduced autonomy lessens their capacity to respond 




Organisational agents experience reduced cultural, relational or 
organisational resource. Resource related stresses and strains 
may reduce their capacity to respond to others’ demands or feel 
that they are  supported to do so.  
 
Furthermore, cultural, managerial or relational unsupportiveness intensifies 
anxieties, directs agents’ attention inward and creates a culture of threat and 
insecurity. Critically, this does not simply concern agents as individuals. It concerns 
them as a group. As a result, it depletes the organisation’s collective capacity to 
notice, appreciate or assess organisational users’ needs, reducing the possibility of 
altruistic responding.  
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8 CHAPTER 8: ORGANISATIONAL UNRESPONSIVENESS  
 
This chapter explores unresponsiveness within the hospital. Institutionalised 
unresponsiveness may be considered a natural adaption to organisational 
environments which are overly demanding. In this case unresponsiveness is 
stimulated by the distracting emotional noise set out in Chapter 5, the de-stabilising 
internal conflict set out in Chapter 6, and the depleting and demanding workplace 
context set out in Chapter 7. Such conditions reduce organisational agents’ helping 
capacity, lessening their temporal, physical, mental and emotional resources with 
which to aid others. Four un-altruistic practices emerge as a result of this 
organisational context. These are inattentiveness or indifference towards hospital 
users, avoidance of them, or the deterrence of them from seeking help (see Figure 
14).  
 




These four practices reduce the attention organisational agents give to some 
activities, lower the priority they give to other activities and lessen their scanning for 














likelihood of patients’ welfare needs being noticed by organisational agents. They 
reduce the chances of patients’ needs being appreciated or entered into as a result 
of that. They also weaken the chances of patients’ needs being assessed for the need 
to respond. It must be acknowledged that such effects would clearly impair good 
care. However, they also restrict the potential for altruism by making user need less 
visible or prominent and thus less likely to be recognised or considered. Such 
patterns of unresponsiveness fit with Korte’s (1981) findings that people in overly 
demanding environmental conditions naturally respond with unhelpfulness. In this 
case, organisational agents adopt the same finely tuned unconscious adaptations 
which Korte identifies, such as walking through situations more quickly or reducing 
attentiveness to their surroundings. Presented with requests for help, they appear 
to be less likely notice them, too hurried to stop and offer aid or even committed to 
being uninvolved. Pertinently, this indicates the fundamental importance of 
attention, which is covered next. 
 
8.1 The Practice of Inattentiveness 
 
The first unresponsive practice evident in this case is organisational agents’ collective 
inattentiveness towards users (see Figure 15). Inattentiveness is particularly evident 
in the way patients are ignored or neglected and their needs remain unseen or 
unnoticed. Inattentiveness is a practice which mentally detaches or distances 
organisational agents towards users. By such means, agents can consciously (or 
unconsciously) minimise their perception of internal helping need, manage any 
arousal or demand arising from seeing those needs and obviate any motivation or 
obligation to act. Such a practice is neither professional nor conducive to good care. 
However, it is also unconducive to altruism by means of its suppressive features. In 
particular, inattentiveness can block agents’ perceptions of users’ needs or welfare. 
In turn, that reduces the likelihood of their appreciating, or emotionally entering 
into, those needs. This would subsequently obviate any requirement for agents to 
assess the validity of users’ needs or gauge their responsibility for responding. By 
such means, the motivational cues and inducements needed to simulate helping are 
 169 
dismantled or robbed of their significance. As will be seen this section, organisational 
agents’ cognition is directed inwardly to their own situation, making them 
introspective. It is also directed away from patient-related matters by distracting 
organisational factors. As a result, they do not look or scan for hospital users’ needs. 
This means any signals which indicate that help is needed are less likely to encroach 
upon their awareness. 
 
Figure 15: Organisational Inattentiveness in Action 
 
There are a number of strands or elements to organisational agents’ inattentiveness 
(see Appendix 14a: Cognitive Detachment). Agents, as a group, are characterised as 
mentally absent or abstracted. Witnesses talk of their ‘going through the motions’ 
or having ‘no sign of life’. They are shown being absorbed in their own minor or trivial 
personal matters. For example, one witness describes nurses as ‘more interested in 
checking their nails and mobile phones than the patients’.212 They are also 
represented as preoccupied by more serious personal difficulties. For example, a 
manager explains how: 
 
‘people’s jobs were not safe and everybody became wary.’213   
 
 
212 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par58, p.18, 
























Agents’ cognitive detachment from users is also evident in their reduced attention 
towards patients’ symptoms and surroundings. They do not appear to look or scan 
for patients’ needs or pick up on the cues or signals that help is need. Some of this 
inattentiveness is rare but serious. For example: 
 
‘When the patient was dying, no staff came to see or check on her condition 
and she was left to die on a noisy ward with visitors coming in and out. Not 
one member of staff noticed when the patient died. It was left to her 
daughter to check her mother’s pulse, inform staff of the death and ask for 
her monitor to be turned off.’ 214  
 
Generally, however, it is more day-to-day or commonplace. Typically, one relative 
describes how a family member’s nutrition tube became blocked and this went 
unnoticed until they reported it.215 Similarly, in a somewhat stranger example, a 
patient explains how, having become painfully entangled in her sheets, she was 
unable to get the attention of nurses and had to ring home for help on her mobile.216  
 
The practice of inattentiveness can be seen in the operation of organisational 
routines, such as the buzzer system (See Appendix 9: Buzzer Routine). Buzzers are a 
means of communication which should facilitate help-seeking or giving by ensuring 
the visibility of users’ needs, providing aural cues about patient welfare and 
signalling that help is required. Answering patient buzzers is clearly part of a 
healthcare employee’s job. It is not altruistic. However, stopping to answer buzzers 
in an emotionally noisy environment exposes you to further, potentially excessive or 
unmanageable emotional distress. Doing so in a highly demanding environment may 
force you to make unpalatable choices between different aspects of your role. Both 
expose you to a potential diminution of your already potentially strained personal 
capacity or helping resources. In an environment of tense relations, if the patient 
whose buzzers you answer has expectations you cannot meet depleting conflict may 
 
 
214 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.65. 
215 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.32. 
216 Patient, independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3. 
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arise. So, although answering buzzers is a requirement, in this context it comes with 
a cost for agents who can choose other less expensive options or activities. Stopping 
would only be deemed altruistic where the action is not only pursued to improve the 
welfare of users, but also chosen over other expectations of one’s role which are 
perceived to have greater organisational priority, as well as done so in spite of the 
high-costs that would be imposed upon organisational agents for making such a 
choice.  
 
Despite the requirement to answer buzzers, the data reveals a widespread group 
level practice of inattentiveness towards them (see Appendix 9: Buzzer Routine). A 
tendency for their sound not to be ‘heard’ or ‘responded to’ was a significant feature 
of the organisational environment (Healthcare Commission Report, 2009). The Trust 
was in the worst 20 percent of hospitals for the time taken to answer them in the 
2005 Patient Survey.217 Typically, patients explain: 
 
‘I was suffering from vomiting, I had been pressing the buzzer for a long time 
but nobody came.’ 218  
 
‘patients in his bay buzzed for nursing staff but no one came. Instead the 
patients had to shout to attract the attention of the nurses.’ 219 
 
Along similar lines, relatives describe how they wait for hours for a reply to the call 
button or ring the buzzer for lengthy periods of time without response.220 221 
Importantly, such inattentiveness impairs the perception of patient need. As well as 
buzzers being unanswered, relatives recount instances of them being placed out of 
reach.222 223 Whether purposefully or accidently, the device intended to make patient 
need heard is deactivated. Even if this misplacement is unconscious, it suggests a 
 
 
217 Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2. 
218 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 01 Witness Statement, par12, p.4. 
219 Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2. 
220 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.394 
221 Relative, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2. 
222 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.23 
223 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.43 
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lack of scanning for patient need or assessment of that need. There are even 
examples of more conscious manipulation. Thus, one patient explains how, when 
using her buzzer to get help for a patient whose buzzer did not work, the nurse said 
‘they had purposely not given this old lady a buzzer, she was a nuisance’.224  
 
A similar pattern to the reduced scanning depicted for buzzers is also evident in other 
routines, indicating that inattentiveness is widespread, as well as systemically 
embedded into hospital routines. Take the medication routine as an example. Given 
the evidence of mistakes and errors, one can argue that this routine achieves its 
secondary purpose, which is delivering drugs, but not necessarily its primary one, 
which  is  correctly and uniformly medicating patients.225 Environmental scanning 
does not occur. For example, users report examples of agents failing to check that 
patients know that their medication is there and that they need to take it or are able 
to do so. Those who are physically unable to medicate themselves, or lack the 
cognitive capacity to prompt them to do so, are not always assisted with this. This 
suggests that their incapacity has not been noticed or recognised. It implies either 
that those delivering the medication have not scanned the situation to identify their 
patients’ capacity to medicate, or if they have identified an incapacity they have not 
ascribed themselves responsibility for addressing it. This pattern is highly evident in 
other routines, such as the systems for feeding or hydrating patients.  
 
In considering inattentive practices, one must acknowledge the possibility that 
patients are neglected because staff are simply not present. As set out in section 7.2, 
constrained staffing levels reduce responding capacity. In the buzzer routine, 
reduced human resources are also an evident cause of neglect. Inadequate staffing 
levels is one of the strongest causes which witnesses attribute to buzzers being 




224 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.127. 
225 A third of those that came to the Healthcare Commission told them that patients did not receive the correct 
medication or were given the wrong medication (Healthcare Commission Report, 2009). 
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‘Nurses were so busy that ringing the bell was a pointless exercise.’ 226 
 
However, it is also possible that rather than being absent or occupied with other 
matters organisational agents are reinterpreting buzzers as interruptions rather than 
help-seeking signals. This would cognitively reduce their perceptual significance or 
importance. Illuminatingly, one employee describes a process of immunity to aural 
signals:  
 
‘The effect was that the [REMOVED] contained significant numbers of 
patients in distress and, as a department, we were immune to the sound of 
pain.’ 227 
 
Such an example suggests that the situation has been reframed into one in which 
such sounds are no longer heard or, if they are heard, they need not be heeded. 
These pattern aligns with Milgram’s (1970) assertion that we adapt to excessive 
demands or inputs, by lessening the importance of certain contextual demands to 
make the overall number or load of inputs in any situation more manageable as a 
whole. Screening out buzzers significantly reduces temporal or physical demands on 
organisational agents, as well as obviating any mental or emotional demands 
associated with helping those who ring them. Failing to scan for patients’ ability to 
feed themselves, as is case with the food routine, achieves a similar effect (see 
Appendix 18: The Food Routine). Inattentiveness can thus be seen as an adaption to 
organisational conditions which protects organisational agents from demands upon 
them. This would simultaneously limit their opportunities for altruism. 
 
A lack of attention to patient need is not just evident in the operation of 
organisational systems. Conversely, inattentiveness might also be shaped by such 
routines. Such an effect can be seen in admission procedures. These are 
characterised by: patients’ admission being delayed or omitted; users being ignored 
 
 
226 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.128. 
227 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement One, par13, p.4. 
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or neglected during, or while waiting for, admittance; and unresponsive or defensive 
communication between patients and those admitting them. The Four Hour Waiting 
Time Target, which forms part of the process, is especially problematic (see Appendix 
17: The Four Hour Waiting Time Target). The target places significant expectation on 
employees coupled with reduced autonomy. It sets out a clear procedural 
requirement for processing patients within a specified timeframe. Staff must work 
at pace to meet it. Pressure to do so is intense. Organisational agents confirm:  
 
‘The pressure to comply with targets was huge.’ 228  
 
‘they felt pressured to prioritise patients who were close to breaching the 
target rather than prioritise by clinical need.’ 229  
 
Stopping to respond to any patient need or distress unrelated to the target in this 
context exposes you to conflict with managers, supervisors and colleagues who are 
focussed on delivering it. Doing so could be altruistic because of the potential costs 
associated with rebelling in this way. Such costs include social censure, 
organisational sanctions or professional penalties. 
 
Importantly, organisational inflexibility concerning this target also constrains 
organisational agents’ autonomy to deploy their attention freely to patient welfare 
needs. Managers and supervisors clearly articulate an expectation that it will be met. 
As one doctor explains:  
 
‘The nurses were threatened on a near daily basis with losing their jobs if 
they did not get patients out within the 4 hours target.’ 230  
 




228 Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, par34, p.12.  
229 Employees, Healthcare Commission Report, p.49. 
230 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par10, p.3. 
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‘crying because they had been told that if they did not meet the 4 hour 
targets, they would lose their jobs.’ 231  
 
In its interviews with those working at the hospital prior to the inquiries, the 
Healthcare Commission (2009) found that they felt: that patient care was secondary 
to the achievement of targets or minimisation of breaches; that doctors were 
expected to treat minor ailments at the expense of more serious ones in order to 
meet such targets; and that they were pressured to prioritise patients who were 
close to breaching the target rather than deciding their treatment on the basis of 
clinical need. Critically, they were expected to report failures to meet this target. 
Pressure could be intense: 
 
‘Nurses were expected to break the rules as a matter of course in order to 
meet targets’’.’ 232 
 
‘Rather than “breach" the target, the length of waiting time would regularly 
be falsified on notes and computer records.’ 233  
 
‘their response was extremely aggressive, basically telling me that they were 
in charge and accusing me, and anyone else who agreed with me, of not 
being team players.’ 234 
 
As these instances show, the consequence of pressures to meet such targets is 
twofold. Firstly, a gaming of the system emerges, with some staff falsifying records. 
Secondly, this is normalised, with some staff bullying and sanctioning organisational 
agents who disagree with that norm. 
 
Such factors show how very strongly the organisation is directing its agents’ 
attention. As a result, one sees them deploying their focus to the time-related 
aspects of admittance procedures at the expense of human or clinical ones. The 
 
 
231 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par10, p.3. 
232 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par8, p.3. 
233 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par8, p.3. 
234 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par13, p.5. 
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genuine needs of the patients are overshadowed by a more immediate concern 
arising out of the hospital’s internal expectations. By way of a specific example:  
 
‘…a doctor was asked to work in “minors”. At the time the doctor was 
administering thrombolysis to a patient who had suffered a heart attack. 
This doctor refused but was worried that a more junior doctor might have 
felt compelled to comply.’ 235 
 
This particular instance shows how meeting the target for one patient takes 
precedence over the need of other more seriously ill patients. The latter patient’s 
welfare need is clearly greater, but their ‘need’ is no longer the criteria for assessing 
helping responses. Human factors, such as the threat to a patient’s health or the 
concern a doctor would feel about leaving them as a result, have been deprioritised 
in favour of meeting an operational target. Such an approach discourages altruism 
towards users by putting organisational expectation above their needs and then 
creating costly consequences for those agents who do not subscribe to this order of 
importance. However, it also fosters a distorted variant of professional practice in 
which patient need or welfare is eroded by organisational targets and expectations.  
 
Overall, the Four Hour Waiting Time Target indicates a high level of organisationally 
generated attentional constraint. Collectively, agents’ activity is structured around 
this target. Their cognitive capacity is anchored on meeting it. Their behaviour is 
directed towards delivering it. By way of illustration: 
 
‘As a result of each patient in the [REMOVED] having to be seen within four 
hours of arrival at [REMOVED], patients were moved to any bed that could 
be found to avoid there being a breach of the 4 hour target. This was even if 
the bed that had been found was not the most suitable for the patient….. 




235 Employees, Healthcare Commission Report, p.49. 
236 Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par84, p.23. 
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This anchoring reduces organisational agents’ autonomy to scan for and attend to 
patient need. Acting automatically, in a routinised way, without scanning a situation, 
or questioning what is happening in it, will reduce one’s exposure to the mental, 
visual, aural or emotional stimuli which would ignite compassion or motivate 
altruistic responses. By organising organisational agents’ time with patients in a 
particular way, the target (albeit unintentionally) lessens their capacity to ‘notice’ 
and ‘assess’ what help is required more generally within their immediate 
environment. It removes the incentive to consider patients based on need and the 
freedom to align your actions accordingly. Critically, it appears to remove the 
‘judgement’ element necessary for clinicians to assess who is most in need of help. 
Being organised along such lines would be unconducive to altruism. But it could also 
subvert good practice and undermine compassionate care. 
 
Notably, it is the organisation itself which is directing agents’ attention in this way. 
Specific constraints promote inattentiveness towards patient need. There is a 
pattern to this. Firstly, a re-prioritisation occurs, in which delivering a target, and 
meeting management expectation, takes precedence. Secondly, the significance of 
patient need, which would be needed to stimulate helping, acquires a lower priority 
as a result. Thirdly, organisational agents’ perception is redirected. Fourthly an 
absence of scanning can arise from this, an absence which is procedurally enabled. 
Thus, inattentiveness becomes embedded into practice by how the internal 
organisational architecture focuses agents’ attention on the targets associated with 
routines, systems or processes, at the expense of attending to the wider welfare 
needs of the patients within them, and then normalises this focus. This practice is 
likely to increase the chance of patient needs being screened out.  
 
8.2 The Practice of Indifference 
 
The second unresponsive practice is this case is organisational agents’ indifference 
towards users’ needs or distress (see Figure 16). In this case, internal organisational 
conditions cause excessive arousal. Organisational agents face a substantial affective 
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load. As already shown in Chapter 5, they exhibit significant personal distress. That 
distress is derived from an emotional noisy environment, fraught with relational 
tension, in which they must meet significant demand with insufficient resources. As 
will be seen in this section, as well as cognitively distancing themselves from patients 
to make such demands upon them more manageable, organisational agents might 
affectively detach themselves to achieve a similar effect. 
 
Figure 16: Organisational Indifference in Action 
 
 
Indifference enables organisational agents to manage the negative emotional impact 
of others’ needs or distress and reduce the requirement to respond should that 
distress feel overwhelming. Importantly, indifference does not prevent agents from 
noticing or seeing users need. Patients’ need or distress may still be seen, however 
it is less likely to be ascribed significance. Indifference blocks agents’ appreciation of 
need rather than their perception of it. It precludes concern. Critically, the emotional 
Inducements to provide help have been removed. Though not axiomatic, this could 
also lessen or obviate any requirement to assess need.  
 
A number of strands or elements are evident in organisational agents’ affective 


























unfeelingly, treating patients roughly or harshly, and acting coldly or insensitively 
towards them (see Appendix 14b: Affective Detachment). Most notable of all, in this 
case, compassion is typically referred to by its absence. Most references to it are 
negative and indicative of some absence, omission or failing. There is a clear 
discourse which describes professionals as lacking compassion towards hospital 
users. Witnesses speak of ‘no compassion from the nurses’ as a group, as well as 
specific staff who ‘did not give us any support or show any compassion’.  237 238 As one 
relative pertinently explains:  
 
‘It was lack of anything; compassion; nobody ever came in to see Mum and 
just say: how are you [name]? Which my Mum used to love. ….. … She liked 
a bit of fuss actually, if I am honest. But no, no compassion whatsoever.’ 239   
 
Witnesses lexicon reveals a clear absence of compassionate actions or orientations 
towards users. Compassion, or related terms such as absence of, lack of or 
uncompassionate, are not uncommon. Antonymic expressions, such as uncaring, 
unconcerned or unfeeling are also used. Effectually, the language used by witnesses 
indicates that compassion, as an emotional or affective resource within the hospital, 
is much depleted or reduced. In its stead organisational agents’ indifference towards 
users emerges.  
 
Pertinently, indifference does not merely detach employees from patient suffering. 
It also has the power to influence their assessment of it, effectually reducing its 
significance. Thus, organisational agents are described as being unconcerned by 
patients’ physical condition or discomfort. Organisational users talk of doctors who 
display ‘little concern or interest’ for patients and appear not to ‘recognise or 
respond’ to their symptoms. Many witnesses depict organisational agents as 
adopting unconcerned stances or orientations towards patients. They describe them 
 
 
237 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness Statement, par,12 p.4. 
238 Relative, Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 07 Witness statement, par30, p. 7.  
239 Relative, Independent  Inquiry Report Volume 1, par274, p.128. 
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‘not being concerned,’ showing ‘no concern,’ ‘demonstrating little concern’ and so 
on (see Appendix 14b: Affective Detachment). Typically, relatives describes how: 
 
‘The doctor demonstrated little concern or interest and, despite her 
mother’s weight having ballooned and her condition having changed 
significantly, he did not appear to recognise or respond to these changes.’ 
240 
‘when he went into hospital, we just got the impression: well, he is an old 
man, he is 80, it is not as if he has got a lifetime ahead of him, so why worry.’ 
241  
 
‘In the hospital the nurses showed no concern that the patient was unable 
to eat.’ 242 
 
Such instances show an indifference to patients’ situation or personhood. 
Organisational agents are characterised as un-appreciative of their more personal 
human needs. For example, they do not appear to recognise that a patient might like 
‘a bit of fuss,’ or prefer the help of a female nurse rather than a male one. Effectually, 
organisational agents’ lack of concern for users is directed towards them as people 
as well as patients. The former might be typified by indifference to their fears or 
anxieties, while the latter might be typified by an indifference to their symptoms and 
the physical dependencies their illness creates. Importantly, if one is not attributing 
worth to people, or importance to their condition, then one is unlikely to be 
concerned by their situation. This means that even if one sees others as needing help 
one does not have to perceive it as significant, undertake any assessment of the need 
to act, or consider your responsibility to do so. Thus, cues that help are needed may 





240 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.44. 
241 Relative, Public Inquiry, Patient A Relative Witness Statement, p.129 




Moving beyond this absence of compassion or concern, one also sees more actively 
demeaning and denigrating attitudes towards patients (as set out in 6.1 and 6.2). 
Occasionally, hospital users make more severe ascriptions of ‘callousness’ or 
outright ‘cruelty’. In one example, the doctor is characterised as callously 
unengaged.  
 
‘the doctor was not so caring upon informing her partner of her prognosis, 
simply saying she “was severely brain damaged and expected to die sooner 
rather than later”. When the patient contracted a chest infection her doctor 
initially refused to treat her, but reluctantly prescribed antibiotics at her 
partner’s request. She did recover and her neurological condition improved, 
… The doctor’s behaviour remained detached, only assessing the patient for 
a few seconds from the bottom of her bed.’ 243 
 
Here a doctor is depicted as being dismissive of the patient’s worth, as well as 
unresponsive to their clinical needs. This intimates a lack of human feeling towards 
both the patient and their relative. The former is shown in their apparent 
detachment, while the latter is evidenced by their communicating uncaringly and 
insensitively. Such examples imply that professionals are neither putting themselves 
into the position of those involved, nor appreciating the distress which their own 
behaviour towards users in such situations can cause. Patients’ pain, in particular, 
may be being downgraded. As a whole, such behaviours indicate that if one 
approaches agents for help one will be dismissed. This would deter users from doing 
so.  
 
Organisational agents’ also express a degree of collective resignation or cynicism. 
There is an implication that they lack the ability to address the welfare needs of 
patients as a whole. Such apathy is evidenced in statements such as patients ‘are 
going to die anyway.’244 Should such feelings of inefficacy infuse their formal 
structural relationships with patients, it would encourage them to deny the remedial 
benefit of helping. Apathy directed in this way would undermine the functionality of 
 
 
243 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.191. 
244 Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par47, p.14. 
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the patient-carer relationship. Critically, it suggests an erosion of the efficacy which 
normally promotes altruistic or helping behaviour. Along similar lines, organisational 
agents also exhibit a resigned stance towards their position as employees within 
hospital hierarchies. For example they say: ‘there was no point’ or ‘nothing would 
ever be achieved’.245 Importantly, they appear to adopt a negative orientation 
towards themselves as employees, towards the institution with its power over them 
as employees and towards their collective capacity to help patients.  
 
8.3 The Practice of Avoidance  
 
The third unresponsive practice evident in this case is organisational agents’ 
avoidance of users (see Figure 17).  
  
Figure 17: Organisational Avoidance in Action 
 
 
As shown in Chapter 5 and 7, the hospital context is emotionally draining and highly 
demanding. In the circumstances, organisational agents may find the scale and 
 
 
245 Some examples of this are: ‘There was a sense that nothing would ever be achieved by attempting to raise or 
report concerns.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 04 Witness Statement, par28, p.8) and 
‘…there remained a group of clinical and health care staff whose general attitude appeared to be to be that there 
was no point reporting problems as nothing would be achieved.’ (Other employee, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 






















intensity of performance expectations unmanageable. In response, they can take 
steps to manage the volume of expectation, adopting behavioural strategies or 
practices which reduce it to a more feasible level. Avoidance is just such a strategy. 
Avoidance primarily inhibits altruism by means of its effect on organisational agents’ 
perception of patient need. Though agents will be conscious of patient needs,  
avoidance lessens the chances or their being presented with them. Avoidance 
enables agents to manage the mental, physical, temporal or emotional demands 
placed upon them by a highly strained organisational environment.  
 
The practice of avoidance is characterised by a number of strands or elements 
(Appendix 15: Avoidant Practices). Firstly, agents are shown avoiding certain 
situations, effectually eschewing contact with patients altogether. There are, for 
example, instances in which they are described hiding from patients, disappearing 
from sight, or otherwise making themselves physically unavailable. Thus:  
 
‘there was a lack of staff on the ward to ask and on one occasion a nurse 
refused to leave her office to speak to the family.’ 246  
 
‘On seeing the consultant in the corridor, they recalled that he hid in a linen 
cupboard to avoid, in their view, having to discuss her husband’s case 
further.’ 247  
 
By such means, employees can avoid perceiving any need at all. However, it is not 
always possible to avoid situations in this way. More generally, agents are depicted 
avoiding the demands which such situations precipitate by rushing through them. 
This is a second element of avoidant practice. As a group, organisational agents are 
characterised as being ‘too busy’ to help, constantly rushing around, hurrying past 
patients and so on. Associated with this is the practice of paying less attention to 
those within these situations. Thus, agents might shun eye contact, dodge requests 
 
 
246 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.15. 
247 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par296, p.134. 
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for help or walk on by. They are frequently shown hurrying in ways that would reduce 
any contact. By way of examples:  
 
‘Nursing staff rarely spoke to the patient, but when they did they rushed and 
did not wait for her to answer.’ 248  
 
‘Nurses came and went but none of them seemed to want to look patients 
in the eye.’ 249  
 
‘although there were staff present on the ward, they seemed to be rushing 
around and the ward itself felt neglected.’ 250  
 
In this case, there is a distinctive pattern of agents speeding up their walking pace, 
rushing past patients or reducing their visual or aural awareness. Rushing through a 
ward might mean not seeing a patient’s troubled expression or hearing their 
distressed cries. Not seeing or hearing their distress signals might mean not having 
one’s feelings provoked. Neither seeing, nor feeling any of this, would mean not 
having to assess patients’ symptoms or requests for help and thus be obliged to 
respond. The point is that even when one has been propelled into a situation 
involving contact with hospital users, one can still minimise or reframe the level or 
nature of the contact one has with them.  
 
In above pattern, organisational agents’ avoidant behaviours lessen their perception 
of, or contact with, patients. Taking this one step further, however, if organisational 
agents cannot avoid certain situations, or eschew contact with users within them, 
they can still remove themselves or terminate their interaction with those involved. 
This is a third element of avoidant practice. By way of examples, one patient 
explained how a doctor’s response was ‘to shrug his shoulders and walk away’ after 
she explained that she had no-one to care for her at home. By leaving, this doctor 
curtails their having to expose themselves to the patient’s need and distress. 
 
 
248 External organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.273.  
249 Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement, 4a, p.3. 
250 Relative, Independent Inquiry Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1. 
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Effectually, one can extricate oneself from being forced to appreciate their distress, 
or assess your responsibility for responding by walking away, rushing past, shrugging 
off contact and so on. In this third pattern, organisational agents may perceive users’ 
need, and even appreciate their distress, however they also take steps to reduce the 
length of their exposure to it. So, although they see a patient’s need, their 
appreciation of it may be dampened or down-regulated. Irrespective of which of 
these patterns is adopted, the requirement to assess need is obviated to a greater 
or lesser degree. Such patterns would not be conducive to altruism amongst 
healthcare professionals. Nor would they promote good care. 
 
The practice of avoidance is evident in the organisations systems, processes or 
routines. Ignoring the sound of buzzers, for example, enables agents to avoid 
entering a situation which might generate demands upon their altruism. 
Unconsciously tuning out (or not hearing) the sound of the buzzers, allows situations 
to be modified into ones where such sounds are assigned a lower level of importance 
compared to any other activities in which one is engaged. Such modifications give 
one psychological permission to ignore or neglect patient welfare. They allow one to 
manage out the need to respond to this particular signal, thereby lessening the 
physical demands of doing so or the emotional labour which would arise from that. 
This could be deliberate or inadvertent. Buzzers might be overlooked because agents 
have focussed their attention elsewhere. Or the sound could be being more actively 
altered in meaning, reframed as a nuisance or reappraised as less important than 
other demands upon their time. Irrespective of the cause, buzzer avoidance removes 
organisational agents from help-seeking situations and inevitably reduces the 
potential for altruism. Notably, however, cognitively reframing or reappraising their 
sound would also enable organisational agents to psychologically avoid any self-
sanctioning associated with acting in this way. 
 
Avoidance is also embedded into practice by means of organisational constraints and 
in-group norms or sanctioning. These combine to make it permissible or even 
preferable for agents to prioritise the operational aspects of internal routines, 
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systems or processes at the expense of the human needs of the patients within 
them. In this case, avoidance appears to have evolved into a systemic level of 
unresponsiveness through the operation of organisational systems, processes and 
routines (see Table 7). Widespread omission or avoidance of certain steps within 
these appears to be normalised and commonplace. This institutionalises poor or 
unprofessional practice. However, by such means the need for altruistic or helping 
behaviour may also become less noticeable.  
 
Table 7: Systemic Unresponsiveness 
 AREA  SYSTEMIC  AVOIDANCE 
1 TREATING  
PATIENTS  
• Patients are not admitted, diagnosed or treated. 
• Treatment is delayed, not undertaken in a timely manner. 
• Patients are precipitously discharged. 
2 PERSONAL CARE • Patients are not properly fed  or hydrated. 
• Patients are not cleaned, groomed or toileted. 
• Patients care aids are not maintained (false teeth, etc).  





• Patient conditions or symptoms are not monitored. 
• Patient records are not accurately maintained.  
5 COMMUNICATING 
WITH PATIENTS S 
• Patient (or relative) requests are ignored or neglected. 
• Buzzers are not heard or heeded.  
6 MEDICATING 
PATIENTS  
• Patients are not medicated, or medicated appropriately. 
• Patients are not provided with drugs in a timely manner. 
7 REPORTING 
INCIDENTS  OR 
COMPLAINTS 
• Patient (or relative) complaints are denied or obfuscated.   
• Serious incidents and events go unreported and omitted from 
records, with mistakes repeated or not learned from. 
 
Arguably, as well as reducing agents’ ability or autonomy to scan for and attend to 
others’ needs, systems, processes and routines actually offer a means to avoid them. 
Importantly, they provide staff with a means to deny responsibility for non-
routinised actions, should they choose to do so, potentially inhibiting their openness 
to altruistic behaviour. Notably, an element of choice is involved. Organisational 
systems, process and routines can be consistently followed in a way which does not 
benefit patients. That could be considered systematic unresponsiveness to need. 
Alternatively, systems can be inconsistently discharged (or not followed) in a way 
which does not benefit patients. This would be a form of systemic breakdown. Either 
approach could feasibly hamper agents from paying attention to patients’ needs. In 
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this case, one sees organisational agents adhering to organisational routines or 
procedures in ways which do not benefit patients. An example might be the rote 
collection of plates of uneaten food at mealtimes. One also sees agents 
inconsistently applying such routines or procedures to the benefit or detriment of 
patients. An example might be the medication routine where there is a perception 
that some nurses were helpful, giving out medication in advance when the drugs 
trolley was going to be late. 
 
The complaints system is another  site of avoidance. Complaints systems are a means 
of managing conflict inside organisations. They support the formal structural 
relationship between patient and user. They should manage the conflicts which arise 
from unmet needs or expectations and address any normative schisms between 
help-seeking or giving. They should help make formal structural relationships more 
effective by managing conflict between agents and users. Instead, the system 
protects organisational agents from the consequences of mistakes or neglect. In 
practice, the Trust was in the top 20 percent when it came to staff seeing mistakes 
or near misses, yet some incidents were not reported despite going to inquest, 
serious incidents were repeated and the board did not appear to discuss them 
(Healthcare Commission, 2009). Complaints and adverse event reporting were an 
organisational blind-spot. There are examples of this having serious consequences, 
for example a patient died after wandering off because employees were not aware 
of policies for missing patients despite this having caused death before.  
 
Where complaints are concerned, however, avoidance is psychological rather than 
physical. It manifests itself in extensive denial. Analysis of the data indicates that 




‘His family then noticed that the oxygen bag had once again gone flat. They 
shouted for help and they were ushered out of the room. An argument then 
ensued as the nurses denied that the bag had gone flat.’ 251 
 
‘After very rudely insinuating that I was lying throughout the meeting, 
[REMOVED] refuted that he had had his insulin changed saying that: “No he 
hasn’t, no he hasn’t, who told you that? At this point the diabetic nurse came 
along and confirmed that his insulin had in fact been changed.’ 252   
 
In these examples, the employees concerned assert that oxygen is available when it 
is not, or that medication has not been changed when it has. Similar instances in the 
data indicate that organisational agents may deny that problems are real or genuine. 
There appears to be a cultural mind-set which is unaccepting of criticism, or the 
expression of users’ concerns. By way of some typical examples which illustrate this 
point: 
 
‘there was a definite reluctance on the part of many members of staff to 
accept responsibility for their actions…..This culture of denial permeated to 
all levels of the Hospital.’ 253 
 
‘I was surprised by the level of denial within some parts of the Trust. I 
remember the phrase “It could have happened to any hospital but we were 
unfortunate to be investigated” being used a lot.’ 254 
 
Insular cultures, characterised by inward-looking mind-sets, can protect an 
organisation, generating or reinforcing the sense that ‘things are fine’ when they are 
not. They provide a means by which organisational agents can avoid acknowledging 
adverse internal conditions and evade responsibility for addressing the deleterious 
treatment of users. By way of some examples:  
 
‘The Consultant told us at the meeting that he had not done anything wrong 
and if there was anything inappropriate about [REMOVED] care, it was not 
his fault but that of the nursing staff.’ 255 
 
 
251 Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.177. 
252 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 20 Witness Statement, par8, p.2. 
253 Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 01 Witness Statement, par35, p.9. 
254 Doctor & Senior Executive, Public Inquiry,  Anonymised Employee 17 Witness Statement, par9, p.4.  
255 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 09 Witness Statement, par23, p.6. 
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‘overwhelming sense of denial... characterised by ‘it is not our fault, it is 
somebody else’s’.’ 256 
 
Notably, as these instances show, some organisational agents themselves recognise 
the existence of such a problem.  
 
However, by denying the existence of problems, organisational agents can avoid 
having to accept the culpability which would arise from acknowledging them. The 
effect of this is twofold. Firstly, denying complaints protects employees from 
censure, whether that arises from their own self-chastisement or from another’s 
disapproval. Accepting complaints in this situation could be considered somewhat 
altruistic because it entails action which would further the welfare of users generally, 
while diminishing the welfare of any individual agents complained about. 
Importantly, accepting complaints imposes costly psychological penalties upon one. 
These might be the shame or embarrassment associated with recognising one’s own 
failures. Or there could be social costs, such as friction with one’s peers against 
whom such complaints may have been made. Denying these allows one to feel 
secure. One can avoid self-censure for conceding one’s own failings, or any guilt for 
acknowledging a colleague’s failings.  
 
Secondly, however, denial forestalls any requirement to change one’s behaviours or 
undertake remedial action. Critically, where altruistic or helping behaviour is 
concerned, psychological avoidance affects one’s assessment of need. It reduces the 
obligation to accept that there is something to rectify or that that one is responsible 
for rectifying it. Thus, even if a relative brings a problem to your attention, and you 
are emotionally aroused or disturbed by their distress, you can rationalise action as 
unnecessary through your reframing or assessment of it. Extending this to an 
organisational level, where denial becomes an internal cultural norm it would a 
reduce capacity to appreciate distress as genuine. Importantly, by such means 
 
 
256 Board member and Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par214, p.347 
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organisational agents can deny that users’ concerns are valid, that there are actions 
which can (or should) be undertaken to address them, or that they have 
responsibility for carrying those actions out. It enables them to shift responsibility 
away from themselves and onto the people who are raising concerns or seeking help. 
By such means, a culture of denial would be unconducive to altruism. However, it 
would also be unconducive to good professional practice or care. 
 
8.4 The Practice of Deterrence 
 
The fourth unresponsive practice is this case is organisational agents’ deterrence of 
users from seeking help. Deterrence inhibits altruism by means of its primary effect 
on the presentation of helping need (see Figure 18). Whereas some actions or 
behaviours allow agents  to ignore or ‘not see’ patients’ needs, or requests for help, 
others allow them to deter patients from seeking help or making their needs visible 
in the first place. As will be seen in this section, deterrence is a behavioural practice 
adopted by organisational agents towards users. It inhibits altruism through its 
influence on need perception, making those who need help less inclined to approach 
organisational agents for assistance. 
 



























As shown in Chapter 6, interaction between organisational agents and users can be 
inconsiderate or discourteous. There are many instances in the data which depict 
organisational agents assuming defensive stances or adopting more off-putting 
behaviours towards users (see Appendix 16: Deterrent Practices). They are shown 
being unwelcoming towards them, being actively disrespectful and even behaving 
threateningly. They are deemed unapproachable, repulsing patients from engaging 
with them and rebuffing relatives from seeking help on patients’ behalf. Taken all 
together, such behaviours indicate that if one approaches agents for help one will 
be dismissed. This would make users feel uncomfortable about approaching any 
agent for help.  
 
In keeping with the social influences which affect bystanders (Darley and Latané, 
1968; Latané and Darley, 1968; Latané and Darley, 1969), users might worry about 
being misconstrued. They might want to avoid feeling foolish or embarrassed. It is 
clear that users are alive to such possibilities. There are instances, for example, in 
which it is clear that they are highly conscious of being mocked, belittled or 
patronised by staff. They seem sensitive to sarcasm or ridicule. In a typical example, 
a patient explains how:  
 
‘the nurse mocked her concerns and she was made to feel she was wasting 
hospital time.’ 257 
 
In another, when a particular staff member is asked about a patient falling from their 
bed, they retort somewhat sarcastically that: ‘we have had a man in here with no 
legs and he did not fall off the bed’.258 In the first of these examples, a patient is 
made to feel like a time-waster and in the second a user is made to feel like an idiot. 
The point is that such treatment would make patients feel deeply conscious of 
themselves, as if they are being silly or unreasonable. That would deter them from 
approaching professionals for aid or assistance.   
 
 
257 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.22. 
258 External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.195. 
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In this case, harsher even more hostile behaviour towards users also acts as a 
deterrent. By way of example, one witness describes how a patient who kept asking 
for a doctor was threatened with eviction from the ward when she confronted a 
nurse about this.259 In another example, a patient is effectually ordered not to need 
or ask for help, by being told to hold off from needing the toilet. At times, agents’ 
behaviour is more subtly menacing. There are examples of them degrading patients, 
making thinly veiled insinuations or hinting at the prospect of reprisals. Patients 
express significant fear of this. Relatives describe how patients were frightened by 
this: 
‘[REMOVED] did not complain about this at the time because he felt 
vulnerable and feared repercussions.’ 260  
 
‘I said I was going to complain. He got very, very agitated and distressed 
saying: don’t say anything, don’t say anything, they will take it out on me.’ 
261 
 
As seen in discussions of agents’ distress and patients’ diminishment (Chapters 5 and 
6) there is also evidence of more actively aggressive or intimidating behaviour 
towards users. If patients fear that they may be even more seriously threatened, 
compromised or degraded they would be even less inclined to approach 
organisational agents. Taken altogether, such defensiveness would deter patients 
from seeking aid.  
 
As already stated, organisational agents will be undoubtedly aware that hospital 
users have extensive needs. However, behaviour which deters users from making 
those needs apparent can effectually ensure that they are not presented. It excludes 
their needs or distress from agents’ perceptions. In keeping with Milgram’s theories 
(1970), in the same way that over-loaded urbanites block off various means by which 
others can engage with them, overloaded organisational agents may deliberately 
adopt off-putting behaviours to deter patients from engaging with them. Acting in 
 
 
259 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.301. 
260 Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2. 
261 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par17, p.54 
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this way would enable them to avoid the mental, physical, temporal or emotional 
demands of interacting with patients as well as focus on other less draining, or more 
manageable, aspects of their work.262 Here it appears to be  an organisational feature 
which reduces the visibility or users’ needs as a whole. It generates a collective 
overlooking or un-noticing of patient welfare, and normalises un-responsiveness 
towards them, or their relatives, as a result.  
 
Deterrence is highly visible in the operation of the hospital complaints system (see 
Appendix 19: Complaints System Narratives). Analysis of this procedure reveals that 
users anticipate retaliation for complaining. They fear adverse repercussions or 
consequences for raising concerns. This includes being poorly cared for, generally 
neglected or exposed to even more actively hostile or aggressive behaviour. 
Examples of patients being ignored or neglected for complaining, or fearing that they 
will be, include:  
 
‘He had actually complained, hadn’t he, about the treatment he had 
received from one nurse whilst there? And as a result this nurse totally 
ignored him for the rest of his stay; like she would walk by the bottom of his 
bed, he would ask for help or a drink and she just totally ignored him.’ 263 
 
‘Some of them were so stroppy that you felt that if you did complain, that 
they could be spiteful to my Mum or they could ignore her a bit more.‘ 264 
 
In the first example, a patient is ignored for complaining. In the second, a relative 
anticipates such an effect should they do so. Critically, the potential threat or 
anticipation of repercussions, as opposed to any retaliation which has actually 
transpired, is a deterrent. Users come to expect that complaining will result in hostile 
action or adverse care and treatment. To  illustrate this point: 
 
‘mother told me not to say anything because she would still be there after 
 
 
262 Evidence of such adaptions in this setting is a intriguing contribution to the literature on altruism in healthcare. 
263 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par30, p.158. 
264 Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par7, p.153. 
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we had gone home, and was scared the nurses would be mean to her.’ 265 
 
‘..she did not want us to complain when she was admitted to the hospital 
because she said that the staff would take it out on her and she feared 
retaliation.’ 266 
 
Effectively, patients are being taught not to expect help from staff. This reduces the 
potential for altruism by means of its negative effect on the presentation of patient 
need.267 Such a pattern would also be highly unconducive to good patient care. 
Moreover, its power to escalate internal emotional noise within the hospital, and 
increase conflict between agents and users, would be extremely strong.  
 
8.5 Towards a Model of Organisational Altruism 
 
The previous chapters show that employee altruism is affected by strained 
organisational conditions or circumstances. Chapter 5 shows an emotionally noisy 
environment, which can obscure patient need and reduce agent capacity to perceive 
or process their distress. Chapter 6 shows groups locked in distracting conflict which 
lessens the significance of users or their needs. Chapter 7 shows that the demands 
of delivering organisational performance expectations in such a context, creates 
temporal, physical, mental or emotional strains which reduce agents’ capacity to 
notice, appreciate or assess and respond to user need. This chapter set out the 
unresponsive states or practices which are created by such conditions inside the 
organisation. A summary of the effects of such practices is set out in Figure 19 on 




265 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.151. 
266 Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 09 Witness Statement par12, p.4. 
267 By way of counterargument, patients might not be willing to complain because they have no wish to get 
employees into trouble, indicating a level of sympathy or compassion for that group. For example: ‘there was very 
few care assistants on the ward that were caring, but the ones that were, you felt you had to look after, and Mum 
kept saying to my niece: don’t make a fuss, you will get her into trouble, don’t make a fuss. That’s all she kept saying, 
even the following day when I came on. She said: leave it, leave it, you will get her into trouble.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par5, p.153) 
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In summary, the organisational conditions underpinning these practices are: 
distracting emotional noise, which is created by a demanding user group, highly 
distressed organisational members and internal chaos and uncertainty; de-
stabilising member conflict, which is characterised by friction between member 
groups and dehumanised users; and extensive organisational demand, which is 
characterised by a high level of strain upon organisational agents coupled with low 
levels of support for them. This is termed a High-Strain-Low-Support context. 
Inherent within these conditions is an organisational culture or climate which is 
threatening and uncertain. Together, these conditions stimulate organisational 
practices towards users which can inhibit altruism. Those practices are 
inattentiveness, indifference, the avoidance of patients and the deterrence of them 
from seeking help.  
 

























Whilst some organisational conditions stimulate these practices, others also help to 
normalise or embed them. In this case, organisational routines themselves and 
certain group norms or sanctioning processes appear to amplify unresponsive 
practices. Their influence is most evident in reducing organisational agents’ 
perception of need. That is achieved by how they constrain employee autonomy, 
direct their attention in particular ways, or normalise patterns of systemic omission 
or avoidance. Organisations can encourage responsiveness by organising their 
routines in two ways. They can organise them to allow the wider environmental 
scanning which would enable their agents to notice (i.e. see) and sense (i.e. feel) 
those needs which fall outside the auspices of the routine. Or they can incorporate 
a level of autonomy or flexibility for those undertaking them which makes additional, 
voluntary or discretionary effort more permissible.  
 
Alternatively, organisations can focus agents’ attention on meeting the narrower 
managerial or operational demands attached to such routines or processes, and 
direct their behaviour to delivering those, at the expense of noticing the wider 
human factors inherent in the situation within which they are being delivered. 
Anchoring organisational agents’ attention on delivering the narrower target-related 
requirements of such routines and restricting their flexibility to decide how to do so 
is likely to create conditions which are unconducive to altruism. Attention to 
organisational routines, goals or targets may be high, but attention to the patient 
may be low, as is the case here. Arguably, as well as reducing employees’ ability or 
autonomy to scan for and attend to others’ needs, systems, processes and routines 
actually offer a means to avoid them. Importantly, they provide staff with a means 
to deny responsibility for non-routinised actions, should they choose to do so, 
potentially inhibiting their openness to altruistic behaviour. Notably, an element of 
choice is involved. So, the way that routines were normalised is also important.  
 
Within organisations, situational clarity can be achieved through formal 
communication or informal norms which ensure that the expectations of employees 
are clear, understood and reinforced or supported by management (Meyer et al., 
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2010). This situation appeared to lack clarity in a number of ways: wards were 
considered chaotic; information and administration appeared disorganised; users 
were confused and disorientated; rules, systems and procedures were, at times, 
unclear or unimplemented; and information was often deemed inaccurate, 
incomplete, or false. Informal norms can fill a vacuum created by an absence of 
formal clarity. They offer an alternative, informally acceptable, course of action to 
stated rules. informal norms can also shape the delivery of state rules or direct the 
actions and expectations of those delivering them. In this case, one sees a level of 
informally or normatively generated un-responsiveness. It appears acceptable or 
permissible to omit actions, take short-cuts, adopt work-arounds and so on when 
undertaking organisational routines. Such practices may be actively at odds with 
formally expressed intentions or procedures within the hospital. Organisations can 
create norms which are significantly harmful to ‘outsiders’ as well as at odds with 
wider ethical expectations or approaches (Dunfree, 2001). The adaptions identified 
in this section – of avoidance and inattentiveness - are potentially harmful to 
patients as an out-group, as well as at odds with their treatment expectations. 
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9 CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
 
There are voices that it is no longer feasible or desirable to use altruism as a 
foundation for medical practice (Harris, 2018). However, the  findings from this case 
indicate that it has importance as an organisational construct and potential strategic 
value in healthcare. This research set out to explore altruism at an organisational 
level. It began with very broad questions about what factors promote or inhibit 
altruism in organisations. The aim was to understand how altruism might be 
encouraged or discouraged inside organisations by their contexts or between their 
members. However, there were some key challenges to working with altruism as an 
organisational construct. While the literature review identified a broad range of 
organisational conditions that would be conducive to altruism, and certain practices 
which could promote it, it did not yield a comprehensive explanation of how it might 
be organisationally undermined. What was missing was an integrated model of the 
organisational contexts or conditions which would be unconducive to altruism, the 
internal practices which would inhibit it and how such factors might work together 
to the detriment of helping. This led to an increased emphasis on the second part of 
the question concerning inhibitory elements, utilising altruism’s evident absence in 
the case studied.  
 
The study findings converge significantly with the extant literature in some respects, 
however there are also some theoretically important points of divergence. The 
literature on altruism indicated that there is a critical instigational role for noticing 
in promoting helping behaviour. The findings supported its centrality. However, they 
also yielded a notable and striking contrast between organisational users whose 
noticing of patients was elevated and organisational agents whose noticing was 
lowered. This is where the case began to diverge from the literature. The 
organisational literature also indicated that altruism inside organisations could be 
promoted by practices in which members notice, appreciate and assess others’ 
needs. Here a stark contrast emerged between users who acted in line with these 
predictions and agents who exhibited a different set of behaviours. Notably, users’ 
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practices of noticing, feeling, and assessing others’ needs, as well defending them 
from harm, provide an answer to the study question concerning what factors 
promote altruism. These will be referred to in the discussion as altruistic practices. 
In contrast, agents’ practices, of inattentiveness, indifference, avoidance and 
deterrence, will be referred to as un-altruistic practices.268 The way these un-
altruistic practices work against perception of need, and contribute to an overall un-
noticing of user welfare, is one of the most striking insights from the case. It answers 
the study question concerning what factors inhibit altruism in organisations.  
 
The literature also indicated that organisational factors which might stimulate or 
suppress altruistic practices include an organisation’s culture or climate, the 
architecture governing the delivery of its activities and the quality of relationships 
between its members, as well the quality or quantity of collective personal helping 
capacity or resources amongst its members. The findings from the case broadly 
supported the relevance of such factors in the inhibition of altruism. So, an 
organisation’s conditions and its members’ helping resources also provide answers 
to the question of what factors inhibit altruism. The study also yielded one significant 
augmentation to organisational conditions in the form of ‘emotional noise’. This 
refers to the extensive level of emotional distress within the hospital which appears 
to act as a noisy distraction. Understanding of how all these factors work together is 
incomplete. More research is needed to ascertain how such practices, conditions 
and resources combine to inhibit altruism. An integrated understanding of that 
process is needed. This chapter has two sections. In the first section the findings are 
discussed, building towards a model of how such a process might work. In the second 





268 By way of a caveat, when the author speaks of agents’ inattentiveness, and other such states or practices it is not 
intended to suggest all hospital staff behaved in this way, or that they did so on all occasions, rather it is intended 
to convey the point that such a pattern was perceived to be evident within the hospital. The same caveat applies to 
users. 
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9.1 The Organisational Inhibition of Altruism 
 
The findings outlined in Section IV mainly focus on agents in line with this study’s 
aim to prioritise understanding of the inhibition of altruism. In contrast, users’ 
behaviour provides an answer to the study’s question of what promotes altruism. 
However, users, as a group, also provide a theoretically valuable contrast to agents, 
as a group, through which to advance understanding of the latter. The findings 
concerning the user group dovetailed with a number of models in the literature 
concerning emergent altruistic practices inside organisations. This was an 
unexpected finding. Moreover, their range of helping actions were surprisingly 
extensive (See Table 8 on the next page). Underpinning them were practices in which 
users paid attention to other users’ pain, experienced significant distress as a 
consequence of that, judged it appropriate that someone should respond and, at 
times, acted when agents did not. Thus, from an unanticipated source within the 
hospital, the noticing, feeling and responding practices predicted by compassion 
organising models still emerged as  a feature of the organisational landscape (Kanov 
et al., 2004; Miller, 2007; Madden et al., 2012; Dutton et al., 2006; Way and Tracy, 
2012; Lilius et al., 2012; Dutton et al., 2014).  
 
So, the study’s answer to the question of what promotes altruism inside 
organisations, in line with the predictions of the literature, is that it comes from 
members’ altruistic behavioural practices which enhance their attention to, or 
appreciation and assessment of, user need. Though the finding is only in respect of 
users, and only amongst some of them, their altruistic practices are nonetheless 
sufficiently clearly delineated in the data to confirm the effect. One important 
inference which can be drawn from the emergence of such behaviours amongst 
users is that altruistic practices may still be strongly manifested inside organisational 
boundaries, even when they are not adopted by agents. This means that agents 
should not be seen as the only source of organisational helping, contrary to some 
approaches and, moreover, that more use might be made of such an effect.  
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A question which arises from this is why do users behave in the way which models 
of altruistic or helping behaviour inside organisations predict when agents do not? 
How can their behaviour, and its emergence, be interpreted? Is there anything in the 
differing contextual motivation of these two groups which might be used to help 
organisations encourage more altruism amongst either? Answering these questions 
could expand understanding of what factors promote altruism inside organisations. 
 
Table 8: Summary of User to User Altruism 
 TYPE RANGE OF BEHAVIOURS  




Behaviours include: watching and monitoring patients’ 
conditions; noticing, assessing and pointing out symptoms 
or problems; and even researching conditions or attempting 
diagnostics. Such behaviour indicates elevated attentiveness 
and heightened noticing.  
2  Seeking aid 
or assistance 
for patients. 
Behaviours include: seeking help for patients; demanding 
tests, checks or courses of treatment for them; querying and 
objecting to treatments taken (or not undertaken); and 
seeking alternative care options (i.e. going private, taking 
patients elsewhere, getting a second opinion). Such 





Behaviours include: undertaking hygiene and grooming for 
patients; feeding and hydrating patients; seeking medication 
and pain relief (or providing it); improving and/or providing 
a comfortable environment; and cleaning patients’ 
immediate or wider environment. Such behaviour results 
from noticing and appreciating user needs. Compassion is 
evident in such acts.  
4  Acting in 
emergency 
situations.  
Behaviours include: noticing or finding patients in extreme 
situations; seeking help in the case of severe symptoms or 
events; intervening in dangerous or threatening situations; 
filling in staff gaps; and fixing, monitoring or operating 
equipment. This is precipitated by noticing such situations 
and assessing them as  significant and important.  
5 Punishing 
wrongdoing.  
Behaviours include noticing and identifying infractions 
towards patients, criticising those responsible and bringing 
wrongdoing to the attention of third parties. This is 
precipitated by noticing such situations and assessing them 
as moral breaches.  
 
In response, one obvious interpretation of users’ differing behaviour towards each 
other lies in the potential motivation provided by their markedly different structural 
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relationship from agents. One would expect family members to monitor their loved 
one’s conditions, seek help if that deteriorates and act if help does not arrive. Many 
of the behaviours set out in Table 8 were frequently undertaken by family members, 
in keeping with predictions of both kinship altruism (Hamilton 1964a; Hamilton, 
1964b) and expectations of dependency relationships on altruism (Berkowitz and 
Daniels, 1963). That should be no surprise. If this were the main source of user to 
user altruism then organisations with significant populations of related users might 
be able to utilise such practices. However, the case indicates that family will be far 
from a complete answer in such circumstances. Altruistic practices extended beyond 
family members to other users, individually and as a group. So, although family may 
be part of the answer, other explanations are required.  
 
Of course, there could be a role for simple proximity. User proximity to other users 
is of a lesser duration than agents, but nonetheless unavoidable. Propinquity, simply 
being close by for protracted periods of time, could well increase the likelihood of 
cues and signals being noticed. Users may respond simply because they are present 
and have the time available in which to observe a situation more fully. This would 
not be so much a feature of their being related, as of being present and also (in the 
short-term) unable to avoid noticing. There is limited escape from the sight of others’ 
suffering during one’s stay. So, arguably, one additional answer to the question of 
what promotes altruism inside organisations is inescapable proximity. It is hard for 
users to not notice. This might explain why they sometimes help when agents do 
not. That this constrained proximity is taking place in an adverse setting might also 
play a role. Setting user actions in the context of theories of emergency related 
helping suggests that the heightened nature of the events they are seeing could 
provide another explanation for their behaviour (Darley and Latané, 1968; Latané 
and Darley, 1968; Latané and Darley, 1969). Central to such theories, helping is 
contingent upon interpreting others’ cues as emergencies. Extending interpretation 
of the case findings, users’ high levels of reactive arousal, such as shock and alarm, 
to user distress signals, could be seen to constitute a form of contextually elevated 
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signal sensitivity. Though this is a matter of supposition, it appears plausible from 
the data. 
 
Although proximity may be part of the answer, again it might not be the whole 
answer. As an explanation it fails to take account of more empathic possibilities 
suggested by the case. Many hospital users’ reactions exceed simple personal 
arousal, showing marked levels of involvement and engagement. It can be inferred 
that they are not simply interpreting the events they see as emergencies, but also 
perceiving them with an element of other-orientated concern. Of course, the data 
cannot prove the motivational elements of such concern. But some reflections on its 
properties or construction are possible. There is an appreciation of other users’ 
situations both as people with similar frailties and as patients with similar 
dependencies.269 This indicates that such concern may be founded in sensitive 
cognitive engagement with the perspective of those in a similar situation in keeping 
with evidence in the literature that perspective-taking aids altruism (Krebs and 
Russell, 1981; Underwood and Moore, 1982; Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; 
Longmire and Harrison, 2018). The considerable acuity of such understanding 
evident amongst some users also suggests that recent conjectures about the 
importance of ‘getting’ perspective rather than merely ‘taking’ it (Eyal et al., 2018) 
are accurate.  
 
However, alongside such cognitive appreciation, and at times in conjunction with it, 
there is evidence of clear affective appreciation. Users feel for other users. Given 
that the literature review indicated cognitive and affective responses alone are 
insufficient for altruism, their ‘confluence’ here may be a critical part of the answer 
to the question of what motivates organisational users to behave altruistically. So, 
another answer may be members’ affectively infused cognitive understanding or 
 
 
269 The literature review also raised the question of whether organisational context plays a role in stimulating 
perspective-taking as a collective resource. The findings partly answer that question with an indication that elevated 
user understanding does appear to fuel elevated user to user helping, stimulated by an associated appreciation of 
context. However, the prevalence of this as a collective resource could not be determined by the study.  
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fellow feeling. Although it is tricky to confirm that this is a group effect because of 
the nature of the material, it is still possible to interpret users’ behaviour towards 
each other as an empathic in-group effect of the kind which is predicted to promote 
altruism (Stürmer et al., 2005; Mathur et al., 2010; Singer and Klimecki, 2014). 
 
A final part of the answer to why users act altruistically might be located in moral 
motivations. One interesting theoretical aspect which does emerge from this group 
is the practice of defending or punishing other users. Defending was tentatively 
discussed within the literature review, albeit mainly as a possible extension of un-
altruistic practices and with questions as to its efficacy or functionality. Instead, the 
case provides insight into how such a practice might operate altruistically inside an 
organisation amongst users. User group defending is characterised by seeking help, 
demanding action, raising concerns and making complaints, often strenuously and 
persistently in the face of agents’ disapproval or resistance. One could speculate that 
the case is hinting that elevated noticing will be accompanied by heightened moral 
acuity. Such behaviour is in keeping with the literature review’s indication of a 
potential, but not axiomatic, relationship between moral, normative or cognitive 
assessments of situations and altruism. Since, in this case, such behaviour is usually 
precipitated by the treatment of others, rather than oneself, it supports predictions 
of the effect of moral violations towards others on observers’ behaviour (Haidt, 
2003; Hoffman, 2008; Kurzban et al., 2015; Lindebaum and Geddes, 2016).  
 
However the duality of patterns of ‘self’ praise and ‘other’ criticism could also be 
interpreted as aligning with ethical models of organisational behaviour in which it is 
the combination of moral or normative judgements of oneself, as well as others, 
which can promote prosocial action (Schwartz, 1973; Treviño et al., 2007; Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010). The inference one can draw from this is that altruism can 
emerge inside organisations, not only because of users’ prosocial expectations of 
themselves, but also as a response to their simultaneous perception of agents’ 
behaviour in keeping with, or out-with, their prosocial expectations of them. Put 
another way, users’ altruistic practices may arise directly in response to agents’ un-
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altruistic ones. This is an illuminating inference which one might draw from the case. 
It suggests that there is a duality to altruism inside organisations. However, the limits 
of moral explanations pinpointed by the literature review do suggest some cautions 
should be taken concerning the validity of this explanation. 
 
It must be acknowledged that defending or punishing behaviour is not helping other 
users per se. It can be interpreted differently, as action to sanction current 
transgressions in order to deter future harm. Extending beyond the findings of the 
case, in this respect it is feasible that users are operating in line with theories of 
strong reciprocity, in which actors mete out altruistic punishment in order to 
maintain expected levels of prosocial behaviour within groups or social institutions 
(Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and 
Fehr, 2003; Nowak, Vallacher and Miller, 2003; Feyr and Rockenbach, 2004; Nowak 
and Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Jensen, 2016). In this regard, the case is open to 
an interesting interpretation. Strong reciprocators might be punishing wrongdoing 
inside the hospital to safeguard prospective users from future harm rather than 
simply protecting current users from actual harm. Although it cannot be proven, 
placing the case findings in the context of literature on strong reciprocity does 
suggest that defending practices could be less a case of protectively motivated 
altruism towards individuals as supposed in analysis of the findings, and more a case 
of broader social maintenance. Of course it could be either, or both, but this remains 
open to interpretation. Nonetheless, in answering the question of what promotes 
altruism in organisations, one unanticipated answer is an absence of altruism.  
 
The case answer to what promotes altruism mainly lies in altruistic practices. The 
additional possibilities one can draw from this discussion is that user altruism can be 
motivated by their elevated noticing and heightened sensitivity to other users’ cues 
and signals of distress, and that this elevation and sensitivity is likely to arise from a 
combination of their close proximity to each other as organisational in-group 
members situated in a commonly shared and adversely perceived emergency 
setting. This is the key insight from the case concerning user to user altruism. The 
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main implication of this for organisations is that their users will exhibit a different 
form of noticing, compared to that of agents, which is partly associated with their 
different structurally generated experience of the internal organisational 
environment. Importantly, they are likely to play close attention to harmful events, 
whether real or imagined, and possibly even closer attention to such occurrences 
than organisational agents themselves. Managers need to be sensitive to the 
possibility of such elevated noticing. They also need to consider its potential to 
negatively affect internal relationships where it arises in conjunction with harmful 
events which are capable of stimulating users’ heightened moral acuity.  
 
Such conditions may produce a hostile in-group, prepared to act defensively on 
behalf of members perceived to be subject to organisational mistreatment or 
neglect. The possibility that their altruistic practices are closely associated with 
agents perceived un-altruistic practice is a contribution to theoretical understanding 
of the subject on which further work is required. Hospitals, in particular, may induce 
altruism between their users by virtue of their poor professional treatment. One 
negative implication of this for managers is that, under conditions of perceived 
threat, users themselves will become an instrument of altruistic punishment 
directed at the organisation and its agents. For example, penalising them through 
public discourse. This was arguably evident in inquiry data, where ‘condemnatory’ 
narratives could be discerned. Such might be an indication of attempts to impose 
interpretation of events common to inquiries (Brown, 2004; Brown, 2005; Brown, 
2018) discussed in the methodology. In this form, altruism may become damaging 
for the organisation. However, a more benign implication is that users could possibly 
be utilised more fulsomely as an internal support system for other users, given their 
elevated attentiveness. This would be in keeping with arguments that UK healthcare 
should consider drawing upon more altruistic public contributions to health and 
welfare services (Gormley, 1996; Riggs, Ubel and Saloner, 2017).  
 
Before discussing the contrast which agents’ un-altruistic practices present to users’ 
altruistic ones, some important considerations arise in respect of the theoretical 
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challenge identifying them presented. The author had to overcome a lack of 
inhibitory altruistic practices within the literature against which to assess 
organisational behaviour. To do so, general theories about how altruism is inhibited 
were interrogated alongside organisational theories concerning promotional 
practices. Synthesising these two strands allowed the author to speculate that 
altruism would be inhibited when organisational members: collectively ignored or 
avoided other’s needs; were unable to appreciate or enter into their distress; or 
eschewed any moral, social or ethical responsibility to respond.270 Critically, in 
developing these suppositions, the author hypothesised that un-altruistic practices 
might be the converse of promotional ones. However, in contrast to the imprecision 
of the initial attempt to scope them from the literature, the un-altruistic practices 
which emerged from the study were conceptually much narrower and more precise. 
This is an important development.  
 
One possible construction which can be made of these more precise un-altruistic 
practices is that there is indeed a direct, almost mirror-like, association between 
them and altruistic practices in the manner initially assumed. To explain, the 
literature indicates that noticing promotes altruism. The case confirms that with 
users, while at the same time indicating that inattentiveness inhibits it amongst 
agents. So, in line with the initial assumption, there is something of a reversal effect. 
However, in other practices there was no apparent mirror image. Deterrence, for 
example, as an inhibitory practice, cannot be straightforwardly matched with an 
opposing promotional force. It is surmised to be more inimical, scuppering altruistic 
practices themselves. To explain this metaphorically, in some cases altruistic and un-
altruistic practices can be likened to using a steering wheel to sail  a boat one way or 
another, however some un-altruistic practices might be better compared to a storm 
that makes it much hard to steer in a certain direction. Deterrence is one such. Such 
divergence between altruistic and un-altruistic practices indicates the necessity of a 
 
 
270 The practices were provisionally termed ignoring or un-noticing, detaching or distancing and disengaging or 
defending. 
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separate model focussed on delineating the organisational inhibition of altruism 
from its more general promotion. It confirms that the answer to what factors inhibit 
altruism, will not simply be the absence of those factors which promote it. This is an 
important contribution to the study of altruism as an organisational construct. It is 
one which has serious implications for managers. It implies that strategies for 
promoting altruistic practices and strategies for tackling un-altruistic practices will 
not necessarily be the same. Which means that the challenge of addressing a lack of 
altruistic or helping behaviour inside an organisation once it has emerged may 
require a very particular solution.  
 
Moving on to consider the matter of agents’ un-noticing of users’ needs, and their 
un-altruistic practices towards them, medical institutions are contexts of acute risk, 
with potentially severe consequences. Such contexts are supposed to heighten the 
conscientiousness of those within them, especially those involving occupations 
where mistakes can lead to damaging outcomes (Meyer et al., 2010).271  So, a 
hospital setting should axiomatically heighten agents’ attentiveness. Noticing is a 
pattern which should be more evident in this case than it is. However, the absence 
of altruistic practices per se is not surprising given the study’s purposeful sampling 
with that in mind. It is the way such practices work against perception of need, and 
their contribution to an overall un-noticing effect, which is theoretically illuminating. 
This forms the most striking observation from the case. It provides one clear answer 
to what factors inhibit altruism inside organisations. Building on the findings of the 
case, it is argued that un-altruistic practices are best understood in reference to their 
hindering effect on need perception, as a foundational precept for inhibiting 
altruism, in the same way users’ altruistic practices are best understood with 
reference to their elevated and sensitive noticing of need as foundational condition 
for promoting it. Taking account of this centrality accorded to noticing or not noticing 




271 In terms of situational strength, consequences are the extent to which the actions that individuals take, or the 
decisions that they make, will have positive or negative repercussions for others (Meyer et al., 2010). 
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Practices which diminish the chances that organisational users will be 
physically noticed, emotionally appreciated or cognitively assessed by 
agents for a response to their need, distress or welfare. Such practices may 
be kindled by an organisation’s context and conditions, or stimulated by the 
quality and quantity of its agents’ personal helping resources.   
 
Although inattentiveness, avoidance, indifference and deterrence were identified in 
this case, it is recognised that there may be other practices, or that some of these 
may be more or less important to the process than others. 
 
Despite these caveats, in responding to the question of what inhibits altruism, the 
case contributes one clear answer in the form of these practices. The findings also 
shed light on how these practices achieve such an effect, through their role in 
reducing notice of user welfare. Whether consciously or unconsciously undertaken, 
they limit agent detection or discernment of users or their needs. Thus, the practice 
of avoidance, can ensure that agents do not see need at all. The practice of 
inattentiveness can ensure that they do not see need even when it is within their 
perceptual scope. There is something to see but it is not seen. Indifference would 
not prevent noticing per se. Such a relationship could not be confirmed by the study, 
though the possibility exists. However, it does reduce the significance of what is seen 
and obviate the need to pay as much attention. So, even if something is noticed, its 
impact is muted. The practice of deterrence puts off users from approaching agents, 
preventing need from obtruding upon their notice or at least reducing their duration 
of exposure to it. However, though not confirmed by the study, it is also feasible that 
deterrence could also be somewhat akin to indifference in obviating the need to see.  
 
While the case findings demonstrate the impact of these practices singly, their 
collective power and interaction could be as, if not more, important. So, there is a 
need to evolve a more integrated understanding of how un-altruistic practices might 
work together. Responding to that point, there appear to be theoretically relevant 
differences between what such practices do. Some create un-noticing by protective 
means. Thus, inattentiveness and avoidance protect agents from having to see users 
or their needs in the first place. Need perception is blocked or eroded. Combined 
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these practices dismantle the necessary stimuli for altruism. Others create un-
noticing by more defensive means. Thus, indifference or deterrence defend 
organisational agents from having to take significant notice of the users that they do 
see. Need perception is compromised rather than eroded. These practices change 
the nature of the stimuli. So, it could be said that the practices are having a markedly 
different effect on what user needs are noticed, how those needs are noticed (as 
significant or not) or the extent to which they need to be noticed. That difference 
may have implications for organisations about what strategies they adopt to tackle 
them. Taking account of these differing roles raises the question of such practices’ 
holistic effects. Although all four are prevalent, it is not known if all four are needed. 
It is possible that altruism could be undermined by just one or two of these. It is 
possible that all four are needed because they address the different means by which 
need can obtrude upon one’s notice, in one’s physical sight, in one’s mental 
landscape or in one’s emotional hinterland. Or it could be that having just one of 
each of the two different types, that is one stimuli reducing and one stimuli changing, 
would be enough. 
 
Moving on from organisational agents’ practices, organisational conditions can also 
provide answers to the study question of what inhibits altruism inside organisations. 
In theory, organisations’ conditions can affect how clear a user’s need for aid is 
within their boundaries by situating them alongside other factors competing for 
agents’ attention. They can also affect how significant such needs are perceived to 
be, by framing them with ascriptions concerning users as objects of greater or lesser 
worth. The organisational contexts and conditions explored in Chapters, 5, 6 and 7 
set out how such factors, on their own, cause user need to become less noticeable 
to agents. Importantly, each factor can singly provide an explanation of why agents 
might be less able, likely, or inclined to notice user need. Thus, contextually induced 
un-noticing can arise from organisational demand and the way systems, processes 
or routines are misaligned to meet that. These might simply temporarily absorb 
agents’ attention or more fundamentally undermine their broader situational 
attentiveness. Their role is as a potential cognitive distraction or constriction. Culture 
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is another source of contextually induced un-noticing. It might draw notice 
elsewhere. Again, its role is as a potential distraction. Relationships might offer 
support to manage the first two aspects or provide further distraction. So far, the 
findings did not diverge greatly from the dimensions established in the literature. 
However, the fourth condition of emotional noise is a new feature. This is expected 
to disrupt the clarity, force or impact of the distress of any particular user, or group 
of users in an organisation. Thus, somewhat akin to other contextual conditions, it 
has a potential role in distracting organisational agents from noticing users. So, in 
responding to the question of what inhibits altruism, the case contributes another 
answer in the form of how organisational conditions can reduce attention to users’ 
needs or welfare. However, this answer also raises questions about whether such 
factors work differently, whether all of them are essential, whether some are more 
important than others and whether only one or two might be needed to inhibit 
altruism. 
 
These are not questions which the study answers, though reflecting on the different 
ways such conditions appear to affect agents’ attention, and distract or direct it 
elsewhere, can shed some light on them. Comparing and contrasting the differing 
effect of these conditions in the case yields three different properties. Firstly, they 
can distract agents’ attention from users or absorb it elsewhere. This is a direct 
effect. Secondly, they can reduce agents’ resources to attend to users. This is an 
effect through more indirect means. Thirdly, they might reduce agents’ appetite to 
attend to users as a result of the first two factors. This is perhaps once again a more 
direct influence. So, they could be responsible for agents simply not noticing user 
need, or somewhat more complicatedly be responsible for agents not wanting to 
notice. Stratifying organisational conditions in this way indicates diverse possibilities 
concerning their potential influences on organisational agents’ behaviours. In terms 
of their influence on what is noticed, organisational conditions could feasibly be 
typologised as attentional absorbers which direct agents’ notice inwardly, 
attentional distractors which direct their notice elsewhere, or attentional depletors 
which reduce their personal capacity to notice. However, in terms of each 
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organisational condition’s influence on what agents might not wish to notice, they 
can be typologised as attentional eluders, which agents can ‘use’ to direct their 
attention elsewhere should they not wish to notice users, or attentional 
demotivators, which reduce their personal desire to notice users and even generate 
an impetus to not do so. This further delineation of organisational condition’s 
potentially varying operational influences extends interpretation of the findings. It 
suggests that they might have very different effects on agents’ motivation, or be 
stimulating un-altruistic practices by very different means. Some conditions appear 
to be associated with all of these attentional effects, whereas others appear 
associated with just a few. For example, the findings indicate that helping need-
resource misalignment could be capable of stimulating all of them. It is less clear 
whether emotional noise might do more than distract and deplete attention. There 
may be more potential permutations that the findings indicate.  
 
Moreover, though such a typology helps indicate the different ways conditions are 
working, it cannot confirm how many of them would be needed to produce such an 
effect, or which might be most important in creating it. That said, a combination of 
them is probably required for the pronounced scale of the effect in this case. Given 
their potentially differing roles or effects, it is conceivable that only when such 
conditions align that such a powerful influence as un-noticing emerges. Arguably, 
much of their power lies in how they combine to produce a holistically highly 
demanding context which causes agents to not notice need, or not want to do so. 
However, although these conditions form part of the answer as to what factors 
inhibit altruism inside organisations, how they integrate to fundamentally 
undermine attention as an integral part of day to day organisational life still remains 
open to interpretation. 
 
Overly loaded contexts, exceedingly demanding environments, or excessively 
distracting sensory factors, are indicated in reducing our desire to be involved with 
others, while simultaneously stimulating associated behaviours which increase the 
chances of our not noticing that they need help (Milgram, 1970; Korte, 1981; 
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Schroeder et al., 1995). So, it can be argued that they can stimulate both not noticing 
and not wanting to notice others’ welfare needs in keeping with the findings from 
this case. Such a combination would be highly pertinent for altruism because of 
‘need’ centrality. Claims of agent overload in an inquiry context could be regarded 
with some suspicion. However, in this case, validity can be also ascribed by means of 
users’ confirmation of agents’ claims. That confirmation is critical to this argument. 
In advancing a discussion of the combined effect of organisational conditions, it is 
important to clarify that load should not be seen only in respect of any misalignment 
between user helping need and organisational resources pinpointed in Chapter 7.  
 
While misalignment is arguably the most concrete and tangible source of potential 
agent over-load, by means of its more visible temporal and physical effects, other 
organisational conditions can still add weight to the internal operational context. 
Moreover, potential interactions between them feasibly have the power to elevate 
the cognitive or affective effects of such misalignment. To give a hypothetical 
example of how such linkages might function as an integrating force, a threatening 
culture would make a failure to meet demand more costly for agents with potential 
social repercussions or sanctions. It would increase agents’ personal arousal when 
seeking to manage conditions of helping need-resource misalignment. That culture 
might create, or even be caused by, relational conflict attributable to such misaligned 
conditions. Distracting emotional noise might arise from agents seeking to meet 
those misaligned conditions in the context of a threating environment with high 
levels of affective tension and relational strain. Many permutations of such potential 
interrelationships are possible.  
 
Critically, the high load in this situation is one which can be considered not easily 
evaded. A closed situation is predicted to promote altruism towards others, but that 
will be lessened where there are avenues of escape (Batson et al., 1986; Batson, 
1987). In a hospital, physical distance from users is impracticable. Agents will be 
routinely and habitually in close physical proximity to patients. Their cues and signals 
of distress will be extensive. So, this is a highly loaded ‘need’ based environment as 
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well as one in which that need is not easily circumnavigated. It is into this context 
that agents’ practices can be interpreted as a means to control load by managing or 
minimising what they have to notice. In this respect, Batson’s (2003) theories offer 
a means to extend the findings of the case, allowing such practices to be interpreted 
as physical or psychological escape routes from organisational conditions, which 
actively allow agents’ to not notice, appreciate or assess cues concerning user 
welfare. Interpreted thus, the purpose of un-altruistic practices becomes that of 
freeing agents from having to cognitively or affectively notice users’ need for help 
when they cannot easily evade sight of them by physical means.  
 
One condition which agents might be seeking to escape within this highly loaded 
arena is emotional noise. As a newly added concept, emotional noise is put forward 
as an additional source of affective load or weight inside organisations. Based on the 
patterns of distress evident in the hospital, the findings indicate that an internal 
organisational terrain can be considered emotionally noisy in and of itself. Such a 
concept is in keeping with a growing body of evidence concerning the emotionality 
of organisations themselves (Fineman, 2003; Armstrong, 2004; Ashkanasy and 
Ashton-James, 2005; Fineman, 2008). However, since no consideration of emotional 
noise as a construct has been identified, an emotionally noisy organisational context 
is defined here as: 
 
A context in which organisational members collectively signal, perceive and 
anticipate an extensive level of distress, stimulated or exacerbated  by the 
organisation’s treatment of them or orientation towards their pain and 
suffering.  
 
The concept of emotional noise raises questions for organisations about how it might 
be gestated within their boundaries. Since emotional noise, or emotionally noisy 
terrains, are conceivably more likely in organisations or industries which are sites of 
extensive pain, widespread suffering or pervasive and inescapable member distress, 
the concept poses a particular challenge for the caring industry. These organisations 
will have a higher degree of emotional noise because of the many sources of pain, 
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suffering and distress. However, organisations which are sites of extensive change 
or uncertainty might also be emotionally noisy, as could those which have 
experienced high levels of public scrutiny or criticism and become the focus of 
political debate. Notably, this case had all three. The concept provides a new 
potential source of answers to the question of what factors inhibit altruism in 
organisations which would be of particular value to those with highly affective 
environments. 
 
So far, the study answer to what inhibits altruism is altruistic practices and 
organisational conditions. That answer raises the question of how such conditions 
and practices work together. As mentioned earlier in this discussion, there is a need 
to evolve a more integrated understanding of how the four un-altruistic practices 
might work together. Reframing them along the lines envisaged above, as an escape 
from constrained and inescapable organisational conditions, facilitates such an 
integration. Singly, they could be said to offer differing means of escape, with 
avoidance being mainly, but not solely a means of physically evading demanding 
organisational conditions, inattentiveness enabling a cognitive evasion of the mental 
pressures inherent in organisational conditions and indifference allowing an 
affective flight from the emotional claims or exigencies inherent in organisational 
conditions. Deterrence could be a physical means of escape, like avoidance, in that 
it prevents users from seeking aid from agents. But it could also feasibly be an 
affective source of escape, somewhat like indifference, infused as it is with emotions 
such as anger. To put that more simply, instead of deterring people because one is 
angry with them, one might be angry at them in order to deter them. Reframing 
organisational conditions and agents’ practices interacting in this way reinforces the 
theory that no one practice would be enough on its own to inhibit altruism because 
they address the different means by which need can obtrude upon their notice, 
through one’s physical sight, mental landscape or emotional hinterland. Combined 
they create a flight from need proximity.  
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Of course one needs to ask why evading proximity is so important. Explanation may 
be found in Milgram’s studies of obedience which show that the closer you get to 
others the harder it will become to harm them.272  This led him to propose that such 
an effect might be explained by: the presence and immediacy of visual cues and 
signals; a narrower cognitive field, in which the closer people are the harder it is to 
deny their suffering; or a reciprocal field of action, in which it is harder to harm a 
person who can see you harming them, since their surveillance of you might provoke 
shame or guilt (Milgram, 1965; Milgram, 1974). Reframing his interpretation, one 
might argue that the more distance we put between ourselves and others the easier 
it is to ‘not’ see or help them. Effectually, the less individuals are forced to see the 
cues and signals of another’s distress the less they have to proffer aid. This means 
that not noticing can be a highly beneficial response to certain organisational 
contexts or conditions. Irrespective of whether such escape is consciously or 
intentionally pursued or unconsciously and inadvertently adopted, agents may 
simply not want to see. Although the findings fall short of being able to confirm such 
motivation, the plausibility of it can be argued on a theoretical basis. Moreover, the 
case implies that organisational agents’ un-noticing could be a habitual adaption to 
such highly loaded contexts, with agents permanently modifying their behaviours to 
manage, minimise or escape the mental, physical, temporal and emotional calls 
upon their time and energy which such conditions create.  
 
Using this revised interpretation it is possible to draw out one final insight from the 
findings concerning how agents’ practices combine amongst themselves, and in 
response to organisational conditions, to produce a more habitual un-noticing effect. 
Firstly, a nurse who physically avoids users will be less likely to notice their cues. The 
presence of patient signals of need would be lessened. So, it would become easier 
not to help. Secondly, a nurse who is less attentive towards patients, would contract 
 
 
272  Testing four conditions of  unseen and unheard subjects, heard but not seen, seen and heard, or seen, heard and 
touched, Milgram identified a pattern whereby the greater the contact (or closeness) the more likely it was that 
participants would refuse the instructions of the test co-ordinator to harm learners (Milgram, 1965; Milgram, 1974). 
Since most consideration of these studies focuses on people’s willingness to harm others, the nuances concerning 
their decreasing willingness to do so under these conditions is often lost in discussion of his work. 
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their cognitive field, making it  easier to deny user needs since they are less likely to 
be confronted by them. Or their cues might only be partially or tangentially 
perceived by such inattentiveness and thus still be present but far less immediate. 
Thirdly, as a result of these behaviours the nurse would not see a patient see them 
not helping them. Actions of avoidance and inattentiveness would, if conjoined, 
feasibly reduce their perception of any surveillance of their inaction. Though one 
cannot be sure of the motivation, nor attribute these behaviours to conscious 
deliberation, such patterns hint at distinctive psychological and emotional benefits 
which might encourage un-noticing, especially in respect of the self-censure which 
could arise from being made conscious of one’s own unhelpfulness. So, instead of 
arguing that agents are not attending to users because they have not noticed them, 
this case offers the possibility of an entirely different perspective. It offers the option 
to infer that agents are more intentionally not noticing users in order to be able to 
not have to attend to them. Arguably, that would be the point of an un-noticing 
effect. Moreover, reducing surveillance could also simultaneously reduce any 
feelings of shame that might arise from seeing others see your unhelpfulness or 
deliberative un-noticing of them. A point I will return to later in this section.  
 
Moving on from the contribution of conditions and practices to the inhibition of 
altruism inside organisations, the last potential answer provided by the study lies in 
organisational members’ helping capacity or resources. The literature review of 
individual traits predicted that the potential for altruism would be affected by the 
level of organisational members’ personal helping resources, cognitive, affective or 
otherwise. The findings provide support for this effect amongst agents. However, 
this feature is one of the hardest elements in the findings to validate. Direct 
correlation cannot be confirmed between agents’ personal resources and helping 
behaviours, even though a pattern of depletion appear alongside a pattern of un-
altruistic practice. That said, users observing these two patterns do, at times, infer 
connections between them. They can be seen making associations between their 
perception of agents’ depleted mental, physical, or emotional states, and their 
perception of agents’ reduced capacity or appetite for helping users. However,  that 
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is still not confirmation. Moreover, instances in the data are not extensive. So, it is 
not possible to say with complete certainty which organisational conditions deplete 
which helping resources, which resource depletions generate which un-altruistic 
practices, or conversely which un-altruistic practices protect agents from the 
depletion of which resources. Furthermore, one cannot say with certainty which 
depletions are more important in their effect on the extent to which agents do, or 
do not, notice users’ needs, whether it is enough if they are present singly, or 
whether the effect requires a reduction of all such resources. Further investigation 
is needed. What one can argue with more certainty, drawing on the findings from 
the case, is: that depleted personal resources do appear to play a role in inhibiting 
altruism by means of an ability to affect what needs are noticed and how; that the 
depletion of such resources is contextually generated; and that such depletions 
appear able to play a role in the evolution of un-altruistic practices. Thus, another 
answer to the study question is that where agents exhibit a reduced level, or 
degraded quality, of personal resources with which to help users, less attention will 
be paid towards them as a group, un-noticing may emerge and altruism can be 
inhibited.  
 
The one resource which merits further discussion despite the aforementioned 
limitations of the findings concerning agents’ helping resources generally, is affective 
resource. Building upon the discussion of emotional noise, the affective property of 
organisational life in this case appeared highly significant, with agents experiencing 
continuous proximate exposure to pain, suffering and distress. In this respect, the 
findings from this case dovetail with theories regarding the role of excessive 
emotional arousal in inhibiting altruistic or helping behaviour, even if they do not 
prove it. Agents’ emotional characterisation in this data, as well as their behavioural 
practices, fit with Hoffman’s (1981a, 1981b) theory that excessive emotions will 
direct people’s attention inward, occupy them with self-regarding emotions and 
focus them upon their own personal state. While causality cannot be proven with 
the data available, high levels of agent distress are evident alongside their adoption 
of defensive practices, such as avoidance, as predicted (Hoffman, 2008). Self-
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regarding emotions, such as fear and anxiety or anger and frustration, can be 
detected in conjunction with such practices.  
 
Although this case was not designed to study emotional labour, it responds to a body 
of work showing that emotional labour or emotion work is a significant expectation 
of organisational agents working in health related or caring professions (James 1992; 
Bolton, 2000; Henderson, 2001; Brotheridge and Grandey, 2002; Larson and Yao, 
2005; Theodosious, 2008; Erickson and Grove, 2008; Diefendorff, Erickson, Grandey 
and Dahling, 2011; Kessler, Heron and Dopson, 2015). Despite the need for that 
resource, emotional depletion or exhaustion is a common feature of professionals 
working within healthcare (Hall, Johnson, Watt and O’Connor, 2019; McKinley, 
McCain, Convie, Clarke, Dempster, Campbell, and Kirk, 2019; Vincent, Brindley, 
Highfield, Innes and Suntharalingam, 2019). Compassion in particular is extensively 
diminished (Van Mol et al., 2015). Moreover, emotional labour is indicated to drive 
much of this emotional depletion (Grandey, Foo, Groth and Goodwin, 2012; Bria, 
Baban, Dumitrascu, 2012; Rogers, Creed and Searle, 2014). Fineman conceptualises 
organisations as emotional arenas, in which emotions can be considered a ‘strategic 
resource’ capable of supporting or disrupting the internal social order (Fineman, 
2008). Drawing these threads together, it appears that there is a damaging 
asymmetry between the quantity and quality of agents’ affective capacity available 
inside healthcare organisations and users’ demand for it as a resource. That 
asymmetry needs to be accounted for when analysing the findings. The case 
supports such a supposition. In this respect, it reveals a mismatch, in the example of 
compassion, between the emotional labour expected and the emotional labour 
which was seen to be undertaken. This damaging asymmetry, and the depleted level 
of affective resource it indicates, may explain a number of elements in the case 
which are less well explained by other factors.  
 
In particular, it may shed light on the purpose of agents’ diminishment of users, and 
how this functions in relation  to their indifferent or deterrent practices towards this 
group. The findings indicate that organisational agents adopt defensive mind-sets 
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which would enable them to deny that patients’ needs are genuine or deserving. 
Whether they are diminished to make un-noticing possible can by no means be 
irrefutably proven. Agents’ behavioural patterns dovetail with theories that one can 
defend oneself by distorting one’s perceptions of the situation, in particular by 
dehumanising, derogating or devaluing the victim, to make it morally permissible to 
treat them differently (Lerner and Miller, 1978; Schwartz, 1973; Stanton, 1998; 
Zimbardo, 2007; Reimann and Zimbardo, 2011). Despite the problem of proving any 
associations with agents’ affective hinterland, one can still speculate on how this 
would work in relation to un-noticing. Diminished users can be seen as less 
important or significant. Their diminishment would justify paying less attention to 
them. It is not being suggested that hospital staff deliberately or collectively set out 
to ‘not see’ patients. Rather, if a patient can be considered a ‘nuisance’, a ‘whiner’ 
or one of the ‘worried well’ then less attention can be paid to them. An illuminating 
example in the case concerns an elderly patient who was given a broken buzzer 
because they were a ‘nuisance’. This appositely illustrates that they do not need to 
be noticed so much because of their reduced significance. If one can see certain 
patients on the ward or groups of patients in the hospital as less deserving of notice, 
one does not need to look around so intently or assiduously while passing by them 
or provide them with a means of gaining your attention.  
 
In the study, user diminishment was positioned and analysed within the findings on 
relational conflict, and thus a causal factor in the inhibition of altruism. However, its 
role could be more nuanced and multifaceted. Considered along the lines above, 
user diminishment might be not so much an organisational condition, as potentially 
more of a rationalisation with which to justify un-altruistic practices. In keeping with 
theories concerning the importance of contracted moral spheres, such diminishment 
is also conceivably a means of avoiding personal self-inflicted sanctions or social 
censure by recasting the nature of others in order to absolve one of imputations of 
misconduct when being unhelpful (Bandura, 2002). Critically, if one interprets user 
diminishment in the context of such theories, it lessens the need to notice, but 
without self-inflicted social or emotional penalties, such as shame. Such practices 
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can make it acceptable to not notice or see users. The reduction of users’ significance 
as a group makes un-altruistic practices more permissible or less uncomfortable for 
agents. Arguably, it absolves agents of misconduct in not noticing users, for example, 
by placing users outside agents’ moral order lessening any obligations towards them 
more generally. So, it can be presumed that an un-noticing effect will be elevated 
where user significance is reduced and reduced when user significance is elevated. 
Critically, framing users in these ways enables agents to avoid censuring themselves 
for ‘not noticing’ user need or paying less attention to it. Where there is less self-
censure associated with inattentive or avoidant behaviours towards users they will 
become more permissible. Confirmation of this is not something which can be drawn 
from the study. Which leaves open the question concerning whether user 
diminishment is caused by the environment, and therefore a condition as set out in 
the findings, or a means of managing it, and thus potentially another un-altruistic 
practice, or both.  
 
Delving into the emotions associated with this might help address that gap. Anger is 
a significant emotion evident in organisational agents’ excessively aroused state. 
This was easily discernible because of the strong visibility of ‘angry’ cues and signals 
in the data. In this respect, agents’ behaviours revealed a level of frustration with 
their own apparently ‘unwarranted’ situation which made them less helpful. It was 
a defensive force. Notably, anger can include the aim of correcting wrongdoing as 
well as perceiving it (Gibson and Callister, 2009). Arguably, it is possible that 
emotional depletion may be deepened by agents’ inability to correct matters. If this 
is the case, that might explain user diminishment in keeping with scapegoating 
practices (Staub, 1985; Staub, 2004). However, one self-regarding emotion not so 
evident in the case is shame. There is but one specific reference to it, in which an 
organisational agent is described as ‘shame faced’.273 The omission seems 
noteworthy. The literature clearly links protective and defensive behaviours such as 
withdrawal and aggression with shame (Tangney et al., 2007; Lewis, 2008; De Hooge, 
 
 
273 Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.361. 
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Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans, 2010; Daniels and Robinson, 2019). Moreover, 
studies show a clear association between shame and defensive practices (both active 
and passive) in health services and caring roles or professions (Sanders, Pattison and 
Hurwitz, 2011; Gibson, 2014; Gibson, 2016; Cherry, Taylor, Brown, Rigby and 
Sellwood, 2016). However, in contrast to the literature, this case is characterised by 
the defensive practices associated with shame (again, both active and passive) while 
failing to provide any evidence of that association itself. One must ask why. Of 
course, it is possible that no shame was experienced but that seems unlikely. One 
possible explanation is that certain emotional cues and signals are indistinguishably 
interlinked.274 Pertinently, Tangney and colleagues argue that shame and anger go 
together, since if you can blame others for your actions, or have the opportunity to 
take your anger out on them, you might be able to avoid feeling shame and in this 
way reassert a sense of personal control (Tangney et al., 2007). So, instead of agents’ 
anger being prompted by their personal frustrations with patients, their theory 
would indicate that it might be provoked by their censure of themselves for not 
meeting organisational expectations towards patients which they share.  
 
The case cannot answer this either way. But there is the possibility that emotional 
cues and signals which are being attributed to other-condemning anger in 
statements could also have been signalling self-condemning shame, or even both. 
Observers may be mistakenly (or less fulsomely) attributing emotional 
manifestations in their statements. This points to a clear limitation of using 
secondary data. If, however, the literature is correct in challenging the case in this 
way, it might ultimately explain why we see user diminishment. The extensive 
denigration evident in the case could be an indication of shame in line with the 
literature, albeit once again impossible to attribute. Despite that limitation, the 
inference or insight one might draw from this is that a critical role for user 
diminishment is managing shame. It is feasible that user diminishment is somewhat 
 
 
274 Other possible explanations lie in the comparatively limited visibility of shame-related cues and signals available 
in the data sources used. Precipitating emotions might also be blurry or imperceptible. 
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necessary for un-altruistic practices, especially those of indifference or deterrence, 
as a means of removing any consequential or resulting shame that would arise from 
adopting them. Considering the matter in this light, it may be a foundational 
condition for those practices or even a practice in its own right alongside them. 
 
Pulling all the threads together concerning agents, it can be said that organisational 
conditions, organisational agents’ practices, and organisational agents’ resources, all 
provide answers to the question of what inhibits altruism inside organisations. 
However, their power appears reliant upon their intensifying effect when integrated. 
Integration is at the heart of how altruism might be inhibited. Together they create 
an ‘un-noticing’ effect in which the needs or distress of their users are neither 
perceived nor recognised as significant in order to manage the demands of 
responding to them. This is conceptualised as: 
 
An effect in which organisational contexts or conditions, and agent practices 
or resources combine to decrease users’ visibility, prominence or 
significance, diminishing the chances that they will be physically noticed, 
emotionally appreciated or cognitively assessed by agents for a response to 
their need, distress or welfare. 
 
As set out in this discussion, how the three factors do ultimately integrate 
procedurally remains a matter of some speculation. Moreover, there are numerous 
potential permutations for interaction between each condition, practice and source 
of helping resource which could have a greater or less impact on altruism by means 
of how they might combine to reduce perception, appreciation of assessment of 
need. Setting out all of them here is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, 
the process of procedural integration and interaction can be explained by means of 
a hypothetical analysis.  
 
So, starting with the first condition, helping need-resource misalignment is factored 
into such analysis. A hospital unit could have fewer nurses on a ward than 
recommended protocols. In such a situation, nurses might avoid the calls of some 
patients on some occasions. However, if that misalignment is extensive and 
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unremitting, their avoidance might become common practice. Deterrent practices 
might arise if nurses habitually seek to put distance between themselves and 
patients as a means of managing this misalignment. Thus, un-noticing would begin. 
Turning to a second condition, cultural threats or instabilities are factored in. If the 
unit has to meet certain targets made more difficult to reach by the precipitating 
misalignment, nurses might become habitually absorbed by those, and less attentive 
to patients. So, un-noticing intensifies. Loading in relational conflict as a third 
condition is complex. However, nurses on the ward may not get on. This could 
deplete their personal resources, for example draining their affective energy through 
hostilities which arise over disagreements concerning how to respond to the targets. 
This could also increase affective strain between parties. Next emotional noise is 
factored in. This might overwhelm nurses in its scale and intensity, making them less 
concerned by the distress of any individual patients or colleagues. Indifferent 
practice might start to emerge.  
 
By this stage, each organisational condition identified by this study is present. 
Potential effects are evident. Singly, they are acting as attentional absorbers or 
distractors which direct nurses’ notice to themselves or away from patients. 
Combined they appear to be acting as attentional depletors, reducing nurses’ 
personal helping resources. So, reduced personal resources are factored in next. If 
the nurses have reduced affective capacity as a result of all these conditions, they 
may be less inclined to attach any significance to the distress of patients. Indifferent 
practice may intensify. As the initial misalignment between demand and resource 
becomes more strained, affective resources would become further depleted, making 
nurses less and less keen to attend to patients’ potentially draining distress. So, 
noticing becomes more draining, and un-noticing becomes much more attractive. 
User diminishment may arise as a result of nurses depleted or degraded affective 
resources, and in response to how draining it is to respond to patients. At this point, 
it would help to reconcile any self-censure that might normally be imposed by such 
actions, making un-noticing more permissible. Indifference or deterrence could then 
escalate as a result of patients’ reduced significance or importance.   
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This is not an un-questionably validated procedural effect, but the findings strongly 
indicate its plausibility. It is proposed that such an effect inhibits altruistic responses 
by initially reducing the chance that organisational users’ needs are perceived with 
significance and subsequently reducing the chances that agents will appreciate their 
pain, engage with their suffering or be motivated to act. Such an effect is likely to 
impair contact between agents and users and undermine the relational architecture 
upon which an organisation is founded. This raises the prospect that un-noticing 
could be responsible for user neglect inside organisations generally, not simply the 
inhibition of any altruistic or helping behaviour towards them. There are many 
implications arising from this. However, a distinguishing feature of un-noticing is that 
the effect can be conceived of as a more behavioural adaption to organisational 
contexts, driven by internal organisational conditions, and even, at times, 
deliberately adopted as habitual practice to circumvent them.  
 
While it might be psychologically comforting for organisations to presume their 
agents do not help because they are too busy to notice users’ needs, the implication 
is that they need to consider the possibility that such behaviour is more deliberately 
constructed in response to their physically close and inescapable proximity to 
intense levels of user need and distress within highly loaded organisational contexts. 
Thus, it becomes important for organisations to understand whether their staff are 
simply not noticing user need or more deliberately adopting practices which enable 
them not to notice it, or both. Importantly, the practices which arise from this not 
only appear capable of inhibiting altruistic or helping behaviour, but also appear 
capable of distorting professional practice. So, tackling their emergence in a hospital 
would be vital for good care.  
 
9.2 Contribution and Research 
 
Having embarked upon this study it became clear that what was most notably absent 
from the literature was a model which explained how altruism might be inhibited 
inside organisations. The model put forward in this section for further investigation 
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addresses that gap. It is the study’s main contribution to the literature. It sets out 
which organisational contexts or conditions are unconducive to altruism and what 
practices might emerge as a consequence of these. There was considerable 
convergence between the broad initial dimensions for such a model predicted by the 
literature review and the more defined narrative themes which emerged from the 
case (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Case Findings with Literature Predictions 




• Agent to Agent 
Relationships 
• Agent to User 
Relationships  
• Organisational In or 
Out-Groups 
• Conflict between organisational agents 
and users.  
• Some ‘diminishment’ of patients as an 
out-group. 
• Poor member relationships 




Culture and Climate  
• Organisational 
Norms and 
Sanctioning    
• Culture perceived as threatening or 
unwelcoming. 
• Context perceived as chaotic and 
unstable.  
• Normalisation of short cuts, omissions 











• Potentially high costs (or low rewards) 
for helping users. 
• Constraints upon agent autonomy to 
help users.  
• High strain on agents coupled with a 
low levels of resource or support with 
which to help users.  
MEMBER 
RESOURCES   
• Collective Helping 
Capacity or 
Resources  
• Low levels of personal helping resource 








• Use practices of noticing, appreciating 
and assessing and defending. 
• Agent practices of inattentiveness, 




• High levels of 
Member distress 
• Emotional noise identified as a 
distraction for agents.  
 
Nested within the model are four un-altruistic practices which were not present in 
the literature, as discussed in the previous section. These are the study’s second 
contribution to the literature. One potential augmentation which emerged from the 
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study is also added to the model. This is emotional noise. The construct is the study’s 
third contribution. A refined diagrammatic of the model is visualised in this section 
(see Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20: A Model of the Organisational Inhibition of Altruism 
 
This refined model takes account of any pertinent differences between the proposed 
constructs for a model drawn from the literature review (see Figure 7) and the 
narratives themes which emerged in the findings (see Figure 10), as well as any 
plausible assumptions, additional possibilities or augmentations discussed in the 
previous section. The model now provides a platform for further research. One 
caveat must be explained. This concerns the position of culture within this 
refinement. Its inclusion is not in doubt. However, its placement is trickier. In the 
case, perception of a threatening culture appeared inextricably linked to demand, 
Inhibit   
Altruism
Relational Conflict




Cultural Fabric and 
Climate
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Culture




High Strain                       
or Constraint
Low Support                   
or Resource
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Noise
High Member       
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and was thus hard to separate out from the misalignment between user helping 
need and resources created by the organisational architecture. However, chaos and 
uncertainty was a source of considerable distress to members and initially hard to 
separate out from emotional noise and agent over-arousal. Reflecting on the 
delineation of culture in the literature, keeping these two factors together within a 
cultural domain will make the model conceptually cleaner and easier to use for 
research. However, there is the possibility that such placement could be changed by 
further investigation.  
 
There are five research themes arising from this model. These concern the model, 
its practices, its procedural integration, the interrelationships between its constructs 
and any new ones. The first theme for research  concerns the validity of model itself. 
The model needs testing in other cases and in different contexts than healthcare. 
The second theme for research concerns the un-altruistic practices. There is a clear 
need to replicate the findings regarding the four practices nested within the model. 
The case convincingly indicates that these can inhibit altruism by means of their 
influence on what is noticed, possessing a power to reduce need perception, 
appreciation and assessment, or even block and obviate them. However, one case is 
insufficient to be certain that this is the complete and irrefutable explanation of their 
influence. Nor can it produce a complete typology of un-altruistic practices. Further 
research is needed into how such practices are created, whether there are more, 
which might be most important and whether all are required for altruism to be 
inhibited. Given the contrast between agent and user helping which emerges from 
the case, studies which explore the duality of practice indicated by the case would 
also be a potentially fruitful source of future research. The contrast is visualised here 
for reference (see Figure 21 on the next page). The possibility for mirroring between 
promotional and inhibitory practices discussed in the previous section is worthy of 
further research. It might reveal nuances in the practices themselves. Thus 
inattentiveness in relation to noticing, and indifference in relation to appreciating, 
merit comparative investigation. The addition of defending as a user practice also 
requires further exploration and considerably greater testing for validity than one 
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case study can provide. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, the 
possibility that altruistic practice arises in response to the four un-altruistic practices 
merits further investigation. 
 




The third research theme concerns procedural assumptions within the model itself. 
These require empirical testing and confirmation. Based on the discussion in the 
previous section, the model incorporates a number of procedural assumptions. 
Firstly, it is anticipated that helping will be inhibited by the routine or habitual 
ALTRUISTIC             
PRACTICES













adoption of the four un-altruistic practices. Secondly, it is assumed that a depletion 
of  organisational agents’ personal capacities or helping resources with which to aid 
others, now termed altruistic resources within the model, will be a causal factor in 
the emergence of such practices. Thirdly, the model predicts that both altruistic 
resources and un-altruistic practices will be affected by the organisation’s emotional 
terrain, cultural fabric, internal relationships and alignment of helping need with 
resource. In that regard, the model predicts that altruism will be diminished where 
an organisation’s emotional terrain is noisy, its culture or climate is threatening and 
uncertain, its relationships are characterised by friction, its users are diminished in 
some way and the balance between their helping needs and organisational helping 
resource is out of kilter.  
 
That predictive aspect of the model requires validation. This case follows that 
prediction, but one case is insufficient to confirm how such a process works, whether 
each of these organisational conditions is necessary, whether they are directly or 
indirectly involved, or both. Picking up on the latter point, it assumed that altruism 
is reduced because these conditions have a twofold influence, in which they may 
directly stimulate un-altruistic practices as habitual adaptions to the context they 
create or, alternatively, indirectly influence the process by depleting agents’ 
altruistic resources within that context. However, again, such procedural 
assumptions need empirical confirmation. They are intimated by the findings, and 
plausible on the basis of the literature, but they cannot be considered confirmed by 
a single case.  
 
The fourth research theme concerns the need to comprehensively delineate the 
numerous possible interrelationships between each of the constructs within the 
model. It is not possible to list every one of these, so the point is best illustrated by 
means of an example. To explain, the case indicates that agents’ reduced or depleted 
mental or cognitive resource has a role in the practice of inattentiveness. Less clear 
is whether there could be a role for it with deterrent practice. Similarly, the case 
indicates that misalignment between users’ helping needs and organisational 
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helping resources could have a direct role in the practice of inattentiveness by 
directing agents’ cognition away from users. It also suggests that there is an indirect 
role for this misalignment by means of its potential to deplete agents’ cognitive 
resources more generally. However, once again it is less clear how this misalignment 
might affect indifferent practice. So, the model provides for the possibility of a far 
greater number of interrelationships than this study was capable of testing or 
determining. These offer a fruitful source of future research.  
 
The last research theme concerns the concept of emotional noise. This requires 
further research to establish its validity as a concept. An investigation of its role in 
distracting organisational agents from users requires empirical confirmation. It could 
have been a simultaneous, but extraneous factor rather than a causal one in the 
inhibition of altruism. Exploration of the role of external institutions in contributing 
to emotional noise inside organisations would also be valuable. Since the study was 
not designed to investigate the concept, its properties have not been considered in 
detail. However, it is proposed here that it is comprised of: the collective 
accumulation of organisational members’ emotional cues and signals; their 
extensive cognitive or affective perception or awareness of other members’ pain and 
suffering; and their conscious or unconscious anticipation of distress amongst 
organisational members, in recognition of their condition. Emotional noise is 
therefore conceptualised as the collective accumulation of distressed signals, 
combined with the widespread perception or anticipation of member distress inside 
an organisation (see Figure 22 on the next page). This hypothesis requires empirical 
testing.  
 
Brown, Rutherford and Crawford (2015) conceptualise clinical environments as 
having their own particular ‘soundscape’, which include technical and human 
factors, as well as daily rhythms, rather than being simply noisy. They suggest this 
raises questions about how such sounds are heard or interpreted. Arguably, 
responding to that question, a hospital soundscape might be interpreted as having 
an emotional tone, timbre or pitch which is cognitively and affectively discernible.  
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Along these lines, many sounds within a hospital setting can be said to have an 
affective quality or property which constitutes, or contributes to, emotional noise. 
However the concept of emotional noise is considered to be broader in scope. It 
assumes that perceived or anticipated pain, suffering and distress will also have an 
emotional resonance or reverberation in the mind of the observer. So, even when 
no distress signals are emitted, nor is any pain and suffering visually or aurally 
communicated, agents might still anticipate emotional distress as a result of the 
internal organisational terrain or members’ personal circumstances, especially 
where the latter are clearly and evidently adverse.  
 
Some parallels with other constructs of ‘noise’ might be drawn. These can be found 
in the literature concerning the influence of sensory overload on altruism. Such 
perspectives contend that stimulus overload affects altruism by means of their 
influence on the extent to which needs are noticed (Shroeder et al., 1995). There is 
a clear body of evidence that potentially sensorily overwhelming or overloading 
factors can have a negative influence on responsiveness to others inside 
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Canon, 1975; Cohen, 1980; Cohen and Spacapan, 1984). Critically, this can provoke 
attentional shifts away from social signals present within a situation (Jones, 
Chapman and Auburn, 1981; Stansfeld, Haines and Brown; 2000). It also leads to 
adaptive behaviours which reduce attentiveness and increase unhelpfulness 
(Milgram, 1970, Kortes, 1981). These patterns were evident in the case. It is a leap 
to argue that emotional noise has a similar effect to visual or aural forms of sensory 
overload, but it might well sit alongside such concepts. Though such studies have not 
considered the concept of overload as an affective property of organisational life in 
this way, the same distractions they offer are anticipated in association with 
emotional noise. However this provides a significant question for future research.  
 
Moving on from the subject of research, there are a number of specific cautions 
which should be taken in respect of this study. One significant limitation of the study 
arises out of the nature of the design. This is a theoretical study rather than an 
empirical one, based on a single case. It is intended to develop and expand theory 
rather than confirm specific hypotheses. This is the most significant limitation, 
constraining the nature of conclusions. Importantly, many of the patterns which 
emerge from the data are compared and contrasted to develop theoretical 
propositions. They appear to correlate but such relationships have not been 
empirically tested and require replication. Moreover, given this design, causality 
between concepts, though plausible at times, cannot necessarily be determined 
from the data. It may be hypothetical supposition. Another weakness is that the 
patterns identified in the data tend to be behavioural. The author can speculate on 
motivations which might underpin such behaviour, using the ascriptions or 
constructions witnesses make, but this is still conjectural. By way of example, angry 
behaviour depicted in the data may be fuelled by moral frustrations (which is at 
times concluded) or by other emotions, such as personal shame, which are harder 
to ascertain. That said, it is especially relevant when studying altruism in 
organisational settings to focus on altruistic behaviours (that can be observed) 
regardless of motivation since it is the promotion of altruism which management 
 235 
needs to understand and encourage regardless of impetus (Li, Kirkman and Porter, 
2014).  
 
A second limitation of this work concerns some challenges which were precipitated 
by the nature, volume and quality of the data. In this case the sheer volume of data 
was significant. Each of the two inquiries produced three volumes (of up to 1,000 
pages). In addition, there were witness statements, summaries of oral evidence, 
expert reports and so on. Simply reading and coding the material available was a 
substantial challenge. Coding (and recoding) all the material from the inquiries would 
have been prohibitive. For this reason, some selective sampling was applied to 
witness statements produced for the public inquiry. Limiting the data coded in this 
way raises the prospect that some themes were over or under-presented, or even 
missed. This is potentially a theoretical limitation of the study. Whilst the quality of 
the data did not, on the whole, pose any theoretical problems for the study, it did 
create some technical limitations. Some of the material which was selected was 
subject to a small amount of data corruption. By way of example, some statements 
were written on or even scrambled. Such documents could not be coded using the 
software because of this. That meant that although they could be read, they could 
not be incorporated into the data tables which were used for analysis. Another 
problem with quality of the material was the potential for duplication. Given that 
there were two inquiries, certain events appeared more than once in the data. As a 
consequence, some themes may be over-represented from being reported more 
than once. That said, textual references to the same event often showed remarkable 
consistency. A final technical problem with the data is that the inquiries omitted 
paragraph or page numbering for certain documents (summaries of oral evidence in 
particular). This creates a challenge for readers who might wish to replicate or 
interrogate the data in this study. 
 
A third limitation of the study is the potential for bias in the data. Problematically, 
the witness data is to some extent dependent on those who came forward. 
Consequently, there is more material from relatives than other types of witness 
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(such as friends). This has theoretical implications. One must also acknowledge the 
potential for bias arising out of the profile of statements and the perspective of those 
providing them. This means there is a need to be cautious when analysing or drawing 
conclusions from witnesses’ oral statements to the inquiry. There are, for example, 
more instances of distress in the data which are related directly by relatives than by 
patients. This is a reflection of the number of statements provided by this group. 
With all witnesses, however, there are potential issues of time-lapse, memory-loss 
and retrospective sense-making. One needs to be especially alive to the possibility 
that inquiry reports are sensemaking narratives which may tell a particular story that 
they seek to impose that upon others (Brown, 2004). While steps were taken to 
minimise the impact of this, it must be acknowledged that the effect cannot be 
completely eradicated and that this form of bias may remain despite the best efforts 
of the author.   
 
Along related lines, there was also lot of cultural change in the period around issues 
such as candour, and the inquiry witnesses may be applying standards which 
emerged later in the timeline of the inquiry. So, there could be biases concerning the 
cultural shifts which took place during this time. The period being studied is care at 
Stafford Hospital from January 2005 to March 2009. The first (independent) inquiry 
was announced on 21 July 2009 and reported its conclusions on 24 February 2010. 
The second (public) inquiry was announced on 9 June 2010, began on November 
2010, and reported its conclusions on 6 February 2013. So, witnesses were asked to 
make statements in writing or orally (in private for the first inquiry and in public for 
the second) about events which took place at some distance, were contested as to 
causes, emotionally charged and in the spotlight. That said, the vividness and clarity 
of witnesses’ memories indicates a lucidity which to some extent counteracts 
arguments that criticism could be solely shaped by hindsight. 
 
A fourth limitation of the study arises out of the potential problems inherent in 
analysing the data. Ensuring the comprehensive and consistent coding of such a large 
volume of material produced over a long period of time was challenging. To ensure 
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the coding process was as comprehensive as possible the data was coded twice. To 
ensure consistency the author used a coding tracker (of both emerging and literature 
codes) during the coding process together with a series of questions to keep the 
coding process on track. Spot-check codings (and re-codings) of key themes 
(throughout the process) were adopted to ascertain any areas where inconsistency 
might be creeping in. In addition, NVivo key words searches were used to identify 
any areas of potential under-coding in areas of critical thematic importance. Despite 
these precautions, given the potential for human error, it should be acknowledged 
that it is possible that the data could be under-coded, that some themes could be 
coded inconsistently and that codes could create unnecessary duplication.  
 
Some specific residual problems from this limitation must be acknowledged. Firstly, 
a small number of codes, such as ‘change’ for example, emerged towards the end of 
the second coding. Along similar lines, humour (jokes, flippancy, laughter, sarcasm) 
emerged during the first coding, but the potential to sub-code it, was considered too 
late in the process to make that viable. This could have benefited the study. 
Secondly, a small number of specific codes proved hard to work with. In particular, 
distress, personal arousal or distress and negative mood (the first an emerging code 
and the second two from the literature) were hard to distinguish between in the 
data. To overcome this, analysis was combined where necessary. Similarly, whereas 
repercussions (an emerging code) was easy to code, sanctions and punishment (a 
somewhat similar code from the literature) was harder to code. However, this 
prompted analysis which indicated a difference between actual sanctioning and the 




Fotaki says that healthcare is driven by less rational forces or conscious dynamics 
than the commonly applied market forces models allow for and that ignoring them 
‘creates toxicity in organisations and corrupts the moral institutional fabric’ (Fotaki, 
2016, p.1). Along similar lines, Wills and Hahn (1991) argue that although 
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professional norms and healthcare policies expect helping behaviour as a given, it 
will be influenced by less rational forces. This case suggests that they may be right. 
Imagine walking down a noisy busy street in a hectic and bustling city. There is 
someone homeless sitting at the side of the pavement. If you let your eyes slide over 
them, you might not be pained by their situation. If you do not look, you do not have 
to feel. Alternatively, you could change the way you think or feel about them. If you 
take the view that It is their own fault, or that they might drink away the change that 
you give them, then they are not worthy of your help. If you can think less of them, 
then you will not have to think less of yourself for not appreciating their situation. 
Or you could rush by and avoid noticing much about them in the first place. If they 
do not fully cross your field of vision, you do not have to be faced with any of this. 
What this research shows is that a busy hospital can be just like a busy city and a 
noisy ward is just like a noisy street. Professionals may, even, at times, as a result of 
their own actions, be less likely to notice that help is needed, be too hurried to stop 
or look around and notice what help is needed, or even be committed to reducing 
their chances of noticing anything at all. Putting this more simply, they may just not 
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12.1 Appendix 1: Case Sampling 
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12.2 Appendix 2: Pilot Findings 
 






Acted as a 
promoter triggered 
by witness’s 
responses to the 
pain, distress and 
suffering of 
others.  
Patients or relatives generally experienced personal arousal 
or distress as a result of the pain, suffering and distress of 
other patients and relatives, prompting altruistic behaviour 
towards them. Employees’ personal arousal was generally 
triggered by the distress of another employee. When patients 
and relatives observed pain, suffering and distress it also 
invoked their empathy, generating other-suffering and other-
condemning emotions (e.g. compassion for those in pain, and 




or affect  
 
Acted as an 
inhibitor for 
employees. 
There are a wide range of moods or states identifiable in the 
pilot group including: anger, shock and alarm; stress, 
frustration and irritation; apathy, gloom, cynicism and 
pessimism; and fear, worry and anxiety. The most common 
moods or emotions for employees were fear and anxiety. The 
most common for patients and relatives were anger 
and frustration, and anxiety and concern. However, in the 
pilot it was difficult to disentangle negative moods or 





Acted as an 
inhibitor for 
employees. 
Employees considered the environment to be one of 
significant time constraint, a factor which appears to have 
limited their capacity for altruistic acts. Patients and relatives 
were also sensitive to this and reinforced employees’ own 






Acted as an 
inhibitor for 
employees by 
impinging on their 
capacity for 
altruism. 
One employee indicated that the situation exercised a strong 
and controlling influence over employees, through 
leadership, culture, resources (especially staffing levels), and 
systems, processes or routines for delivering care. Such 
situational factors appear to have distracted them from 
patients and reduced their level of discretionary effort, in 










their capacity for 
altruism. 
One employee indicated that social disapproval may have 
exercised a controlling influence over employees. Again, this 
appears to have distracted employees from patients and 
reduced their level of discretionary effort, effectually 








their capacity for 
altruism. 
Employees indicated a high level of job stress.  There is a 
general sense of pressure and strain from their roles and 
workload. Such factors appear to have (in conjunction with 
other contextual and relational features) distracted them 





Acted as an 
inhibitor for 
employees by 
being absent.  
Employees indicated a substantial lack of support from 
leaders. There is a general sense of pressure and strain from 
managers’ expectations and targets. Such factors appear to 
have (in conjunction with other contextual and relational 
features) distracted them from patients and reduced 
discretionary effort, thereby inhibiting altruism. 
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12.3 Appendix 3: Coding Template   
 
1 : Case timeline, events and facts 
2 : Emerging Behaviours 
3 : Abandoning (or abandoned) 
4 : Alone 
5 : Dumping 
6 : Forgotten 
7 : Lost 
8 : Abusing 
9 : Accepting 
10 : Aggressive (or aggression) 
11 : Antagonistic (or antagonism) 
12 : Friction 
13 : Apologising 
14 : Attentive (or paying attention) 
15 : Avoiding 
16 : Belittling 
17 : Blaming 
18 : Scapegoating 
19 : Brusque 
20 : Bullying 
21 : Harassment 
22 : Callousness 
23 : Cruelty 
24 : Insensitivity 
25 : Comforting 
26 : Complaining 
27 : Concern (raising ) 
28 : Confidence (having faith in) 
29 : Deferring (& deference) 
30 : Demanding 
31 : Deterring (or deterrents) 
32 : Dignity (treating people with) 
33 : Dismissing 
34 : Brush off 
35 : Fob off 
36 : Engaged (or disengaged) 
37 : Explaining 
38 : Eye Contact 
39 : Help seeking 
40 : Helping 
41 : Not helping or being helped (action or behaviour, 
context or state) 
42 : Hostility 
43 : Humour 
44 : Ignoring 
45 : Intimidating (or feeling intimidated) 
46 : Kindness 
47 : Labelling 
48 : Listening 
49 : Misconduct 
50 : Malfeasance 
51 : Mistakes 
52 : Nasty 
53 : Neglecting 
54 : Noticing 
55 : Panicking 
56 : Patronising 
57 : Perfunctorily 
58 : Politeness 
59 : Praising 
60 : Impressed 
61 : Professionalism 
62 : Protecting 
63 : Questioning 
64 : Reassuring (or reassurance) 
65 : Refusing 
66 : Reprimanding 
67 : Resisting 
68 : Respecting 
69 : Disdainful 
70 : Responding 
71 : Roughness 
72 : Rudeness 
73 : Scrutiny or scrutinising 
74 : Secretive 
75 : Shouting 
76 : Silent (silencing or silenced) 
77 : Speaking out 
78 : Supporting or supportive 
79 : Threatening (or feeling threatened) 
80 : Trusting 
81 : Un-noticing (or un-noticed) 
82 : Unwelcoming 
83 : Waiting 
84 : Warning 
85 : Whistleblowing 
86 : Emerging Context 
87 : Closed 
88 : Conspiracy (or suspicion) 
89 : Culture 
90 : Deterioration 
91 : Openness 
92 : Transparent 
93 : Uncomfortable 
94 : Warning Signs 
95 : Emerging emotions or feelings 
96 : Caring 
97 : Distress 
98 : Upset 
99 : Nostalgia 
100 : Suffering 
101 : Pain 
102 : Emerging miscellaneous 
103 : Individual Beliefs, Morals, Norms or Standards 
104 : Beliefs 
105 : Fairness 
106 : Integrity 
107 : Justice 
108 : Other beliefs 
109 : Morality 
110 : Personal Norms or Standards 
111 : Personal responsibility (or ascription of) 
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112 : Individual Moods, Emotions and Feelings, and 
Personal Arousal or Distress 
113 : Defence Mechanisms 
114 : Defensiveness 
115 : Denial 
116 : Dissociation 
117 : Distortion 
118 : Passive Aggression (Chair removal) 
119 : Rationalisation 
120 : Emotions (moral) 
121 : Anger 
122 : Compassion 
123 : Contempt 
124 : Disgust 
125 : Elevation 
126 : Embarrassment 
127 : Gratitude 
128 : Guilt 
129 : Shame 
130 : Sympathy 
131 : Unsympathetic 
132 : Emotions (non-moral) 
133 : Anxiety 
134 : Apathy 
135 : Indifference 
136 : Uncaring 
137 : Cheerfullness 
138 : Despair 
139 : Dismay 
140 : Fear 
141 : Dread 
142 : Frustration 
143 : Grief 
144 : Happiness 
145 : Helplessness 
146 : Hope 
147 : Horror 
148 : Humiliation 
149 : Irritation 
150 : Annoyance 
151 : Overwhelmed (emotion) 
152 : Pride 
153 : Resentment 
154 : Sadness 
155 : Shock 
156 : Alarm 
157 : Stress 
158 : Surprise 
159 : Vengefulness 
160 : Vulnerability 
161 : Worry (or concern) 
162 : Empathy 
163 : Negative mood 
164 : Temper 
165 : Over-arousal Effect 
166 : Personal Arousal or Distress 
167 : Uneasy (ill at ease) 
168 : Positive mood 
169 : Individual Personality or Characteristics 
170 : Altruistic Personality 
171 : Conformity 
172 : Non-Conformity 
173 : Personal Characteristics 
174 : Agreeableness (A) 
175 : Approachable 
176 : Considerate 
177 : Friendly 
178 : Helpful 
179 : Patient 
180 : Pleasant 
181 : Conscientiousness (C) 
182 : Dedicated 
183 : Hardworking 
184 : Lazy 
185 : Emotionality (E) 
186 : Extraversion (X) 
187 : Honesty-Humility (H) 
188 : Arrogant 
189 : Loyal 
190 : Openness to Experience (O) 
191 : Personal Efficacy 
192 : Competence 
193 : Internal Control (Locus of) 
194 : Self-Esteem 
195 : Internal document, report or correspondence 
196 : Negative 
197 : Organisational Factors 
198 : Felt Concern (Organisation) 
199 : Felt Obligation (Organisation) 
200 : Group Cohesiveness (Organisation) 
201 : Teamwork 
202 : Group Membership (Organisational) 
203 : Job Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) 
204 : Job Stressors (Organisation) 
205 : Burnout 
206 : Busy 
207 : Exhaustion 
208 : Insecurity (of employment) 
209 : Overworked 
210 : Pressure 
211 : Rushing 
212 : Leadership Supportiveness 
213 : Organisational supportiveness 
214 : Organisational Metaphors 
215 : Change (Organisation) 
216 : Culture (Organisation) 
217 : Information (Organisation) 
218 : Instrument of Domination (Organisation) 
219 : Machine (Organisation) 
220 : Organism (Organisation) 
221 : Political System (Organisation) 
222 : Psychic Prison (Organisation) 
223 : Organisational Pro Social Behaviours (13) 
224 : 01. Assisting co-workers with job-related 
matters 
225 : 02. Assisting co-workers with personal matters. 
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226 : 03. Showing leniency in personnel decisions. 
227 : 04. Providing services or products to consumers 
in organisationally consistent ways 
228 : 05. Providing services or products to consumers 
in organizationally inconsistent ways. 
229 : 06. Helping consumers with personal matters 
unrelated to organizational services or products 
230 : 07. Complying with organizational values, 
policies, and regulations. 
231 : 08. Suggesting procedural, administrative, or 
organizational improvements. 
232 : 09. Objecting to improper directives, 
procedures or policies 
233 : 10. Putting forth extra effort on the job 
234 : 11. Volunteering for additional assignments. 
235 : 12. Staying with the organization despite 
temporary hardships. 
236 : 13. Representing the organisation favourably to 
outsiders 
237 : Other Healthcare Institution (inc Cannock) 
238 : Positive 
239 : Quotes 
240 : Relational - General Reciprocal Principles or 
Relations 
241 : Indirect Reciprocity 
242 : Reputation 
243 : Reciprocal Altruism 
244 : Patient as carer 
245 : Strong Reciprocity 
246 : Relational - Kin or Kinship 
247 : Relational - Social Roles, Rules, Relations and 
Structures 
248 : Groups 
249 : Observers or Third Parties 
250 : Punishment or Sanctions 
251 : Social Norms 
252 : Social Roles 
253 : Friendship 
254 : Social Traps or Fences 
255 : Role (perspective) 
256 : Board Member 
257 : Doctor 
258 : Friend 
259 : Manager 
260 : Nurse 
261 : Other Employee 
262 : Other role 
263 : Patient 
264 : Regulator 
265 : Relative 
266 : Senior Executive 
267 : Situational (contextual) Costs and Rewards or 
Other Expectations 
268 : Costs 
269 : Ostracising 
270 : Rewards 
271 : Roles or Responsibilities 
272 : Rules, Processes or Systems 
273 : Admittance 
274 : Care (& treatment) 
275 : Care (action or behaviour inc. basic care, caring) 
276 : Treatment (or Service) 
277 : Complaints, incidents & events 
278 : Diagnostics 
279 : Discharge (& external transfers) 
280 : Drugs (& medication) 
281 : Food (& hydration) 
282 : Information (& communication) 
283 : Buzzers 
284 : Communication 
285 : False 
286 : Information 
287 : Knowledge 
288 : Record-keeping (&records) 
289 : Monitoring 
290 : Personal hygiene (& toilet assistance) 
291 : Resuscitation 
292 : Targets 
293 : Ward moves (& internal transfers) 
294 : Situational (or contextual) Participants 
295 : Audience Inhibition 
296 : Dehumanisation 
297 : Derogation 
298 : Deindividuation 
299 : Diffusion of Responsibility (Bystander Effect) 
300 : Humanisation 
301 : Recipient Characteristics 
302 : Dementia 
303 : Dependency 
304 : Inconvenience 
305 : Nuisance 
306 : Elderly 
307 : Likable 
308 : Vulnerability 
309 : Social influence (approval or disapproval) 
310 : Situational (or contextual) Strength 
311 : Chaos 
312 : Conflict of Interest 
313 : Confusion 
314 : Disorientation (context or state) 
315 : Death 
316 : Bereavement 
317 : Delay 
318 : Disaster 
319 : Isolation 
320 : Power 
321 : Repercussions 
322 : Resources 
323 : Equipment 
324 : Time 
325 : Visibility 
326 : Staff 
327 : Junior staff (quality or characteristic) 
328 : Leadership 
329 : Management 
330 : Senior staff (quality or chracateristic) 
331 : Staff attitude (quality or characteristic) 
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332 : Staff availability (context or state) 
333 : Staff competence (quality or characteristic) 
334 : Staff experience (quality or characteristic) 
335 : Staff levels (context or state) 
336 : Staff morale (emotion) 
337 : Staff sickness (incident or event) 
338 : Staff training (incident or event) 
339 : Staff turnover (incident or event) 
340 : Tier 
341 : Executive 
342 : Expert 
343 : External Individual 
344 : External Organisation 
345 : Inquiry 
346 : Non-Executive 
347 : Professional 
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12.4 Appendix 4: Literature Review Process  
 
In view of the commitment to an iterative approach, the literature review is 
organised in various phases. The purpose of the first phase was to familiarise the 
researcher with the concept of altruism and develop an initial feel for the scale and 
scope of the literature. The first phase (See Table A below) showed that the most 
pertinent disciplines for the study would be management, business, economics, 
social psychology, sociology, behavioural science, anthropology, evolutionary 
biology, social sciences, philosophy, political science and ethics. 
 
Table A: Phase One Literature Review 
ACTION ENGINE  TERMS PARAMETERS OUTPUT 





























Review   Web of 
Knowledge 




economics, social psychology, 
sociology, behavioural 
science, anthropology, 
evolutionary biology, social 
sciences, philosophy, political 
science, ethics 
 
The purpose of the second phase (See Table B below) was to identify ways in which 
to refine the search scope to a more manageable level. This included a second 
narrower search for the 500 most cited papers (one for management on its own, and 
one for all disciplines together), which when combined identified a total of 89 papers 
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for review and 180 for possible review. Phases one and two produced some key 
constructs (which are set out in Appendix Two). 
 
Table B: Phase Two Literature Review 
ACTION ENGINE  TERMS PARAMETERS OUTPUT 






Years 1945-2013 (for 
articles, books, book 
chapters, reviews and 








Same  Same parameters, same 
disciplines 
35 papers for 
probable review 







Same  Same parameters, 
management discipline 
alone 
54 papers for 
probable review 
and 56 for 
possible review. 





Years 1945-2013 (for 
articles, books, book 
chapters, reviews and 
proceedings in English) in 
above disciplines. 
27 papers for 
probable review 
and 19 for 
possible review.  
 
Phase two showed that papers are likely to be especially relevant if they are a classic 
citation paper, a landmark paper for other reasons (i.e. ground-breaking in the field), 
or have an organisational application or setting. It also showed that a large number 
of papers are likely to be irrelevant, particularly those relating to: non-human 
altruism (insects or animals); human genetic factors; corporate social responsibility; 
charitable giving; philanthropy or volunteering; and spiritual practises (e.g. 
mindfulness or loving-kindness meditation). In addition, a small discrete search, in 
field of nursing, identified the potential relevance of searching professional 
groupings related to case industry. Both these phases demonstrated the scale of the 
 
 
275 Incorporates the following:  Science Citation Index Expanded (1945-present), Social Sciences Citation Index (1970-
present), Arts & Humanities Citation Index (1975-present), Conference Proceedings Citation Index- Science (1990-
present), Conference Proceedings Citation Index- Social Science & Humanities (1990-present), Book Citation Index– 
Science (2005-present), Book Citation Index– Social Sciences & Humanities (2005-present).  
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literature, and the need for tighter search parameters to make the review 
manageable and organisationally pertinent.  
 
A third literature review was undertaken alongside the pilot study to assist with the 
development of a core set of constructs. This yielded 378 articles, of which all were 
reviewed at abstract level and an additional 53 articles were reviewed in full (see 
Table C below). These were used to finalise the key constructs for the Predetermined 
Codes.  
 
Table C: Phase Three Literature Review 
ACTION ENGINE  TERMS PARAMETERS OUTPUT 
Search  Web of 
Science 
altruism OR altruistic 
OR prosocial; AND 
organisations or 
organisational; AND 
human (to exclude the 
large amount of 
material on non-human 
groups) 
Years 1976-2016 (for 
articles, books, book 




child* OR adolescen* 
and philanthop* OR 
charit* OR volunteer*. 
378 items 
(reviewed at 







12.5 Appendix 5a: Code Summary 
 
CORE THEMES  ORGANISATIONAL NARRATIVES  






High Need Narrative: An organisational user group 
with a high level of need and dependency.  
  
 
High Distress Narrative: A high level of pain, suffering 
and  distress amongst organisational members.  
  
 
High Uncertainty Narrative: An organisational context 
which is chaotic, insecure and uncertain. 
   
 







Threatening Narrative: a threatening and 




 Conflict Narrative: a high level of friction between 
organisational members. 
  
 Diminishment Narrative: The derogation or 
‘diminishment’ of organisational members. 












Low support Narrative: a low level of support for 
organisational agents including insufficient resource 











Inattentive Practices: Organisational agents’ 
inattentiveness towards users.  
  
 
Indifferent, Uncompassionate or Unfeeling Practices: 
Organisational agents’ indifference towards users 
  
 
Avoidant Practices: Organisational agents’ avoidance 




 Deterrent Practices: Organisational agents’ deterrence 





12.6 Appendix 5b: Complete Code Amalgamation 
 
The full set of codes and their allocation is shown below. Some codes are duplicated across 
groups, and 13 codes have not been loaded onto the model.  
 
THEME ONE - EMOTIONAL NOISE 








organisational users   
• Vulnerable 
organisational users.   
•  Elderly 
• Dementia 
• Dependent 





• Uncomfortable  
• Demanding 
organisational users 
with significant needs 
and/or expectations.  
 
• Pain, Suffering 
• Personal Arousal or Distress 
• Help-seeking, Helplessness 
• Vulnerability, Dependency 
• Fear, Anxiety, Worry (or Concern) 
• Dread, Horror 
• Shock, Alarm, Surprise  
• Visibility (N) 
• Relational - Kin or Kinship  
• Patient as carer 
• Helping,  Protecting 
• Demanding, Questioning,  Scrutiny (or 
scrutinising)   
• Likeable (N) 
Organisational 
members’ pain, 
suffering and  
distress.  
  
• Distressed (and in 
need) organisational 
users.   
• Pain, Suffering 
• Upset, Distress 
• Personal Arousal or Distress 
• Uneasy (ill at ease) 
• Deterioration, Death, Bereavement, Hope, Grief 




• Empathy, Compassion, or Sympathy 
• Worry (or concern), Concern (raising). 
• KIndness 
• Strong moods , states 
or or emotions  
• Anger Contempt, Disgust 
• Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment 
• Fear, Worry (or concern), Anxiety 
• Sadness, Dismay, Despair  
• Dread, Horror 
• Shock, Alarm, Surprise 
• Over-arousal effect  
Organisational chaos 
and uncertainty. 
• Unclear and uncertain 
events or situations  
• Chaos, Disaster 
• Confusion, Disorientation 
• Delay, Waiting 
• Reassuring (or reassurance) (N) 
• Explaining (N) 
• Audience Inhibition 
• Overlooked and 
disregarded users.  
• Lost, Forgotten 
• Dumping, Abandoning 
THEME TWO - CONFLICT CLIMATE 
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INDIVIDUAL CODES  
(FOURTH ORDER) 
A strong, closed, 
inescapable 
situation.  
A closed and isolated 
situation.   
• Closed, Isolation 
• Openness (N), Transparent (N) 
• Secretive, Conspiracy (or suspicion) 
• Situational or contextual strength 
• Warning signs 
• Staying with the organization despite temporary 
hardships. 
A strong and suppressive 
context. 
• Silent (silencing or silenced) 
• Speaking out (N), Whistleblowing  
• Situational or contextual strength 
• Warning signs 
• Negative mood  






organisational culture.  
• Culture 
• Deterring (or being deterred) 
• Dismissing, brush off, fob off 
• Brusque, Politeness (N) 
• Unwelcoming, Perfunctorily 
• Staff (attitude) (N) 
A threatening organisational 
culture. 
• Culture 
• Bullying, Harassment, 
• Intimidating (or feeling intimidated) 
• Threatening (or feeling threatened),  
• Job stressors (insecurity of employment 
• Change (organisation) 
• Culture (organisation) 
• Instrument of Domination (Organisation) 
• Complying with organizational values, policies, 
and regulations. 
• Objecting to improper directives, procedures or 
policies 
The expectation of 
repercussions or retaliation.  
• Power 
• Resisting  
• Repercussions 
• Blaming, Scapegoating, Reprimanding 
• Vengefulness 
• Psychic Prison (Organisation) 







organisational members . 
 
• Friction 
• Hostility, Aggressive (or aggression), Antagonistic 
(or antagonism) 
• Frustration, Irritation, Annoyance, Temper 
• Abusing, Rudeness,  
• Nasty. 
• Conflict of Interest 
Criticism of others (and 
other-condemning or self-
praising emotions) 
• Anger, Contempt, Disgust 






• Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment 
The diminishment of 
others. 
The dehumanisation of 
organisational users.  
• Dehumanisation, Humanisation  
• Derogation, Labelling 
• Callousness, Cruelty 
• Insensitivity, Humour (N) 
• Staff (attitude) (N) 
• Machine (Organisation) 
 289 
The disrespectful or 
undignified treatment of 
organisational members.  
• Dignity (N) 
• Disdainful, Respecting (N) 
• Inconvenience, Nuisance  
• Roughness, Brusque 
• Belittling, Patronising, 
• Insensitivity, Humour (N) 
• Derogation, Labelling  
• Callousness, Cruelty, Humiliation 
• DEMANDING AND DEPLETING WORK  




INDIVIDUAL CODES  
(FOURTH ORDER) 
High-load on 





Organisational agents are 
physically overloaded or 
temporally overstretched, 
and/or lack sufficient 
physical or  temporal 
resources.  (Physically 
overloaded and Temporally 
overstretched) 
• Pressure, Stress 
• Busy, Rushing  
• Overworked, Hardworking, Lazy 
• Exhaustion, Burnout 
• Putting forth extra effort on the job (N) 
• Volunteering for additional assignments. (N) 
Organisational agents are 
mentally overtaxed and/or 
lack sufficient cognitive 
resources. (Mentally 
overtaxed) 
• Personal efficacy, Competence, 
• Internal Control (locus of), Self-esteem 
• Beliefs (fairness, integrity, justice, other) 
• Morality 
• Personal Norms or Standards)  
• Personal responsibility (or ascription of) 
• Openness to Experience (O) 
Organisational agents are 
emotionally overwhelmed 





• Empathy, Compassion, or Sympathy 
• Uncaring, Caring (N),  
• Panicking, Shouting, Crying  
• Overwhelmed, Over-arousal effect 
• Detachment, Apathy, Indifference 
Demanding organisational 
users with significant needs 
and/or expectations.  
 
• Pain, Suffering 
• Personal Arousal or Distress 
• Help-seeking, Helplessness 
• Vulnerability, Dependency 
• Fear, Anxiety, Worry (or Concern) 
• Dread, Horror 
• Shock, Alarm, Surprise  
• Visibility (N) 
• Relational - Kin or Kinship  
• Patient as carer 
• Helping,  Protecting 
• Demanding, Questioning,  Scrutiny (or 
scrutinising)   
• Likeable (N) 




Low levels of relational 




• Leadership (N), Management (N) 
• Leadership Supportiveness (N) 
• Organisational Supportiveness (N) 
• Costs, Rewards (N) 
• Punishment or Sanctions 
• Social Norms 
• Labelling, Ostracising 
• Supporting, Supportive (N) 
• Assisting co-workers with job-related matters 
• Assisting co-workers with personal matters. 
• Showing leniency in personnel decisions. 
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High levels of cultural 
pressure on organisational 
agents. (Culturally under 
supported) 
• Time, Rushing, Pressure 
• Costs, Rewards (N) 
• Punishment or Sanctions 
• Social Norms 
• Targets  
Low levels of 
organisational 
resource. 
• Insufficient Physical 
Resources 
• Insufficient Temporal 
Resource.  
• Insufficient Mental Or 
Emotional Resources. 
• Resources, Equipment   
• Staff Levels (N) 
• Staff Availability (N),  
• Staff Competence (P/N),  
• Staff Experience (N) 
• Staff Morale (N) 
• Staff Sickness (N) 
• Staff Training (N) 
• Staff Turnover(N) 
• Junior Staff (N) 
• Senior Staff (N) 
• Time, Rushing, Pressure 
• Job Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) 
• Agreeableness (N) (Approachable, considerate, 
Friendly, Helpful, Pleasant) 
• Conscientiousness (N) (Dedicated, Hardworking, 
Lazy) 
• Emotionality 
• Extraversion (X) 
• Honesty-Humility (H) (Arrogant, Loyal) 




Social and Structural roles or 
relationships  
 
• Roles or Responsibilities 
• Role (perspective) (Board Member, Doctor, 
Friend, Manager, Nurse, Other Employee, Other 
Role, Patient, Regulator, Relative, Senior 
Executive) 
• Tier (Executive, Expert, External Individual, 




• Diffusion of Responsibility (Bystander Effect) 
• Groups, Group Cohesiveness, Group Membership 
• Teamwork  
• Observers or Third Parties 
• Social Roles 
• Friendship 




Processes and Systems  
• Admittance, Discharge, Ward Moves  
• Diagnostics, Care (& Treatment) 
• Complaints, Incidents and Events  
• Food (& hydration) 
• Drugs (& medication) 
• Information (& Communication) (Buzzers, 
Communication, False, Information, Knowledge, 
Record-Keeping & Records) 
• Monitoring 
• Personal hygiene (& toilet assistance) 
• Resuscitation 
• Information (Organisation) 
• Providing services or products to consumers in 
organisationally consistent ways 
• Providing services or products to consumers in 
organizationally inconsistent ways. 
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• Helping consumers with personal matters 
unrelated to organizational services or products 




• Indirect Reciprocity 
• Reciprocal Altruism 
• Social influence (approval or disapproval) 
• Social Traps or  Fences  
• Nostalgia 
• Felt Concern (Organisation) 
• Felt Obligation (organisation) 
• Gratitude 
• Suggesting procedural, administrative, or 
organizational improvements.(N) 
• Representing the organisation favourably to 
outsiders 
UNRESPONSIVENESS   








1. Not seeing/ (Un-
noticing (or un-
noticed) 
• Noticing (N) 
• Un-noticing (or un-noticed) 
• Attentive (or paying attention) (N) 
• Ignoring 
• Listening (N),  
• Eye contact (N) 
2. Not feeling, unfeeling  
or uncaring  
• Compassion (N), Unsympathetic 
• Uncaring, Caring (N),  
• Comforting (N), Reassuring (or reassurance) (N), 
Explaining (N) 




3. Not responding or 
unresponsiveness  
• Neglecting 
• Responding (N) 
• Engaged or Disengaged 
• Helping, Not helping or being helped  
• Comforting (N) 
• Refusing  
• Professionalism (N) 
4. Defending or acting 
defensively   
 
 
• Defence Mechanisms, Defensiveness 
• Denial, Distortion, Dissociation 
• Rationalisation 
• Passive Aggression, Resentment 
• Apologising (N), Accepting (N) 
• Avoiding, Deferring (& deference) 
• Misconduct, Malfeasance, Mistakes  
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12.7 Appendix 6: Data Output Samples  
 
Data Table Type 1: Code (by role) 
 
In this type of table, codes are shown by the role (or perspective) of witnesses, to 
identify which groups most commonly identify issues. Where possible, any themes 
which arise from analysis of the raw text will be identified and illustrated with sample 
quotes in the analysis.  
 
The example for nostalgia shown below suggests that this is a small theme mainly 
raised by patients or relatives. Analysis of the raw text suggests that members of this 




ROLE CODES REFERENCES 
1 : Board Member 0  
2 : Doctor 4 
3 : Friend 0 
4 : Manager 0 
5 : Nurse 0 
6 : Other Employee 1 
7 : Other role 0 
8 : Patient 9 
9 : Regulator 0 
10 : Relative 7 
11 : Senior Executive 0 
 
An alternative example coded for anger (below) indicates that this emotion is most 
commonly exhibited by relatives. Relatives are the main group to significantly indicate 
or express this emotion. Analysis of the raw text suggests that (for this group) anger 
is generally precipitated by the treatment of family members or (inadequate) 
responses to their complaints about that treatment. Interestingly, there is also a small 
amount of evidence of professionals’ anger being precipitated by (and/or perceived 
as directed at) patients themselves, their needs and demands.  
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Table Anger (by role) 
ROLE CODES REFERENCES 
1 : Board Member 3 
2 : Doctor 3 
3 : Friend 1 
4 : Manager 0 
5 : Nurse 5 
6 : Other Employee 1 
7 : Other role 2 
8 : Patient 2 
9 : Regulator 0 
10 : Relative 28 
11 : Senior Executive 3 
 
Data Table Type 2: Positive versus Negative Patterns  
 
In this type of table, codes are shown alongside positive and negative codes to see 
which they are most often co-coded against. The example below for fear shows the 
emotion to be unsurprisingly negative.  
 
Table Fear (positive versus negative) 
FEAR CODES  NEGATIVE POSITIVE 
1 : Fear 102 6 
2 : Dread 1 0 
 
An alternative example below which codes arousal (and related concepts) indicates 
that feeling aroused or distressed was also generally experienced as a negative event.  
 
Table Arousal (positive versus negative) 
AROUSAL CODES  NEGATIVE POSITIVE 
1 : Distress 125 6 
2 : Upset 41 3 
3 : Anxiety 16 2 
4 : Worry (or concern) 106 11 
5 : Negative mood 63 2 
7 : Over-arousal Effect 32 0 
8 : Personal Arousal or Distress 186 14 
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Data Table Type Three: Code (all other Codes) 
 
In this type of table, a code is shown against all other codes. This data is used to assist 
with the production of the other tables.  
 
Table: Fear (cross referenced for all codes) - Excerpt 
ALL OTHER CODES FEAR 
65 : Care (basic care, caring) 3 
66 : Caring (showing care, caring, etc) 0 
67 : Uncaring (inc. care less, care lack) 0 
68 : Chaotic (inc chaos, hectic, disorganised) 0 
69 : Closed 0 
70 : Comforting (comfort, comforted) 0 
71 : Communication 0 
72 : Complaints (make complaint, complained, complaining) 11 
73 : Concern (raising concerns) 3 
74 : Confidence 0 
75 : Conflict of Interest 0 
76 : Confused (inc confuse, confusing, unclear, lack of clarity) 1 
77 : Considerate (inc. consideration) 0 
78 : Conspiracy (inc. cover up, whitewash) 0 
79 : Cruel (inc cruelty) 0 
80 : Culture 7 
81 : Death 0 
82 : Dedicated 0 
83 : Defensive 0 
84 : Delay 0 
85 : Demanding 0 
86 : Denial 0 
87 : Derogation 0 
88 : Deterioration 0 
89 : Dignity 0 
90 : Disaster 0 
91 : Disdainful (inc disdain) 0 
92 : Dismissive 0 
93 : Disorientated 0 
94 : Dissociation 0 
95 : Distancing (inc distant, detached, removed, etc) 0 
96 : Dumping (inc dumped, dumping ground) 0 
97 : Equipment 1 
98 : Exhausted 0 
99 : Explaining 1 
100 : Eye Contact (looking) 0 
101 : Fairness 0 
102 : False (or falsified) 2 
103 : Fobbed Off 0 
104 : Forgotten (inc. left, lost) 0 
105 : Friction 3 
106 : Friendliness 0 
107 : Friends or Friendship 0 
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Data Table Type 4: Code Conjunctions  
 
In this type of table, codes are shown alongside other codes against which they are 
most often co-coded.  
 
The example below using fear indicates that it could be an issue for staff which is 
associated with employment related matters (e.g. organisational culture, job related 
stressors, job security). This example also suggests that fear might inhibit complaints, 
with potential cultural restraint and concern about retaliation. Separate analysis of 
the raw text for job security (and job or employment related stressors) and complaints 
(or raising concerns) confirmed these themes.  
 
Table Fear (most Common Code Conjunctions) 
CODES  REFS 
183 : Staff 13 
72: Complaints (make complaint, complained, complaining) 11 
80 : Culture 7 
128 : Job security (inc. job loss, insecurity) 7 
170 : Repercussions (retaliation) 7 
270 : Personal Arousal or Personal Distress 7 
290 : Job or Employment Related Stressors 7 
241 : Negative Mood, State or Affect, Negative State Relief, Arousal Reduction 6 
187 : Staff (levels) 4 
196 : Targets 4 
229 : Anger 4 
267 : Vulnerability 4 
299 : Organisation as Instrument of Domination 4 
 
An alternative example below for compassion shows that compassion is not a 
singularly negative factor. Although compassion is most likely to appear with a 
negative coding, it also appears in conjunction with a positive coding (43 negative 
references compared to 22 positive refences), suggesting that compassion is not a 
solely negative feature (i.e. absent, or lacking) in this case. Of the other most 
frequently coded together with compassion, the most notable is staff attitude with 
21 conjunctions in the coding. The next most common conjunctions are a group of 
 296 
codes which congregate around caring emotions, actions or behaviours, and 
professionalism. Other interesting conjunctions are death and communications.  
 
Table Compassion (most Common Code Conjunctions)  
COMMON CONJUNCTIONS COMPASSION SYMPATHY EMPATHY 
195 : Negative 43 22 10 
237 : Positive 22 11 11 
329 : Staff attitude (quality or characteristic) 21 4 5 
95 : Caring 8 0 2 
129 : Sympathy 6 34 1 
282 : Communication 6 0 0 
313 : Death 6 0 1 
273 : Care (action or behaviour inc. basic care) 5 1 2 
60 : Professionalism 5 0 1 
25 : Complaining 5 6 2 
39 : Helping 4 0 3 
58 : Praising 4 2 3 
161 : Empathy 4 1 25 
284 : Information 4 0 0 
 
Data Table Type Five: Raw Text (by theme or conjoined themes) 
 
In this type of table, the raw data (from inquiry reports, witness statements and so 
on) which has been coded is captured for analysis.  
 
Sample pages of the data exports for fear and fear and complaining together is shown 
below. This data confirms fear as a possible obstacle to complaining.  
 
FEAR AND COMPLAINING CODES TEXTUAL DATA SAMPLE PAGE 
 
Internals\\Employee 11  
 
Whilst the whistleblowing policy is in place, I still think there was, and is, a reluctance to 
raise concerns. I think there was a culture of fear to speak up, as it is difficult to talk about 
colleagues in a critical way. In an organisation where employees work and live in the same 
place it is often easier if complaints and concerns are raised externally. This culture of fear 
was reinforced with the workforce reductions. 
 
Internals\\Employee 13  
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Despite complaints from nurses and patients increasing, and sickness levels for staff going 
through the roof, nurses were afraid to complain. 
 
Internals\\Employee 23  
 
At this point the floodgates opened and a lot of other people came forward to complain 
about the poor practice and bullying culture in A&E. However, the climate of fear still 
existed and so many people did so anonymously. They agreed with everything I was 
saying but could see what was happening to me and often backed down. The way that I 
was treated put many people off raising their heads above the parapet. 
 
Internals\\Independent Inquiry Report-Vol1 (2010)  
 
patients’ attitudes were characterised by a reluctance to insist on receiving basic care or 
medication for fear of upsetting staff. 
 
Internals\\Independent Inquiry Report-Vol2 (2010)  
 
I was frightened to complain in case my treatment got even worse 
 
Internals\\Independent Inquiry SUMMARYOFORALEVIDENCEWEEK2  
 
He also recalls experiences of bullying by one member of staff on Ward 11. Mr D1 did not 
complain about this at the time because he felt vulnerable and feared repercussions. 
 
Internals\\Relative 09  
 
was never happy with the treatment that she received from Stafford Hospital, but she did 
not want us to complain when she was admitted to the hospital because she said that the 
staff would take it out on her and she feared retaliation. 
 
Internals\\Relative 15  
 
Meanwhile, was afraid to complain about anything because he thought that if he did he 
might make his stay there even more uncomfortable. 
 
Internals\\Relative 20  
 
1 [sic] know that one night he was lying in a wet bed for hours, and it had got to the stage 
that he was too frightened to complain in case they took it out on him. 
 
He got agitated, saying things like “Oh, what have you done, don’t complain, they’ll take it 







12.8 Appendix 7: Coding Tracker Excerpt 
 













Empathy  • ‘ability to understand and appreciate another person's 
feelings, experience,’ or ‘quality or power of projecting one's 
personality into or mentally identifying oneself with an 
object of contemplation, and so fully understanding or 
appreciating it’(OED). 
• 'emotional response elicited by and congruent with the 
perceived welfare of someone else’ (Batson & Coke 1981, 
p.169). 
• Empathetic Concern: state arising from seeing another's 
distress comprising emotions such as ‘compassion, concern, 
warmth, softheartedness’ (Batson & Coke 1981). 
Negative mood, 







• Mood: 'A prevailing but temporary state of mind or feeling; 
a person's humour, temper, or disposition at a particular 
time.' (OED, n)  
• The experience of a negative moods or state, which may not 
have a specific cause, may not be strong, might be 
temporary or longstanding, and might not be expressed.  
 Temper  • ‘Mental balance or composure, esp. under provocation of 
any kind; moderation in or command over the emotions, 
esp. anger; calmness, equanimity’ (OED, n). 








• Empathic arousal which is ‘so intense as to direct the 
observer's attention to him- or herself rather than to the 
victim, with a resulting decrease in the likelihood of an 
altruistic response’ (Hoffman, 1981, p133) 















• Personal distress: state arising from seeing another's distress 
made up of emotions such as shock, alarm, disgust, shame, 
fear. (Batson and Coke 1981) 
• Empathic distress: Observing someone in distress will 
instigate an empathic distress response. (Hoffman 1981) 
• Empathetic (or personal) distress ‘refers to a strong aversive 
and self-oriented response to the suffering of others, 
accompanied by the desire to withdraw from a situation in 
order to protect oneself from excessive negative feelings' 
(Singer & Klimecki, 2014, p1). 
• Likely to driven by egoistic emotions such as shock, alarm, 




• Emotion or feeling, context or state. 
• ‘Characterized by absence of ease or comfort; suggesting or 
manifesting want of ease in body or mind’ (OED, n). 
• This code includes ‘ill at ease’. 
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12.9 Appendix 8a: User Distress Narratives  
 
User Pain, Suffering and Distress Narratives 
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
User 
Condition 
‘the patient became extremely concerned that he was going to have a heart 
attack.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.219) 
User 
Condition 
‘….she was extremely fearful of the diagnosis of cancer; particularly given she 
had lost her mother to cancer some years earlier.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1) 
User 
Condition 
‘After suffering a seizure the patient was admitted.…. She was scared and 
confused.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.40) 
User 
Condition 
‘The patient was confused and frightened.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.88) 
User 
Condition 
‘The patient was terrified.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.45) 
Deficient 
Treatment  
‘the patient’s wife was concerned that he was not treated for the cancer and 
by the time he was discharged he had developed diarrhoea.’ (Independent 
Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.138) 
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘[REMOVED] waited for three hours before pain relief or assistance were 
given. This was traumatic and stressful for the patient and her family.’ 
(Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.346.) 
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘I had to keep asking for his syringe-drivers to be refilled when they emptied. 
It just didn’t seem to be a priority. On two occasions, I waited for over an hour 
for a reply to the call-button and eventually I just had to go and find a nurse 
and insist that they left the patient they were with to come and help... He was 
crying by that time and in great distress due to the pain he was experiencing.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.394) 
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘On the day she expected to have the scan, [REMOVED] was reassured that 
she would be sent for the scan, before she was eventually told that the staff 
had gone home. This was extremely worrying and distressing.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2)  
Deficient 
Treatment  
‘My daughter was so shocked at his appearance that she said something like 
“What the hell are they doing to you?” and had to leave the room in tears.’ 




‘I noticed that the urine container under the bed was full and needed 
emptying. When I looked closer I discovered that there was also a dirty nightie 
under the bed, which had obviously been either concealed or forgotten. I 
found [REMOVED] sitting in her own urine more than once. The bed was wet 
through. Whenever I asked nurses to come and change [REMOVED], I was 
upset.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par25.22, p.1604) 
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘When in the isolation ward, on one occasion, [REMOVED] could not access 
the call button and was left without help all night. He was very distressed by 




‘I was bubbling with anxiety about what would happen to older people at the 
hospital.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement, 




‘..she was appalled to observe another patient being told her water had been 
removed to stop requests for toileting.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.244) 
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘[REMOVED] and her son were also distressed by an elderly patient in a 
neighbouring bed who was in some difficulty.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 2, p.291)  
Deficient 
Treatment 
‘…. it was worse, I thought, for the old lady next to me, who couldn’t get out 
of bed, and she was on a commode at least 15 minutes ringing and ringing, 
and it went on and on, and she was a very ill lady.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry 
Report, Volume 3, par23.11, p.1501) 
Indignities ‘She was ignored for long periods by nurses. There was no respect for the 
patient’s dignity.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.26) 
Indignities ‘He felt demeaned. He lost a lot of his dignity, his pride. There was so much 
taken away from him that – it was just unbelievable to see a man that was so 
full of life brought down to the – to the state that he was in, that he was 
frightened to say anything or to be able to stand up to people.’ (Relative, 
Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par23.10, p.1501) 
Indignities ‘my wife’s niece came over to stay with us.….she was absolutely shocked at 
the way a consultant would speak to a patient in the ward, would speak quite 
loudly so everybody could hear….. didn’t pull the curtains round or speak in 
low tones.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par211, p.111) 
Indignities ‘Everyone could have seen her. That is why I was so distressed because my 
Mum would have been horrified if she would have known that people were 
walking past and could see her. The door was just left open all the time.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par21, p.55.) 
Indignities ‘People could be calling for a bedpan or help to get to the toilet: yes, I will be 
back in a minute. Off they go and they weren’t back in a minute. They had no 
intention of doing it, until people were just left to do it where they were. 
There was no dignity. There was no care. It was just totally dreadful.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par206, p.109) 
Indignities ‘The same thing had happened to the gentleman in the opposite bed. The 
result was that he couldn’t get to the toilet in time so he was in a wet bed. 
That is distressing enough anyway, let alone for a 77 year old that do [sic] not 
walk. The loss of dignity that he experienced was just awful; it was really 
embarrassing for him.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 20 
Witness Statement, p.12) 
Indignities ‘there was a lovely old man in the bed opposite. He obviously had some type 
of dementia, but he was very gentle and kind, i witnessed him having to wet 
himself. He was all dressed up in a suit ready to go home. He begged and 
pleaded for the nurse to bring him the toilet bottle, but she said “You'll have 
to wait, I'm dealing with so and so's patient”. It would only have taken her a 
moment. The cleaner heard him and she came, but it was too late. There 
wasn’t a curtain round him or anything. It was heartbreaking. There was no 
dignity. I will never forget it.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 11 
Witness statement, par11, P.4) 
Indignities ‘ this guy had got a hospital gown on, and I will never forget him, a tall elderly 
man. He was covered all the way down in faeces, he was showing all of his 
genitals,..…I was thoroughly disgusted. I thought a dog at a vet’s would not be 
left like that, and this guy, he has probably fought in two World Wars, has 
been left.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, par207, p.110) 
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12.10 Appendix 8b: Agent Distress Narratives  
 
Agent Pain, Suffering and Distress Narratives 
 NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Own 
Situation 
‘I put on three stone in weight as I was upset, worried, stressed and I was 
increasingly suffering asthmatic attacks due to stress.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par67, p.18.)  
Own 
Situation 
‘I use [sic] to get palpitations when going onto the ward to undertake a 
ward round, as I felt exposed and vulnerable and was very uncomfortable at 
being forced to cut corners.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 
20 Witness Statement, par43, p.10) 
Own 
Situation 
‘This left me feeling very exposed and vulnerable.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par27, p.9)  
Own 
Situation 
‘I had become so dispirited.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Witness Statement 
Anonymised Employee 18, par19, p.6)  
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘My colleagues were much more stretched and were in a terrible position. I 
knew how bad it was.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 
Witness Statement, par39, p.11) 
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘There was continual discontent from the junior doctors.’ (Doctor, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par37, p.10) 
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘a number of nurses were under a lot of stress, as a result of the wards 
being heavily understaffed.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 
13 Witness Statement, par48, p.13) 
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘Consultants lost heart.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 
Witness Statement, par3, p.2)  
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘Consultants weren’t happy and said so but were ground down.’ (Doctor, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par3, p.2) .’  
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘I heard girls in their late 20s crying that they couldn't stand being moved 
again from ward to ward.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Witness Statement 
Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par37, p.10) 
Colleagues’ 
Situation 
‘It was clear to me that she had not really wanted the job. I felt quite sorry 




‘I think she had a very difficult time.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement, par73) 
Insecurities ‘The proposal left people fearing for their jobs.’ (Manager, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 11 Witness Statement, par31, p.9) 
Insecurities ‘people were concerned about how it would affect them personally.’ 
(Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, 
par52, p.17.)  
Insecurities ‘I had friends who were nurses who were also very concerned that the 
reductions would impact on how they performed their jobs.’ (Manager, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 11 Witness Statement , par31, p.9) 
Insecurities ‘A “fear factor” mind set was created when the workforce reductions came 
in, as people’s jobs were not safe and everybody became wary.’ (Manager, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 11 Witness Statement, par32, p.9)  
Insecurities ‘we were hearing about redundancies within the NHS on a daily basis.’ 
(Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 07 Witness 
Statement, par37, p.9) 
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12.11 Appendix 9: Buzzer Routine 
 
Buzzer Routine Narratives 
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Buzzers 
unanswered  
‘On two occasions, I waited for over an hour for a reply to the call-button.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.394) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘On a number of occasions, [REMOVED] rang the buzzer for lengthy periods in 
order to get assistance to go [sic] the toilet.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry, 
Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘When [REMOVED] visited her mother, other patients would say that her 
buzzer had been ringing for a considerable amount of time.‘ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘There was a time when I was suffering from vomiting, I had been pressing 
the buzzer for a long time but nobody came and I was left to vomit on my 
bedclothes.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 01 Witness 
Statement, par12, p.4)  
Buzzers 
unanswered  
‘[REMOVED] told the Inquiry that on one occasion, several patients in his bay 
buzzed for nursing staff but no one came. Instead the patients had to shout 
to attract the attention of the nurses.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry, 
Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘After about 20 minutes you could hear the men shouting for the nurse, 
“Nurse, nurse”, and it just went on and on. And then very often it would be 
two people calling at the same time and then you would hear them crying, 
like shouting “Nurse” louder, and then you would hear them just crying, just 
sobbing, they would just sob and you just presumed that they had had to wet 
the bed. And then after they would sob, they seemed to then shout again for 
the nurse and then it would go quiet …’ (Relative, Public Inquiry Report, 
Volume 3, par23.8, p.1500) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘In Mum’s bay the woman in the next bed, she would sound the buzzer and it 
would just go off and off and off and then the same – it was the same thing, 
she would just call out for the nurse.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 1, par26, p.57) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘an old man on ward 11 pressed a buzzer over and over again as he wanted 
to urinate. He was a frail chap with poor mobility, and as the buzzer was not 
answered, he eventually went to the loo in the early hours of the morning 
and broke a hip. He went in for surgery and died the next day. I recall 
attending the inquest, the outcome of which was that the non availability of 
nurses was partly at fault.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 
Witness Statement, par83, p.19)  
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘Nurses were so busy that ringing the bell was a pointless exercise.’ (Patient, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.128) 
Buzzers 
unanswered 
‘The effect was that the [REMOVED] contained significant numbers of 
patients in distress and, as a department, we were immune to the sound of 
pain.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement 




‘The emergency button was often left out of reach.’ (Relative, Independent 





‘The patient’s buzzer was left on the wall out of his reach.’ (Independent Case 




‘..call bells were rarely answered and in any case were frequently placed out 





‘When in the isolation ward, on one occasion, [REMOVED] could not access 
the call button and was left without help all night.’ (Relative, Independent 




‘The nurses told her to ring the buzzer, but because of her paralysis she could 





‘…he rang the buzzer but no one came. He later discovered the buzzer did 




‘When she pressed her buzzer to get assistance for an older patient a nurse 
informed her “they had purposely not given this old lady a buzzer, she was a 
nuisance”.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.127).  
Consequences ‘[REMOVED] recalls that her husband was infrequently washed and given 
clean clothes, despite frequently soiling himself. She recalls that her husband 
had sores on his bottom and on his heels. She states that her husband rang 
the bell for toileting assistance but by the time the nurses arrived it was too 
late. She reports that she used to ring the bell for 20 minutes before it was 
responded to.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.333) 
Consequences  ‘He would also come in and find me lying in my own vomit, urine, and on one 
occasion, I was suffering from severe violent diarrhoea. I had been buzzing 
for some time as my Stoma bag had burst. I was embarrassed and ashamed 
when my mum walked in to see me in that state.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Patient 01 Witness Statement, par15, p.5) 
Consequences ‘In Mum’s bay the woman in the next bed, she would sound the buzzer and it 
would just go off and off and off and then the same – it was the same thing, 
she would just call out for the nurse. When the nurse did come, she would be 
put on to the commode and it was obviously too late. The nurse would put her 
back into the bed, you could hear her – she would wait on the commode for 
half an hour and very often she would just try to make it herself and just go 
smack on to the floor.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par14, 
p.53) 
Consequences ‘I had to keep asking for his syringe-drivers to be refilled when they emptied. 
It just didn’t seem to be a priority. On two occasions, I waited for over an hour 
for a reply to the call-button and eventually I just had to go and find a nurse 
and insist that they left the patient they were with to come and help... He was 
crying by that time and in great distress due to the pain he was experiencing.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.394) 
Consequences ‘…. it was worse, I thought, for the old lady next to me, who couldn’t get out 
of bed, and she was on a commode at least 15 minutes ringing and ringing, and 
it went on and on, and she was a very ill lady.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry Report, 




12.12 Appendix 10: Member Friction 
 
Friction between Organisational Agents and Users  
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘They just totally ignored me. There was no niceties. There was no: good 
morning, Mrs [...], how are you? When they did anything for [my husband], 
it was never: Mr […], I am going to do so and so; or Mr [...]; or whatever. 
They just treated him as if he wasn’t there.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 1, par310, p.137) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘The staff were so unapproachable there. It was just the looks they gave 
when we came back in.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 
Witness Statement, par40, p.12) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘it was the eye roll, the tutting from the nurses that I remember, it was not 
what they said, it was the way they used to say it. It was the attitude and 
the looks and I can still remember that’. (Relative, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par25, p.8) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘I recall hundreds of instances of raised eyebrows or the flick of the head 
from the Hospital staff.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 01 
Witness Statement, par36, p.11) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘the nurses never spoke. They didn’t know how to behave socially, I don’t 
think. They spoke to one another though, having said that. They would 
carry on conversations over your head but they would never once 
acknowledge you. You were an absolute pain because – I used to get there 
at about 9.15, 9.30 every morning, and I always asked permission to go on 
to [the ward] – is it convenient for me to go on to the ward to stay with [my 
husband]? I sat, held his hand and wiped his face and his hands and washed 
his mouth. Just there to comfort him and do whatever I could. But they 
didn’t hide the fact that they didn’t like me being there.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par206, p.110) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘One day I demanded to see a Doctor and had a conversation with a 
[REMOVED] (I think that was his name). Mum said to him “I’m dying” and 
he said “I assure you [REMOVED] you’re not” at which point I said “when 
are you going to call her [REMOVED]?”.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Relative 07 Witness Statement, par13, p.3) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘The nurses made her feel like she was a burden.’ (Patient, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.113) 
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘I think the initial comment of the nurse which said: we don’t like you 
visiting during mealtimes.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 
1, par128, p.88)  
Unfriendly or 
unwelcoming  
‘we were a nuisance. They didn’t really want us there. The whole attitude 
was “Don’t bother us, we’re busy. Don’t ask anything, we haven’t got the 
answers”. It was looks and shrugs of the shoulders and things like this if you 
made a query, you know, as to my mum’s health or was anything happening 




‘there were a couple that were very nice, very, very helpful, but the 
majority, no. It was a lot of the looks and the shrugs and “Yes, we’ll do it”, 
you know “when I’ve got the time”, and, you know, you’re a pain.’ (Relative, 




‘She observed patients being antagonised by the nurses who were rude and 
dismissive.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.22) 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘This nurse practitioner told me to “shut up”.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Relative 07 Witness Statement, par23,p.6) 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘..she said to my Mum:… what medication have you had today? Is Mum 
supposed to remember that?... and my Mum had said: sorry, what did you 
say? And she snapped: I said, what medication did you have? I said: excuse 
me, I didn’t understand what you said, you’d mumbled it.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par295, p.134) 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘She would often soil herself, and some of the nurses and the auxiliary staff 
were actually, whilst I was there, were quite, I would say stroppy, almost.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par39, p.60 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘Some of the staff were caring but others had a brusque manner.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.188) 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘when she attended the [REMOVED], the nurse was abrupt and bad 
mannered.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.270) 
Incivilities 
(rudeness) 
‘Her daughter found that the staff were very uncommunicative about her 
mother’s condition and extremely abrupt.’ (External Organisation, 




I was admitted to the Hospital and the following morning a very scruffy 
consultant came and said to me “Now you’ve had your bed and breakfast, 
you can go home”. I was absolutely stunned by his attitude.’ (Patient, Public 




‘I found the nurses’ approach very patronising…They were very flippant and 
were clearly just paying lip service to the issues. They were extremely 
patronising and asked me if, once I had got over my grief, I would be 
prepared to provide training to their nursing staff. I was outraged by this.’ 





‘I recall that when [REMOVED] was on the stroke ward, the nurses were 
horrible at the time. They were laughing at patients who weren’t able to do 
anything for themselves. There was no care at all.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, 




‘She was admitted to [REMOVED] at Stafford Hospital where her husband 
was very upset to hear a male nurse joking about her predicament. He 
spoke to the other nurses and found that his behaviour was fairly typical.’ 




‘her husband informed her of an incident whereby two nurses were talking 
and laughing about the patients, she reports that her husband actually 
confronted the nurses about their lack of respect for the patients on this 




‘I went to see one of the nurses to explain that I thought it was something 
more serious and the nurse said to me “if you don’t think it is a panic attack, 
you find out what it is” and gave me a medical book to look through.’ 
(Relative, Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 Witness Statement One, 
par36, p.14) 
Hostilities  ‘And she huffed and she puffed and she banged the door and she left…. She 
just walked off.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par295, 
p.134) 
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Hostilities ‘… he said: I need to go to the toilet. … he said she seemed quite angry that 
he wanted to go to the toilet. So she flounced out.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par15, p.154) 
Hostilities  ‘[REMOVED] told his wife that he had asked a nurse for help to go [sic] the 
toilet but the nurse had got angry before leaving to find a bottle. 
[REMOVED] was not able to wait and he told his wife that the nurse had 
‘exploded’ and threw either the urinal or the food tray onto the bed and 
left.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1)  
Hostilities ‘a nurse came in and literally threw documents at her that she said she 
would need for the funeral.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of 
Oral Evidence, Week 3) 
Hostilities  ‘My father was lambasted by one of the senior nurses for the suicide 
attempt because she said it was a selfish act.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par19, p.155) 
Hostilities ‘a very, very stroppy sister threatened to have me thrown off the ward 
altogether because I was being very emphatic in wanting to see somebody 
who had information as to what was the matter..’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par281, p.130) 
Hostilities ‘…she was due to go on a break, and he said to her: I’m really sorry but I 
have done it, and with that she exploded. She threw the urinal down on to 
the bed and she pushed his trolley up against where he was with his dinner 
and she went out and she never came back.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 1, par15, p.154) 
Hostilities ‘at one point they had a basket at the end of the bed that they would put 
sheets into, and we would go in and they were covered in urine, and they 
were covered in faeces and the smell. And we would constantly drag this 
out and put it outside of the room and said: please, would you not leave 
this in my Mum’s room because all of the germs are airborne and they are 
– as soon as we had gone, it would be put straight back in again.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par39, p.61) 
Hostilities  ‘I do not believe that the staff were happy about the fact that I had raised 
a complaint, because they did strange things like take the visiting chair 
away when my daughter went to sit with him, and consequently she had to 
sleep on the floor when she visited.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Relative 10 Witness Statement, par17.1, p.4/5) 
Hostilities ‘Despite family complaints, the nurses left the door to the room open and 
chairs from her room were frequently borrowed.’ (Independent Case Notes 
Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.104) 
Hostilities ‘I continued to stay with mum at all times but the nights were dreadful. The 
first three or four nights there wasn’t even a chair for us to sit in. Whenever 
we did find one, we would go to the toilet and come back and find it gone. 
The nurses made it perfectly clear that they didn’t want us there. They had 
no interest in making us comfortable and in fact made it very clear they 
didn’t want us there at all.’ (Relative, Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 
19 Witness Statement One, par25, p.10) 
Hostilities  ‘I was standing outside my father’s room, she came out to get something 
and on her way back in she said to me: if you don’t disturb us, we won’t 
disturb you. I said: pardon? She said: I didn’t mean it like that. I thought to 
myself: you flipping well did, you would not have said it otherwise. Which 
upset me.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report Vol 1, par143, p.92) 
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‘The attitude of staff could be variable, some demonstrating a 
commendable recognition of the humanity of those they engaged with 
while others did not.’ (Inquiry Chairman, Independent Inquiry Report, 




‘She hated being called [REMOVED] and, although we asked on 
numerous occasions that she was called [REMOVED], everyone kept 
calling her [REMOVED]. This upset me, as Mum had limited hearing and 
sight. If you call someone by a name that they are not known as, they 
are not going to respond.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 




‘The nurses never offered me any conversation; they never even 
addressed me as a person. They never spoke to [REMOVED] either. They 
never mentioned his name, and they certainly never mentioned mine.’ 
(Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 11 Witness Statement, 




‘…their mother was not treated as an individual. It was their perception 
that none of the patients they observed were treated as though they 
were an individual person.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry, Summary of 




‘I think my experience with the nursing staff, they don’t actually – it isn’t 
care at all, it is – you are a number.’ (Role, Independent Inquiry Report, 




‘When they did anything for [my father], it was never: […], I am going to 
do so and so; or Mr […]; or whatever. They just treated him as if he 
wasn’t there. As if he was just – well, as I said, a log of wood or 





‘We didn’t see anyone treated as an individual. We were a commodity 
to be shifted through the system as quickly as possible. That is the 
feeling you got, observing 24/7.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 




‘Nursing staff continually called her by her Christian name, completely 
disregarding her frequent requests to be referred to by her full name. This 




‘The patient was told that he was a ‘dirty old man’ and that he should 
‘not expect his sheets to be changed each time.’ (Independent case 




‘There were two nurses that were actually talking about the patients, 
and they were laughing about them, and my husband did actually turn 
round to them and say: excuse me, I might have had a stroke but I do 
know what is going on… They had just come out of the ward and were 
laughing and saying about the smell in there, and they were talking in 
general, thinking that because he had had a stroke, he wasn’t able to 
understand that they were actually taking the mickey out of the 





‘Staff also made derogatory comments about her partner: “Young 
enough to be your son”.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, Independent 




‘She was ignored for long periods by nurses. There was no respect for 





‘He felt demeaned. He lost a lot of his dignity, his pride. There was so 
much taken away from him that – it was just unbelievable to see a man 
that was so full of life brought down to the – to the state that he was in, 
that he was frightened to say anything or to be able to stand up to 




‘….the doctor has told you that there is nothing wrong with you and that 
you are simply used to being in charge — now you are not in charge and 
that is your problem.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 
Witness Statement One, par17, p.7) 
Blaming or 
Scapegoating 
‘She informed the hospital that she had consumed some alcohol, 
whereupon her daughter believes the doctor’s attitude changed and 
“she was not treated with the same care”. The patient was then 
discharged and told it was “nothing acute”.’ (Independent Case Notes 
Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.71) 
Blaming or 
Scapegoating 
‘Her husband was unhappy with the consultant’s attitude, primarily as 
he seemed to be convinced that his wife was suffering from alcohol-
induced pancreatic disease. Her family constantly emphasised that she 
only consumed alcohol occasionally and never to excess, and indeed had 
drunk very little since her first pregnancy in 1978. The family believe 
that the consultant’s assumption and refusal to listen to the family 




‘many patients suffered from acute confusional states..….some medical 
staff did not understand this diagnosis and its importance and in some 
instances treated it as ‘bad behaviour’ rather than as a valid medical 




‘I said why – you have rushed the blood through, I said to the sister, and 
she said – she said – no, she said, what has happened is I have had to 
come in and give the blood and don’t moan, she said, because I have 




‘Following her husband’s death his wife was spoken to by a nurse in the 
pub who said “her husband was disgusting to get so fat, he needed 
every porter in the hospital to move him”.’ (External Organisation, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.106) 
Blaming or 
Scapegoating 
‘The same nurse who was previously reprimanded for her unacceptable 
behaviour came back into my room. She said “you’ve made me ill! I have 
been off sick with stress because you reported me!”. I find this totally 
unacceptable and a demonstration of the fact that some of the nurses 
simply do not care about patients’ feelings.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, 




12.14 Appendix 12: High-Strain Narrative 
 
HIGH STRAIN NARRATIVES 
EXAMPLES 
‘We were all working crazy hours, perhaps 70 to 80 hours per week and we were on call on 
top of this. Working at this pace created its own problems. One Consultant went on long-
term sick leave and we had a problem with illness.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 15 Witness Statement, par67, p.21)  
‘…. Nurses in particular felt that there was pressure to care for patients in a given timeframe.’ 
(Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 21 Witness Statement, par66, p.15) 
‘On one occasion she was shocked to see the same doctor on duty for over 24 hours.’ 
(Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p274) 
‘People were busy running around, doing three things at once and not taking breaks, or 
lunch.’ (Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, par5, p.2) 
‘I waited for four and half hours while one extremely harassed doctor raced around like a 
headless chicken.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement par3, 
p.2) 
‘They didn’t really have time. There were not enough around.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, 
Patient A Witness Statement, p.101) 
‘People, and certainly nurses, were under more and more pressure and they did not have the 
amount of time they thought they should have to offer their patients.’ (External Individual, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised External 96 (GP) Witness Statement, par10, p.3) 
‘The porter told me that he was struggling to find an oxygen cylinder that actually contained 
some oxygen as they were all empty. The porter was quite anxious and he told me that he 
had a 15 minute slot in which to move mum or he would be in trouble.’ (Relative, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 19 Witness Statement One, par18, p.8) 
‘‘There were not enough hours in the day.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 06 Witness Statement, par43, p.12)  
‘Nurses were often forced to work very long hours and take administrative work home as 
there wasn’t time to complete this when in the hospital.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 13 Witness Statement, par72, p.20) 
‘When [REMOVED] first arrived she was met with a huge workload,’ (Other Employee, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 05 Witness Statement Number, par, p.11) 
 ‘I was up until 1.00am typing my report, even though I was due back on shift at 7.00am.’ 
(Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par19, p.6) 
‘….the nurses there weren’t unkind to him, but they were overworked.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry report, Volume 1, par20, p.55) 
‘…the patient’s wife was concerned that there was a lack of staff to provide adequate care 
and found that nurses often worked double shifts.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.236) 
‘There were also very few nursing staff on the ward and they came across as ‘overworked, 
ill-informed and careless’.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.119 
‘We worked this hard because we believed strongly in improving the Department. The 
difficulty is that if you work a team that hard for so long you begin to break people. We broke 
one Consultant and therefore ended up with three, making our work even harder.’ (Doctor, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par88, p.26).  
‘I was working under pressures that would have broken most people’ ( Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par14, p.4) 
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‘We [sic] all exhausted, mentally and physically. We are fed up with tackling unmanageable 
workloads, going without breaks, not getting off on time, doing extras with no respite. The 
environment is neither safe for patients or staff.’ (Anonymous Letter, Independent Inquiry 
Report Volume 1, par78, p.205) 
‘On the ward there were not enough staff and the nurses were clearly exhausted.’ (Patient, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.70) 
‘The nurses were overwhelmed with the number of patients, one crying with exhaustion and 
frustration.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.45) 
 ‘Whilst on the ward her son was concerned by the lack of staff. He found one nurse crying 
as she had worked for 12 hours without a break and at the weekend.’ (External Organisation, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.135)  
‘I saw lots of examples of simply not enough nursing care.’ (Doctor, Public inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 18 Witness statement, par35, p.100) 
‘…there were simply not enough people to provide basic care. In the circumstances, the 
nurses had to make choices about how to spend their time.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement, par78) 
‘Clinical Leads were still doing their full time clinical jobs and simply did not have the 
necessary time needed to devote themselves to effective management.’ (Doctor, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 14 Witness Statement, par9, p.4) 
‘The vast majority of nurses wanted to spend more time with the patients, and their families 
and carers, but due to the pressure of work and the impact of the low staffing levels, they 
were not able to do this and were not able to communicate as much as they would have 
wanted to.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 21 Witness Statement, par34, p.9) 
‘There were too few doctors and nurses, alongside poor training and supervision, and 
junior doctors were put under pressure to make decisions quickly without advice and 
support from more senior doctors.’ (Healthcare Commission Report, 2009, p.7) 
‘.. there was certainly great and increasing disquiet regarding the pressure of work on 
nurses following staffing cuts at the Hospital….It was clear that there was increasing 
disquiet in the Hospital regarding inadequate levels of staffing.’ (External Individual, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised External 96 (Witness Statement, par10, p.3) 
‘In my view [REMOVED] had his hands tied. He had to balance the books; he had to get FT 
status and he had to sort the problems out at the Trust notwithstanding that money had 
been taken out.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 19 Witness Statement, 
par15, p.5) 
‘…it had been made crystal clear to me by the SHA that come what may, the hospital had to 
break even by the end of the financial year.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 06 Witness Statement, par53, p.15) 
‘I believe this requirement to cut the budget would have come right from the top.’ (Doctor, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 19 Witness Statement, par14, p.5)  
‘I was required to achieve financial balance within the one year. This was reiterated at the 
monthly meetings where target sheets were handed round so that all could see how each 
hospital was progressing.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 06 




12.15 Appendix 13: Low Support Narrative 
 
Low Support Narratives  
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES 
Resourcing ‘On the ward there were not enough staff and the nurses were clearly 
exhausted.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.70) 
Resourcing  ‘The Department by this stage was hideously under-resourced.’ (Doctor, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par47, p.14) 
Resourcing ‘I remember a conversation with one of the senior nurses who told me that she 
was on her own and had 50 meals to serve.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, par25.17, p.1601) 
Resourcing  ‘…an understaffed and under resourced department, was “horrendous”.’ 
(Manager, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 1 , par2.341, p.277) 
Resourcing ‘This situation put the consultants in an unacceptable, invidious, and extremely 
frustrating position. They were denied the basic tools they need to do their job 
properly.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness 
Statement, par40, p.10) 
Agent  
Friction 
‘It was also clear to me that there were certain factions within the management 




‘..interpersonal relationships between the consultant surgeons were generally 




‘My view was that the [REMOVED] contained strong personalities, who were 
quite assertive individuals. If the [REMOVED] did not agree on a topic, they 
would make this quite clear and the meetings could become quite unpleasant.’ 




‘There were clear clashes of ethos, ego, and basic philosophy.’ (Doctor, Public 
inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15, Witness Statement, par6, p.2) 
Agent  
Friction 
‘…instead of being at the top table presenting the plans, he was sitting right at 
the back and haranguing the top table.’ (Doctor, Public inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 15, Witness Statement, par29, p.9) 
Agent  
Friction 
‘There seemed to be an endemic atmosphere of aggression in meetings with 
the [REMOVED]. I think that a lot of the tension focused around money. 
Whenever we talked about money the conversation became hostile.’ (Doctor, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par41, p.12) 
Agent  
Friction 
‘There was some issue regarding the aggressive behaviour of bed management 
and trainees often felt intimidated.’ (External Organisation, Public Inquiry 




‘A few of my senior clinical colleagues were represented on the Trust Board, 
but I do not think they had a significant voice.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 




‘…the medical staff felt that they didn’t have a voice. I think they felt they were 
not listened to so therefore there was no point speaking up.’ (Senior Executive, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 02 Witness Statement, p.67) 
Disregarding  ‘… these consultants were helpful to our cause in raising poor staffing levels as 




(Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness 




‘Many consultants considered that they were not listened to, and that the trust 
did not welcome constructive criticism or heed concerns that proposals could 
have a negative effect on the care of patients.’ (Healthcare Commission Report, 




‘I was upset, and my staff were upset but unfortunately I as their manager was 
unable to assist them as members of the Executive team were not listening to 
anything I was saying.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 
13 Witness Statement, par67, p.18) 
Suppressing 
 
‘I noticed that there appeared to be a general lack of engagement between the 
management and the senior clinicians due to the fact that the clinicians were 
feeling disenfranchised.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 17 
Witness Statement, par11, p.4) 
Suppressing ‘The [REMOVED] always took the view that he had to support the Trust Board.’ 
(Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par39, 
p.11) 
Suppressing ‘Those Consultants who were involved in management would have nothing to 
do with the dissent.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness 
Statement, par3, p.2) 
Suppressing ‘I was surprised that the [REMOVED] wasn’t more supportive to us but she 
towed the party line, in that she agreed with the senior Executives….’ (Nurse, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par46, p.12) 
Suppressing ‘I felt that the response we received to these concerns was intimidating. I 
believe I was viewed as being a troublemaker, rather than someone raising 
genuine concerns.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness 
Statement, par95, p.21) 
Suppressing 
 
‘..you just didn’t put your head above the parapet because you would be in 
trouble if you did.’ (Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, 
par76, p.168) 
Suppressing ‘I thought that this was a serious issue but found that if I protested I was 
considered to be awkward. Every day was a battle, and I just wanted to go on 
the ward rounds and not have arguments.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par78, p.18)  
Suppressing ‘..if you asked a Ward Sister for example “do you have enough staff?” she 
would always respond “yes” as the staff do not want to get into trouble.’ 
(Non-Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Non-Executive 06 Witness 
Statement, par8, p.3) 
Suppressing ‘The experience of the few nurses at Stafford who sought to stand up for 
proper standards suggests that doing this can result in discouragement and 
isolation.’ (Inquiry Chairman, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 3, par23.63, 
p.15.17) 
Suppressing ‘whenever I actually said something at the meetings the rest of the attendees 
would carry on as if I had never said anything.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par25, p.7) 
Suppressing ‘Some time ago I told [REMOVED] and a [REMOVED] that I did not think that 
the [REMOVED] was staffed to a satisfactory level. I was told that it was and 
made to feel that I was wrong for having even raised the issue.’ (Doctor 




‘There was a culture of bullying and harassment towards staff.’ (Doctor, Public 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par1.241, p120)  
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘There was a blame-led culture, the attitude being that problems had to be 
fixed or nursing jobs would be lost.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 15 Witness Statement, par9, p.3)  
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
 ‘….when the [REMOVED] was under pressure, this could sometimes create a 
feeling of blame.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 22 Witness 
Statement, par176, p.47) 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘We feel compromised, bullied and disempowered. The ward no longer 
belongs to us. And [on] occasion we almost feel derided.’ (Anonymous Letter, 
Independent Inquiry Report Volume 1, par78, p.205) MOVE 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘She didn’t like to be criticised at all. If something was happening that she 
didn’t approve of, didn’t like, then your life was made hell. Several of the 
nursing staff who came to talk to me about their problems they had got with 
her were saying: I can’t do any more because if I do she will just make my life 
hell.’ (Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par39, p.160) 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘I really had to fight for this issue, and felt vilified and intimidated for raising 




‘The former [REMOVED], [REMOVED], was frequently mentioned by 
witnesses as having a management style which was forceful, and was viewed 
by some as bullying. [REMOVED] told me: “People were very afraid of the 
[REMOVED] [REMOVED]”.’ (Senior Executive, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 1, par39, p.160) 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘..their response was extremely aggressive, basically telling me that they were 
in charge and accusing me, and anyone else who agreed with me, of not 
being team players.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness 
Statement, par13, p.5) 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘….a lot of other people came forward to complain about the poor practice 
and bullying culture in [REMOVED]. However, the climate of fear still existed 
and so many people did so anonymously. … The way that I was treated put 
many people off raising their heads above the parapet.’ (Nurse, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par21/22, p.7) 
Bullying or 
Intimidating 
‘….a band of doctors, who had been bullied by the [REMOVED] into rushing 
their diagnoses, wrote a joint statement. However, they were later persuaded 
to retract this when a superior told them that it would not look good on their 




‘[REMOVED] was one of the worst for frightening people, coming down and 
pressurising people, which is why it led to lying.’ (Nurse, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 1, par58, p.164) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘I had the impression that the [REMOVED] did not like me objecting to things 
and that they found me a nuisance.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 18 Witness Statement, par15, p.5) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘Even though I raised concerns revealed by incident reports at JNCC meetings 
and these issues were raised at surgical directorate meetings, there was a 
general perception by the Executive team that the nursing staff were 





‘Unfortunately when nurses raised issues about staffing levels not being safe 
[REMOVED] put pressure on them to not raise their complaints formally. I am 
aware that she would advise staff that if they considered staffing levels were 
unsafe that this was a breach of the NMC Code of Conduct for the nursing 
profession, and they should be very careful about what they put in a formal 
complaint as it might lead to them losing their job.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par59, p.16) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘The culture in the Trust was that staff should be careful about what they say. 
In particular [REMOVED], the Trust’s [REMOVED] at the time, would often say 
to staff that if they valued their job then they should stop moaning.’ Nurse, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par72, p.20) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘My relationship with the [REMOVED], [REMOVED], was not good. She 
thought I was a troublemaker and had accused me of breaching the 
provisions of the Code of Conduct by communicating with the press. She in 
fact summoned me to a disciplinary meeting with her.’ (External Individual, 




‘As a result of this, I believe that [REMOVED] did not consider me to be 
“playing the team game”.’ Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 
Witness Statement, par70, p.16) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘If you care about your patients and your work, you had a problem (you were 
deemed as a problem!).’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 
Witness Statement, par41, p.10) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘I was completely ignored and they carried out inspections without using the 
sheets prepared. To say that I felt ostracised would be putting it mildly.’ 
(Other Role, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Non-Executive 07 Witness 
Statement, par40, p.13) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘One of my colleagues who also complained regularly was suspended after 
something happened on a ward. He had been fairly vocal in criticising the 
Hospital and I suspect the real reason behind his suspension was because he 
was becoming a problem.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 
Witness Statement, par52, p.14) 
Sanctioning  
 
‘I seem to recall that I had tried to raise this issue but by this stage I was 
completely ostracised by the Hospital anyway.’ (Other Role, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Non-Executive 07 Witness Statement, par68, p.21) 
Labelling ‘I would always want to know the weight of my patients, or their fluid intake 
etc, but over time this was not considered part of my job, and I was seen as 
awkward for asking such questions.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 20 Witness Statement, par78, p.18) 
Labelling ‘I believe I was viewed as being a troublemaker, rather than someone raising 
genuine concerns.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness 
Statement, par95, p.22) 
Labelling ‘Indeed, it was very clear that I was regarded as a trouble maker.’ Doctor, 
Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 20 Witness Statement, par65, p.15) 
Labelling ‘The response was always that we had to do what we were told and were 
“naughty boys” for objecting.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 
18 Witness Statement, par2, p.4) 
Labelling ‘The consistent reaction from the PPIF when I verbally raised these concerns 
was praise for the Hospital and a view that it had done them an excellent 
service and that “there will always be some people who moan”.’ (Board 
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Member, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Non-Executive 07 Witness Statement, 
par35, p.12)  
Labelling ‘I would keep asking questions on the ward round, but no one could answer 
me. After a period of time I think people began to see me as being awkward 
and not being a “team player”.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 






12.16 Appendix 14a: Cognitive Detachment  
 
Cognitive Detachment Narratives  




‘..it was like the lights are on but there was no sign of life.’ (Relative, Public 




‘I had the sense that he was just going through the motions.’ (Relative, 




‘I know I am nobody and it doesn’t matter, but, surely, courtesy… nobody 
even came and said: are you all right with your Mum? Other than this young 
lad walking by, I never spoke to anybody. Nobody came and said: could you 
do with a drink or anything? There was nothing there.’ (Relative, 




‘I had problems with the staff there, they seemed more interested in 
checking their nails and mobile phones than the patients.’ (Relative, Public 




‘Some people, including in the portering department, are just waiting to see 





‘..there was a degree of hostility and suspicion of other organisations ……. 
and an unwillingness to engage with other organisations.’ (Senior Executive, 




‘Clinical staff appeared disengaged.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, 




‘Nurses came and went but none of them seemed to want to look patients in 





‘Some of them were simply not interested in doing anything other than 
what they perceived to be their day job.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, 




‘On one occasion, when his nutrition tube became blocked it went unnoticed 
until his wife informed a nurse.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 




‘Staff failed to monitor her fluid levels and it was left to her family to 
highlight when her fluid levels became alarming.’ (Patient, Independent 




‘When the patient was dying, no staff came to see or check on her condition 
and she was left to die on a noisy ward with visitors coming in and out. Not 
one member of staff noticed when the patient died. It was left to her 
daughter to check her mother’s pulse, inform staff of the death and ask for 
her monitor to be turned off.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, 




‘Later we found out from one of the other patients (this patient had been a 
nurse and had helped Mum – I never found out her name) that the staff had 
just ignored Mum for most of the earlier part of that day. She had been 
slumped down and unresponsive but they had just delivered and collected 
 317 
breakfast and delivered dinner without bothering with her. It was only when 
they collected dinner that they realised that something was wrong.’ 





‘….the nurses never spoke. They didn’t know how to behave socially, I don’t 
think. They spoke to one another though, having said that. They would carry 
on conversations over your head but they would never once acknowledge 
you. You were an absolute pain because – I used to get there at about 9.15, 
9.30 every morning, and I always asked permission to go on to [the ward] – 
is it convenient for me to go on to the ward to stay with [my husband]? I sat, 
held his hand and wiped his face and his hands and washed his mouth. Just 
there to comfort him and do whatever I could. But they didn’t hide the fact 
that they didn’t like me being there.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 1, par206, p.110) 
Apathetic 
 
‘I doubt being a whistleblower would have achieved anything.’ (Doctor, 
Public inquiry, Anonymised Employee 18 Witness statement, par52, p.14) 
Apathetic ‘…there was a poor culture for reporting incidents which seemed inherent 
across the organisation as a whole…….People felt that something actually 
had to happen i.e. someone would have to fall to classify as an incident.’ 
(Manager, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 09 Witness Statement, 
par23, p.8) 
Apathetic ‘I saw grown men crying because they had wet themselves. The attitude on 
the ward was that it just did not matter.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Relative 01 Witness Statement, par27, p.8) BETTER? 
Apathetic ‘I took the path of least resistance.’ ’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Volume 1, 
par2.138/ 2.141, p.176/77) 
Resigned  ‘There was a sense that nothing would ever be achieved by attempting to 
raise or report concerns.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 04 Witness Statement, par28, p.8) 
Resigned  ‘…there remained a group of clinical and health care staff whose general 
attitude appeared to be to be that there was no point reporting problems as 
nothing would be achieved.’ (Other employee, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 08 Witness Statement, par50, p17). 
Resigned ‘I would sometimes be discussing a patient with colleagues who would say 
things like “are they not going to die anyway?”.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par47, p.14) 
Disengaged  ‘I noticed that there appeared to be a general lack of engagement between 
the management and the senior clinicians due to the fact that the clinicians 
were feeling disenfranchised.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 
17 Witness Statement, par11, p.4) 
Disengaged  ‘Clinical staff appeared disengaged.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, 




12.17 Appendix 14b: Affective Detachment 
 
Affective Detachment Narratives  
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Indifferent or 
unconcerned  
 ‘…..when he went into hospital, we just got the impression: well, he is an 
old man, he is 80, it is not as if he has got a lifetime ahead of him, so why 




‘Her false teeth were lost and the patient was not able to eat, but nursing 




 ‘In the hospital the nurses showed no concern that the patient was 
unable to eat.’ (External organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.139) 
Indifferent or 
unconcerned  
‘I know I am nobody and it doesn’t matter, but, surely, courtesy… nobody 
even came and said: are you all right with your Mum? Other than this 
young lad walking by, I never spoke to anybody. Nobody came and said: 
could you do with a drink or anything? There was nothing there.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par312, p.138) 
Indifferent or 
unconcerned 
‘In the hospital the nurses showed no concern that the patient was 
unable to eat.’ (External organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.139) CONCERN MOVE 
Indifferent or 
unconcerned 
‘…..the doctor was not so caring upon informing her partner of her 
prognosis, simply saying she “was severely brain damaged and expected 
to die sooner rather than later”. When the patient contracted a chest 
infection her doctor initially refused to treat her, but reluctantly 
prescribed antibiotics at her partner’s request. She did recover and her 
neurological condition improved, allowing her to communicate through 
blinking. The doctor’s behaviour remained detached, only assessing the 
patient for a few seconds from the bottom of her bed.’ (Relative, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.191). 
Indifferent or 
unconcerned 
‘A healthcare assistant came into the room, didn’t acknowledge us at all. 
She just walked in with a tray...she just put down the meal and just 
walked out the room again…About 15 minutes later, the healthcare 
assistant came in and just picked up the meal – the film was still on it – 
and just went to take it away and I said: she hasn’t touched her food. She 
says: she never does; and just walked out.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 1, par119, p.86) 
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring  
 ‘Whenever I met with her, she was quite challenging in her approach and 
certainly did not give us any support or show any compassion.’ (Relative, 
Public inquiry, Anonymised Relative 07 Witness statement, par30, p. 7) 
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring 
‘The doctor demonstrated little concern or interest and, despite her 
mother’s weight having ballooned and her condition having changed 
significantly, he did not appear to recognise or respond to these 
changes.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.44) 
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring 
 ‘The patient was concerned that the receptionist “who couldn’t have 
cared less” was permitted to make clinical judgements about patients.’ 




‘There was no compassion from the nurses. I remember one day he 
called a nurse to go to the toilet. Her response was that she was looking 
after four other beds and was not able to help. Those four patients were 
asleep and I said that surely she could help. She begrudgingly said “go on 
then".’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness 
Statement, par,12 p.4) 
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring 
‘‘They had no business being nurses. They had no compassion, no love for 
the human race as a whole.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 
11 Witness Statement, par52, p.15) 
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring 
 ‘a lack of compassion was notable amongst the nursing staff on 
[REMOVED].’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.295)  
Uncompassionate  
or uncaring 
 ‘It was lack of anything; compassion; nobody ever came in to see Mum 
and just say: how are you [name]? Which my Mum used to love. ….. … She 
liked a bit of fuss actually, if I am honest. But no, no compassion 




‘And I looked at this doctor holding my mother’s head and I said: this is my 
mother. As cold and as calculated as anything, her retort as fast as anything 
was: I have got a mother too. There was no compassion in that woman 
whatsoever.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par54, 
p.65) 
Callous, Cruel or 
Insensitive 
‘She said that the staff would come and switch off the bell and tell her 
husband to hold on.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, 
p.301) 
Callous, Cruel or 
Insensitive 
‘Eventually the doctor came out and said he needed to speak to me and 
took me into a side room. He told me that mum’s prognosis was poor and 
that I should sign a “do not resuscitate” form. I told him that I was sorry 
but I couldn’t do that as I was not prepared to give up on her, even though 
it appeared the doctors had.’(Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 
19 Witness Statement One, par22, p.9) 
Callous, Cruel or 
Insensitive 
‘The doctor repeated himself and again said that mum would die a painful 
death. He said she would die “just like that” as he clicked his fingers. I 
simply couldn’t believe his attitude.’(Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Relative 19 Witness Statement One, par22/3, p.9) 
Callous, Cruel or 
Insensitive 
‘I referred to him as “Doctor Death” because of his callous attitude towards 
the older patients on the ward.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 




12.18 Appendix 15: Avoidant Practices  
 
User Need Avoidance Narratives 
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Avoiding 
Situations   
‘It was difficult to obtain information from staff, who her husband believed, 
would “disappear at visiting times”.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.34) 
Avoiding 
Situations 
‘On seeing the consultant in the corridor, they recalled that he hid in a linen 
cupboard to avoid, in their view, having to discuss her husband’s case 
further.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par296, p.134) 
Avoiding 
Situations  
‘His family tried to find out about his treatment but there was a lack of staff 
on the ward to ask and on one occasion a nurse refused to leave her office 





‘Nurses came and went but none of them seemed to want to look patients in 
the eye.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Patient 02 Witness Statement, 
4a, p.3)  
Avoiding 
Contact  
‘There were occasions where medical and nursing staff went to great lengths 
to avoid having to discuss issues with families.’ (Inquiry Chairman, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par296, p.134) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘There was no word for it. … particularly during the two weeks that Mum 
was dying, effectively, they were calling out for the toilet and they would 
just walk by them.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, p.45) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘Nursing staff rarely spoke to the patient, but when they did they rushed and 
did not wait for her to answer.’ (External organisation, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 2, p.273) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘…..although there were staff present on the ward, they seemed to be 
rushing around.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.290) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘There was very little that she could do and we feel the food was just put 
there and left and nobody sort of cajoled her.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par121, p.87) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘REMOVED] described them as being extremely busy and constantly running 
around.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3) 
Avoiding 
Contact 
‘…although there were staff present on the ward, they seemed to be rushing 
around and the ward itself felt neglected.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 1) 
Terminating 
Contact 
‘[REMOVED] recalls that on completing the examination the doctor left 
without saying anything to the patient or his wife.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 3) 
Terminating 
Contact  
‘The patient informed the doctor she had no family and lived alone; his 
response was to shrug his shoulders and walk away.’ (Patient, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.196) 
Terminating 
Contact 
‘When he questioned a nurse, he was looked at in a way to suggest, “Why 
are you bothering us?”.’ (Independent Case Notes Review, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.80)  
Terminating 
Contact 
‘…although I was told they were encouraging her to eat, I stood back and 
watched the encouragement and they sort of came along: […] do you want 
anything to eat? She would say no and they would put the lid on and walk 
away.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par126, p.88) 
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12.19 Appendix 16: Deterrent Practices 
 
User Need Deterrence Narratives 
 NARRATIVE SAMPLES  
Unwelcoming ‘[REMOVED] and [REMOVED] said that they felt intimidated by many of the 
staff and that they were unapproachable.’ (Relatives, Independent Inquiry 
Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
Unwelcoming ‘The following day [REMOVED] attended the [REMOVED] at Stafford 
Hospital. [REMOVED] said that she saw a nurse who was very off hand and 
told them they had to go via [REMOVED].’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry, 
Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
Unwelcoming ‘When the patient asked for assistance in breast-feeding a nurse curtly 
replied “don’t ask me about breast-feeding; I only have cats and dogs”.’ 
(Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.187) 
Unwelcoming ‘Her daughter found that the staff were very uncommunicative about her 
mother’s condition and extremely abrupt.’ (External Organisation, 
Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.131) 
Discourteous or 
Disrespectful 
‘when she attended the [REMOVED], the nurse was abrupt and bad 
mannered.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.270) 
Discourteous or 
Disrespectful 
‘A junior doctor was rude to the family who were then informed that their 
mother had died.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.177) 
Discourteous or 
Disrespectful 
 ‘She felt that the nurse mocked her concerns and she was made to feel she 




 ‘Some of the staff were caring but others had a brusque manner.’ 
(Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.188) 
Discourteous or 
Disrespectful 
 ‘She felt that the nurse mocked her concerns and she was made to feel she 




‘When she asked staff about his fall, a nurse curtly responded, “we have 
had a man in here with no legs and he did not fall off the bed”.’ (External 
Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.195) 
Discourteous or 
Disrespectful 
‘She observed patients being antagonised by the nurses who were rude and 
dismissive.’ (Patient, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.22) 
Threatening ‘On a daily basis, [REMOVED] asked to see a doctor. She eventually 
confronted a nurse about the fact that she had not seen a doctor and the 
nurse threatened to evict her from the ward.’ (Relative, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.301)’  
Threatening ‘…the receptionist told her ‘that if she refused to wait her turn she would 
be removed from the hospital’.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.54) 
Threatening ‘My mother told me not to say anything because she would still be there 
after we had gone home, and was scared the nurses would be mean to 
her.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.151) 
Threatening ‘Some of them were so stroppy that you felt that if you did complain, that 
they could be spiteful to my Mum or they could ignore her a bit more.‘ 
(Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par7, p.153) 
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12.20 Appendix 17:  The Four Hour Waiting Time Target 
 
Four Hour Waiting Time Target Narratives 
Elements Narrative Samples 
Targets 
Norms 
‘Nurses were expected to break the rules as a matter of course in order to 
meet targets, a prime example of this being the maximum four-hour wait time 
target for patients in [REMOVED].’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Employee 23 Witness Statement, par8, p.3.) 
Targets 
Norms 
‘Rather than “breach" the target, the length of waiting time would regularly 
be falsified on notes and computer records.’ (Nurse, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 23 Witness Statement, par8, p.3.) 
Targets 
Norms 
‘As a result of each patient in the [REMOVED] having to be seen within four 
hours of arrival at [REMOVED], patients were moved to any bed that could be 
found to avoid there being a breach of the 4 hour target. This was even if the 
bed that had been found was not the most suitable for the patient….. some 
patients were moved up to four times in a 24 hour period.’ (Nurse, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 13 Witness Statement, par84, p.23) 
Targets 
Norms 
‘To prevent patients "breaching”, the nurses would move them when they got 
near to the 4 hour limit and place them in another part of the Hospital. ….The 
overriding concern of the [REMOVED] was to get patients out as soon as 
possible.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, Anonymised Employee 15 Witness 
Statement, par14, p.4) 
Targets 
Norms 
‘….a patient had been moved by someone in [REMOVED] to a ward without 
the knowledge of the medical staff on duty and without adequate venous 
access. The patient subsequently died. I had concerns that the move was the 
result of a decision made by someone in [REMOVED] because the patient had 
not been dealt with within the target 4 hours.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 18 Witness Statement, par10, p.3) 
Targets 
Norms 
‘One example was given of when a doctor was asked to work in “minors”. At 
the time the doctor was administering thrombolysis to a patient who had 
suffered a heart attack. This doctor refused but was worried that a more junior 
doctor might have felt compelled to comply.’ (Employees, Healthcare 
Commission Report, p.49)  
Targets  
Pressure 
‘The pressure to comply with targets was huge.’ (Manager, Public Inquiry, 




‘Many staff that we interviewed volunteered their view that the approach of 
the trust meant that the care of patients had become secondary to achieving 
targets and minimising breaches. Doctors considered that the prioritisation of 
the patients with minor ailments led, on occasions, to a distortion of clinical 
priorities. Middle grade doctors told us that they were asked to work with 
patients in the “minor” side to push these patients through, although this was 
at the expense of more seriously ill or injured patients. They felt pressured to 
prioritise patients who were close to breaching the target rather than prioritise 




‘Both doctors and nurses told us that the pressure to meet the four-hour target 
forced doctors in training to make rapid decisions either to discharge or admit 
patients. In some instances, they were discharged inappropriately and, in 
others, they were admitted but without a proper plan of care.’ (Employees, 




‘The treatment by management of nurses in particular was beyond belief. The 
nurses were threatened on a near daily basis with losing their jobs if they did 
not get patients out within the 4 hours target.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 
Anonymised Employee 15 Witness Statement, par10, p.3)  
Targets 
Pressure 
‘I wouldn’t attend the meetings myself but would see nurses going into the 
meeting with the bed co-ordinator and management. It was quite normal for 
nurses to come out at the end of these meetings crying because they had been 
told that if they did not meet the 4 hour targets, they would lose their jobs. 
This sometimes happened several times in a week.’ (Doctor, Public Inquiry, 




‘Nurses told us they felt they were in “the firing line” with regards to breaches 
of the target and, as such, were always being blamed.’ (Nurses, Healthcare 




‘The pressure to meet this generated a fear, whether justified or not, that 
failure to meet targets could lead to the sack.’ (Inquiry Chairman, Independent 




12.21 Appendix 18: The Food Routine 
 
Food Routine Narratives 
NARRATIVE SAMPLES 
‘Sometimes even though I had filled in the menu sheet, I didn’t get a meal. Very often didn’t 
get a meal.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par112, p.84) 
‘…..her son often found her hungry……. Her son had to buy meals from the café and then 
feed her himself “to prevent her [his mother] starving”.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 2, p.258) 
‘He could not hold his trousers up because of the lost weight ….. When he was admitted he 
was looking well and of normal weight. He was not fed for nine days.’ (Relative, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness Statement, par12, p.4) 
‘He could not hold his trousers up because of the lost weight ….. When he was admitted he 
was looking well and of normal weight. He was not fed for nine days.’ (Relative, Public 
Inquiry, Anonymised Relative 12 Witness Statement, par12, p.4) 
‘He was given solid food, despite being unable to eat and requiring a nutrition tube.’ 
(External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.203) 
‘[REMOVED] had problems swallowing and was given inappropriate food to eat, for 
example bacon and an orange that he was unable to peel.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry 
Report, Volume 2, p.301) 
‘She was provided with a meal but it was left out of her reach and in an attempt to feed 
herself she caused injury to her arm.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, 
p.185) 
‘Often his daughter attended to find his meal left on the table, her father could not eat 
unaided and had simply been left.’ (External Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.97) 
‘…..staff did not move the patient to aid her eating. It was left to family members to assist 
her eating.’ (Patient, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p201) 
‘…..staff provided no help with drinking or eating and her family found that her meals were 
simply left by her bed.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.26) 
‘…she often witnessed food being put out for patients who were not asked if they needed 
help to eat. The food was then removed untouched.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2, p.320) 
‘The chap next to him, he got Alzheimer’s, he had got tomato soup with a lid on, he got rice 
pudding with a lid on, he had got sandwiches in cellophane. They can’t do that when they 
are ill. They just can’t.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par117, p.85) 
‘They were putting the glass—you know, a jug of water there. Mum couldn’t see the jug of 
water. She couldn’t see the glass to pour the fluids.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry Report, Volume 
2, par25.17, p.1601) 
‘She may have said: I don’t want that. She needed encouraging because, you know, when 
you are ill and your palate – it needs tempting and it seems – I don’t know, it seems to me 
as though she almost starved to death on that ward.’ (Relative, Independent Inquiry Report, 
Volume 1, par121, p.87) 
‘I went in one day..... and his dinner was not on the bottom of the bed and I said: where is 
your dinner? And he says: she took it away. I said: why? He said: I don’t know, I couldn’t 




12.22 Appendix 19: Complaints System Narratives  
 
Complaints System Narratives 
ELEMENTS NARRATIVE SAMPLES 
Denying  ‘His family then noticed that the oxygen bag had once again gone flat. They 
shouted for help and they were ushered out of the room. An argument then 
ensued as the nurses denied that the bag had gone flat.’ (Independent Case 
Notes Review, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.177) 
Denying ‘After very rudely insinuating that I was lying throughout the meeting, 
[REMOVED] refuted that he had had his insulin changed saying that: “No he 
hasn’t, no he hasn’t, who told you that?’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Relative 20 Witness Statement, par8, p.2) 
Denying ‘The patient was then discharged with medication in tablet form; on return 
home, her husband telephoned the hospital to remind them she could only 
take liquid medication. The nurse curtly responded that she had shown him 
the medication and that he had said it was suitable, but he knew this to be 
untrue, as he had collected the medication from the pharmacy.’ (External 
Organisation, Independent Inquiry Report, Volume 2, p.34) 
Denying  ‘The Consultant told us at the meeting that he had not done anything wrong 
and if there was anything inappropriate about [REMOVED] care, it was not his 
fault but that of the nursing staff.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 
Relative 09 Witness Statement, par23, p.6) 
Denying ‘An “overwhelming sense of denial... characterised by ‘it is not our fault, it is 
somebody else’s’”.’ (Board member and Senior Executive, Independent 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1, par214, p.347)  
Denying ‘I was surprised by the level of denial within some parts of the Trust. I 
remember the phrase “It could have happened to any hospital but we were 
unfortunate to be investigated” being used a lot.’ (Doctor & Senior Executive, 
Public Inquiry,  Anonymised Employee 17 Witness Statement, par9, p.4)  
Denying ‘…..there was a definite reluctance on the part of many members of staff to 
accept responsibility for their actions…..This culture of denial permeated to all 
levels of the Hospital.’ (Senior Executive, Public Inquiry, Anonymised 




‘….she did not want us to complain.…..because she said that the staff would 
take it out on her and she feared retaliation.’ (Relative, Public Inquiry, 




‘I overheard and I said I was going to complain. He got very, very agitated and 
distressed saying: don’t say anything, don’t say anything, they will take it out 




‘[REMOVED] was afraid to complain about anything because he thought that 
if he did he might make his stay there even more uncomfortable.’ (Relative, 




‘He had actually complained, hadn’t he, about the treatment he had received 
from one nurse whilst there? And as a result this nurse totally ignored him for 
the rest of his stay; like she would walk by the bottom of his bed, he would 
ask for help or a drink and she just totally ignored him.’ (Relative, 




‘He also recalls experiences of bullying by one member of staff… [REMOVED] 
did not complain….because he felt vulnerable and feared repercussions.’ 
(Patient, Independent Inquiry, Summary of Oral Evidence, Week 2) 
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